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Summary 
How no deal might happen 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union provides for an EU Member State to leave the 
EU with or without a withdrawal agreement or ‘deal’.  
 
The UK White Paper on future UK-EU relations sets out a model for future relations in 
which the UK follows a ‘common rulebook’ and maintains selected access rights to EU 
policies, bodies and programmes. The EU insists it will not allow the UK to ‘cherry-pick’ in 
order to be in a better position outside the EU than in it. These two positions, if they are 
resistant to compromise and flexibility, could result in no agreement being in place by 29 
March 2019 and no agreement to carry on negotiating.  
 
The EU and UK aim to reach agreement by October 2018 on the UK’s terms of withdrawal 
and on the framework for future relations, although this deadline is now likely to slip to 
November. A way of avoiding a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland is 
proving particularly difficult for the negotiators.  
 
If there is no withdrawal agreement, and no UK request or no EU agreement to extend 
the negotiations, or if either the UK Parliament or the European Parliament or the other 
27 EU Member States do not endorse a withdrawal agreement, there will be no deal and 
the EU Treaties will no longer apply to the UK from 29 March 2019.  
 
Another point at which ‘no deal’ could occur is at the end of the proposed 21-month 
transition (implementation) period if there is no detailed agreement on the future EU-UK 
relationship or if such an agreement is not in force. 
 
Both sides in the negotiations agree that ‘no deal’ is not what they want, but some Brexit 
supporters would prefer it to a ‘soft’ Brexit which does not end free movement, payments 
to the EU, membership of the Single Market and customs union, continued adherence to 
EU rules and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU.  
 
EU preparations for no deal 
In the absence of what the European Commission describes as “functional solutions” to 
the Irish border issue, the EU has stepped up preparations for a no-deal scenario in March 
2019. The Commission has been drafting amendments to EU legislation to take account 
of the UK’s exit in areas such as shipping, tariff obligations, energy, customs, aviation, 
health and safety, transport and citizenship. The Commission is identifying the legal acts 
that will have to be adapted in the context of Brexit by “preparedness acts” that will fill 
legislative gaps and “contingency measures to remedy negative impacts in the cliff-edge 
situation”, which would take effect in the event of a no-deal scenario. 
 
UK preparations for no deal 
Chequers statement 
The UK Government insists that preparations for no deal are part of its overall Brexit 
preparation strategy. The Prime Minister’s  Statement on the Cabinet away day at 
Chequers in July included a pledge to step up preparedness for all possible outcomes to 
the negotiations, including no deal, and the Prime Minister has assured Parliament that it 
is preparing for ‘no deal’ as well as other scenarios.  
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European Union (Withdrawal) Act 
Secondary legislation is being laid under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that 
will preserve EU law in domestic law or convert it into UK law on exit day. If the UK leaves 
the EU without a deal, most EU law will still apply in the UK but as domestic law (‘retained 
EU law’ or EU-based UK law). But there will be no reciprocity with EU Member States. 
Government guidance on preparing for no deal 
The Government believes a no-deal scenario could be managed in an “orderly” fashion 
(although this view is not necessarily shared by other stakeholders). On 23 August the 
Department for Exiting the EU published 25 ‘technical notices’, the first of three sets of 
‘guidance on how to prepare for Brexit if there's no deal’.  
 
Some contributions to this paper were written before the publication of the 
Government’s no-deal planning guidance. Sections in which the technical notices 
have not been taken into account will be updated in due course. 
 
No deal in practice 
What would no deal look like in practice? No deal on a withdrawal agreement would 
mean no transition (implementation) period and no framework for future relations – let 
alone a full future relations agreement. The impact is still unknown overall, but in some 
areas it is easier to estimate the practical consequences and costs than in others.  
 
The economy  
It is difficult to pinpoint the economic impact of ‘no deal’ with certainty.  Many 
economists expect the pound to fall in value in the event of ‘no deal’. This would mean 
the price of imports would rise, pushing up inflation. However, UK exports would become 
cheaper internationally, potentially mitigating some of the disruptive effects on trading 
with the EU. There might also by an opportunity for improved UK growth prospects from 
trade deals with other non-EU countries.   
 
But most economic modelling in this area shows that the potential benefits of leaving the 
EU with no deal over the longer term do not make up for the higher trade barriers with 
the EU, given its importance to the UK.   
  
Trade and customs  
With no withdrawal agreement or framework for future relations, trade between the two 
economies would be conducted under the terms of the World Trade Organisation. Tariffs 
on UK exports to the EU and vice versa are expected (assuming the UK would not change 
its Most Favoured Nation tariffs under WTO rules).  Tariffs would be low, averaging 
around 3%, but for some goods they would be higher. Potentially more disruptive would 
be non-tariff barriers, where additional paperwork, customs checks, technical 
requirements and regulatory standards could slow things down.   
 
At the moment of leaving the EU customs union without a deal, the border between the 
UK and the EU would become a customs border. This is likely to mean more customs 
controls and probably increased costs and delays for business. It is estimated, for 
example, that delays caused by customs checks of trucks from the EU could cause a 17-
mile queue at the port of Dover.  
  
A hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland  
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The EU and the UK Government share a commitment to avoiding a hard border between 
Ireland and Northern Ireland, but they have yet to reach an agreement on how best to 
avoid checks and infrastructure at the border. Technology, a degree of ongoing regulatory 
alignment and some sort of customs agreement have all been suggested as possible 
solutions, but it is unlikely that any of these would be in place in a no-deal scenario.   
 
One proposed solution to avoid disruption at the border is for the UK to waive checks and 
tariffs on EU goods as they enter NI. However, many trade experts believe this would 
trigger the Most Favoured Nation principle that applies to all WTO agreements, which 
would require the UK to waive its tariffs and checks on goods coming in from all other 
countries. The EU has said they would impose checks on goods entering Ireland 
regardless. This would cause delays and probably reduce trade, particularly in agri-foods, 
which make up a large proportion of cross-border trade.  
 
There are concerns, shared by the UK government, that if there is infrastructure on the 
border to enable checks on goods, it would become a target for dissident republicans. 
However, some commentators believe that border checks would not inspire a new wave 
of dissident activity, and that any infrastructure and checks can be done away from the 
border, which would lessen their impact. The majority of people in Northern Ireland are 
opposed to any form of North-South border checks.  
  
Free movement  
Free movement of people rights, whereby any EU national can work in, live in or provide 
services in any EU Member State providing they meet certain conditions, is a key citizens’ 
right that will be affected by a no-deal Brexit.   
 
The Government wants to implement a ‘settled status’ regime for EU nationals in the UK, 
whether there is a withdrawal agreement or not.  Those with settled status should have 
full access to UK social security benefits. The position of those who on exit day have not 
yet been resident in the UK for five years – those with ‘pre-settled status’ – is less clear.    
For UK nationals in the EU it is unclear whether they could continue to access UK social 
security benefits in the EU27 Member State they reside in at the time. The existing 
reciprocal healthcare arrangements for UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in the UK 
would probably end.  
  
Food supply  
Half of the UK’s food and drink supply comes from within the UK, with 30% from the EU 
and 20% from the rest of the world.  Potential disruption to food supplies immediately 
after a no-deal Brexit has been given regular media coverage. Exiting the EU Secretary 
Dominic Raab told the Exiting the EU Committee that the Government would “look at this 
issue in the round and make sure that there is adequate food supply…”.  The retail sector 
is concerned about the practicalities of stockpiling food.   
 
Agriculture and fisheries 
Trading arrangements - tariffs and standards – would be the main issue. With no 
alternative arrangement, the UK as a third country would be subject to tariffs, checks, 
registrations, certifications etc for commodities, food and feed, plant and animal-based 
products.  Agriculture could also impacted by the ‘no deal’ effects of other policies such as 
immigration (for seasonal, agri-food workers and vets).  
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Brexit means the UK will become an independent coastal state with responsibility for 
managing fisheries in the UK’s Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 miles.  It will not be bound 
by the Common Fisheries Policy and could deny access to EU Member States’ vessels (and 
vice versa). But under international law States are required to minimise economic 
dislocation to other States whose nationals have habitually fished in a zone.  
Energy   
The UK and EU energy sectors are integrated through trade, legislation and inter-
connection of energy supply, although EU Member States are ultimately responsible for 
their domestic energy supply to citizens. Aspects of the UK energy sector, such as Euratom 
and the Internal Energy Market (IEM), will probably be affected similarly by a deal or no-
deal Brexit. The UK will leave Euratom along with the EU; the Government is open to 
leaving the IEM and has begun preparations for leaving, but the future relations White 
Paper suggests a preference for future energy integration. ‘No deal’ could mean a less 
integrated relationship than the UK would like and not enough time to prepare for 
alternatives.   
  
Internal security   
The UK currently participates in around 40 EU measures that support and enhance internal 
security and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. According to police 
organisations, leaving the EU without a deal could result in a loss of operational capacity 
and strategic influence and an increased demand on resources because of the need to 
compensate for these losses. They say this could have a significant impact on public 
safety. Both the UK and the EU have emphasised the importance of maintaining 
cooperation in the field of security, law enforcement and criminal justice, but the Home 
Secretary has said security should not be linked to the other aspects of the negotiations, 
and that the UK’s proposals are unconditional.  
  
Transport  
For the International Air Transport Association (IATA), the aviation deadline is earlier than 
the Brexit deadline of 29 March 2019. But would planes actually stop flying between the 
UK and the EU27 in the event of no deal? The Government believes it might be possible 
to agree a ‘bare bones’ aviation agreement in the event of a no-deal scenario.  
  
Research and higher education  
The UK currently does disproportionately well in securing EU research funding and UK 
Universities are the top performers in receiving EU funds based on scientific excellence. 
The higher education sector and research bodies are concerned about the impact of a no-
deal Brexit on access to EU research funding and collaboration in EU projects, recruitment 
and retention of EU staff, access to the Erasmus+ programme and the possible 
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1. How could no deal happen? 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides for an EU 
Member State to leave the EU with or without a withdrawal agreement 
- or ‘deal’ - within a two-year timeframe starting from the formal 
notification of withdrawal by the leaving State.  
1.1 Timing is crucial 
The UK Government delivered a letter notifying the European Council 
of its intention to leave the EU on 29 March 2017, which started the 
clock ticking under the Article 50 process. The EU and the UK aim to 
complete negotiations on the UK’s ‘orderly’ withdrawal from the EU by 
October 2018. Theresa May told the Liaison Committee on 18 July that 
the aim was still to have “sufficient detail of this agreed by October”.  
Dominic Raab told the Lords EU Committee on 29 August he was 
“confident” a deal was “within our sights”, that he was still aiming for 
the October deadline but there was a measure of leeway. He 
confirmed that the 20% of matters not agreed included data transfers, 
police and judicial cooperation and collaboration and governance 
issues; the contours and principles were agreed but not the technical 
details. A solution to the Irish border was the main outstanding issue.  
If October proves impossible, as many believe it will be, November or 
even December is more likely.1 This would allow only just enough time 
for the UK and European Parliaments (the EP has said it needs three 
months) to consider and vote on a withdrawal agreement, and for the 
27 other EU Member States to ‘ratify’ it in the Council of the European 
Union in time for exit day on 29 March 2019 (11 pm UK time).  
The UK and EU have agreed to “continuous” negotiations on Brexit “to 
energise the final phase of the diplomacy and to reach a deal that is in 
both sides’ interests”.2  
1.2 Scenarios for a no-deal Brexit 
Leaving the EU without a withdrawal agreement – no deal - cannot be 
ruled out. Terms used to describe a ‘no deal’ outcome to the 
negotiations include ‘cliff edge’ Brexit,3 ‘hard Brexit’4 and the UK 
‘crashing out’ of the EU.   
 
No deal could be the result of various scenarios: 
- The EU and UK do not agree on the terms of a withdrawal 
agreement and/or a framework for future relations because of 
                                                                                               
1  Bloomberg, U.K. and EU Drop October Deadline for Brexit Deal, 29 August 2018 
2  Dominic Raab, speech 23 August 2018 
3  Described in the Lords EU Committee report Brexit: deal or no deal, 7 December 
2017, “as overnight between 29 and 30 March 2019 they would have to adjust to 
radically different terms of trade, while citizens would face profound uncertainty 
over issues such as residence, property and other rights, child custody decisions, or 
health insurance”. 
4  Although ‘hard Brexit’ now seems to mean something short of no deal. 
 
“I’m determined 
we’re going to find 
an agreement for an 
orderly withdrawal 
which is much better 
than the opposite and 
Dominic and I think 
it’s possible to reach 
that agreement in 
October”. 
 
Michel Barnier, 31 
August 2018 
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lack of time and/or because there are intractable disagreements 
and no willingness to compromise – the talks break down; 
 
- There is agreement in principle on the substance of a 
withdrawal agreement but more time is needed and the other 
EU Member States refuse to extend negotiations;5 
 
- There is agreement in principle on the substance of a 
withdrawal agreement but more time is needed; the EU27 are 
willing to extend negotiations under Article 50 TEU but the UK 
refuses to ask for an extension;6  
 
- The UK Parliament rejects the negotiated withdrawal agreement 
and framework for future relations; 
 
- The European Parliament rejects the negotiated withdrawal 
agreement and framework for future relations; 
 
- The Council does not endorse the withdrawal agreement by an 
enhanced qualified majority (20 of the 27 Member States, 
representing 65% of the EU population); 
 
- A withdrawal agreement is concluded and enters into force, but 
at the end of the implementation/transition period there is no 
agreement on future EU-UK relations; or there is an agreement, 
but it has not been implemented in the UK or ratified in the EU 
Member States and has not entered into force provisionally. 
1.3 Are any scenarios more or less likely than 
others?  
It would appear less likely that the EU27 Member State governments or 
the European Parliament (EP) would unexpectedly vote against an 
agreement drawn up by the EU and UK negotiators. The EP, which has 
a power of veto over the final deal, has been kept fully informed of 
developments in the negotiations and its resolutions on Brexit have 
been taken into account so as not to jeopardise final agreement. The 
EU27 governments have (so far) maintained solidarity in their position 
on the negotiations, so surprises, either in the adoption of a final text or 
in allowing an extension of negotiations, are unlikely. Earlier reports that 
Spain could veto a withdrawal agreement because of its sovereignty 
claim on Gibraltar are unfounded, since no EU Member State has a veto 
                                                                                               
5  The Select Committee on Exiting the EU recommended in its Third Report of March 
2018 that the Government should be prepared to seek a limited extension to the 
two-year article 50 period if substantive aspects of the future relationship are not 
agreed, or if Parliament votes against the withdrawal agreement, or if there is no 
deal, but acknowledged that the EU might not grant such a request. 
6  Trade Secretary Liam Fox has said asking for an extension would be a “complete 
betrayal” of Brexit voters (Politico, 27 July 2018). 
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power,7 although Spain could, of course, contribute to a blocking 
minority against an agreement. 
 
Some scenarios might provide a more or a less favourable environment 
for a no-deal departure than others (i.e. a ‘smooth’ no deal scenario or 
a ‘disruptive’ no deal), depending on the good will of the parties and 
the political mood. But the consensus among the negotiators and most 
stake-holders is that any no-deal outcome should be avoided.  
 
In early August the Governor of the Bank of England, Mark Carney, 
described the possibility of no deal as “uncomfortably high”.8 The 
Government insists no deal is “unlikely”9 but also believes it is taking a 
“responsible” approach10 and making “sensible preparations”, so that 
even a no-deal scenario could be managed in an “orderly” fashion.11 
1.4 A ‘bare bones’ deal? 
‘No deal’ would mean no withdrawal agreement, and this would mean 
no transition (implementation) period in which to adapt to being 
outside the EU and to finalise and ratify a future relationship agreement.   
 
Professor Derek Wyatt and Hugo Leith of Brick Court Chambers told the 
Foreign Affairs Committee in March 2017 that a ‘no deal’ outcome next 
March did not necessarily mean the end of negotiations, suggesting 
that a negotiation outside the Article 50 process could take place: 
The economic and political shock for the UK and the EU could 
lead to renewed attempts to deal with outstanding issues. The 
position might be recovered, and a belated withdrawal agreement 
which included transitional arrangements might be put in place.12 
It might be possible to agree a “bare-bones” deal covering key issues of 
mutual concern, as David Davis suggested to the Lords EU Committee in 
October 2017: “in the event that we did not get a full deal, the interest 
of both sides on, say, counterterrorism co-operation, justice co-
operation or data exchange co-operation is so great that I find it hard to 
believe that we will not get some fundamental deal there”.13  
 
Or there might be an assortment of last-minute unilateral (EU) and/or 
bilateral (UK-EU27) ‘parachute’ agreements to minimise disruption in 
certain areas. Philip Rycroft (DExEU)  suggested the European 
Commission would want to avoid “unnecessary disruption” to business 
                                                                                               
7  The EU27 ‘ratification’ of the withdrawal agreement and declaration on a 
framework for future relations will be by an enhanced qualified majority vote: 20 of 
the EU27 States representing 65% of the EU27 population. 
8  BBC Today Programme, 3 August 2018. 
9  See Theresa May, the Chequers statement, 6 July 2018, and Dominic Raab, UK 
government's preparations for a 'no deal' scenario, updated 24 August 2018 
10  Ibid 
11  See, e.g. BBC News, No 10 deny plan for Army role in 'no deal' Brexit, 30 July 2018. 
12  FCA, Ninth Report of Session 2016–17, Article 50 negotiations: Implications of ‘no 
deal’, 12 March 2017 
13  House of Lords European Union Committee, Oral evidence, 31 October 2017; 7th 
Report of Session 2017–19, Brexit: deal or no deal, 7 December 2017. 
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between the EU and UK and would therefore want to be pragmatic 
even in the event of ‘no deal’. This assumption was part of the 
Government’s thinking but could not be guaranteed. Dominic Raab told 
the Exiting the EU Committee on 5 September that there could be “no 
deal deals” in some areas if negotiations break down: the UK and EU 
could coordinate what they do without a legally binding agreement; 
sign Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs); or there could be more 
formal agreements.14 
 
But there could still be a period of undeterminable length in which the 
UK and the EU are without any agreements on withdrawal or post-
Brexit relations, and possibly little good will among the EU27 towards 
the UK. Anand Menon of ‘UK in a Changing Europe’ is pessimistic 
about all such no-deal mitigation scenarios: 
Given the political capital expended by both the UK and the EU on 
reaching an agreement within the Article 50 timeframe, a no deal 
outcome of any kind is likely to generate considerable acrimony. 
In particular, there will be a lot of finger-pointing about who is to 
blame.  
This matters on a number of levels. Most immediately, it will 
complicate any moves to secure emergency deals on critical 
systems such as air travel, medicines or fissile materials, especially 
if politicians on either side seek to use such issues to teach the 
other a lesson or force compromises elsewhere. Mitigations in the 
form of agreements with the EU would be particular to each 
sector, meaning the impact of no deal could vary considerably, 
with certain sectors more vulnerable than others. The difficulty is 
that we cannot know at this point just how many of these 
emergency agreements it would be possible to reach in a relatively 
short period of time and in a confrontational political atmosphere.  
Moreover, a breakdown of the negotiations would colour the 
pursuit of any wider efforts to restart the UK-EU relationship, in 
terms of the attitudes of both sides and the lack of a clear basis 
upon which to work. No withdrawal agreement means no 
political declaration on the future relationship, and it would be 
wise to assume that the general level of trust and willingness to 
compromise would be small.15 
Furthermore, Michel Barnier said on 3 September that the EU would not 
engage in any kind of “managed no-deal Brexit” if negotiations break 
down. He told the Exiting the EU Committee there would be no further 
discussions or negotiations, no “side-deals”, no “mini-deals”, the 
discussions would stop.16  
 
 
                                                                                               
14  Reported in The Guardian, 5 September 2018. 
15  UK in a changing Europe, Cost of no deal revisited, 3 September 2018 
16  House of Commons Exiting the EU Committee, Oral evidence, 4 September 2018. 
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2. Preparations for no deal 
2.1 UK Government preparations 
The return of “no deal is better than a bad deal” 
In her Lancaster House speech in January 2017 the Prime Minister, 
Theresa May, was “clear that no deal for Britain is better than a bad 
deal for Britain”. By the time of her Florence speech in September 
2017, she firmly supported a negotiated withdrawal and the option of 
walking away from a bad deal was not mentioned. Both sides in the 
negotiations agreed that an orderly, negotiated withdrawal was 
preferable and in both their interests.  
Agreement on phase one of the negotiations in December 2017 
appeared to enhance prospects for a mutually acceptable negotiated 
withdrawal. The mutual benefits of a good Brexit deal were reiterated 
in the Prime Minister’s Chequers Statement in July 2018 and the 
ensuing White Paper on future relations.17 
But the prospect of a no-deal outcome to the negotiations has returned 
to the Brexit rhetoric in the UK as well as the EU (see section 2.2 below), 
with each side accusing the other of being inflexible and contributing to 
the possibility of a breakdown in the negotiations and a no-deal 
scenario. Theresa May said in her statement on the Chequers 
agreement on 9 July that unless the EU changes its negotiating position, 
“there is serious risk it could lead to no deal” and this would be a 
“disorderly no deal”.  Michael Gove said on the Andrew Marr Show on 
8 July that the UK was being “generous”, and that if the EU did not 
reciprocate, “we may have to come to the conclusion that we need to 
walk away without a deal” and “be in a position to walk away in March 
2019”. The new Foreign Secretary, Jeremy Hunt, warned that without a 
“change in approach from the EU negotiators”, there is now a “very 
real risk of a Brexit no deal by accident”.18  
The Prime Minister stands by her Lancaster House evaluation; she told 
the Liaison Committee on 18 July: 
You ask me about the fact that I have said that no deal is better 
than a bad deal. I stand by that. I think that that is right. I think a 
bad deal—for example, some have suggested that we would be 
prepared to pay “any price” for something—would not be a good 
deal for the United Kingdom. 
Michel Barnier insists the EU is prepared to be flexible if the UK 
Government gives way on its ‘red lines’.19 
                                                                                               
17  For information on the Government’s Brexit future relations White Paper, see 
Commons Briefing Paper 8387, The Brexit White Paper on future relations and 
alternative proposals, 28 August 2018. 
18  BBC News, Brexit: Jeremy Hunt warns EU of 'no deal by accident', 23 July 2018 
19  Michel Barnier: speech 23 April 2018; speech, Institute of International and 
European Affairs, 6 July 2018 
 
“We are preparing 
for a range of 
outcomes, in terms of 
our future 
relationship with the 
European Union, 
including, at one 





evidence to Treasury 
Committee, 11 October 
2017 
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The new Brexit Secretary Dominic Raab is reported to be “insouciant” 
about a no-deal Brexit.20 He maintained there would be “opportunities” 
from a no-deal outcome (including immediate regulatory freedom, 
independent trade and immigration policies, and “a swifter end” to 
payments into the EU budget).21 Brexit supporter Jacob Rees-Mogg MP 
is reported to have said that no deal would be preferable to the 
Government’s Chequers proposal.22 But Business Secretary Greg Clark 
told the French newspaper Le Figaro on 24 July that no deal “would be 
bad for all countries and all citizens of the European Union. And that 
would impoverish everyone”.  
Opposition leader Jeremy Corbyn has said that “No deal is a bad deal 
and would represent a historic failure”.23 
The Liberal Democrat leader Vince Cable has said a no-deal Brexit could 
be “potentially catastrophic”.24 
Departmental preparations 
In its report published on 12 March 2017 on Article 50 negotiations: 
Implications of ‘no deal’25 the Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
recommended: 
The Government should require each Department to produce a 
‘no deal’ plan, outlining the likely consequences in their areas of 
remit and setting out proposals to mitigate potential risks. Such 
preparation would strengthen the Government’s negotiating hand 
by providing credibility to its position that it would be prepared to 
walk away from a bad deal. 
In June 2018 an Institute for Government (IfG) report summarised what 
preparations the Government would need to make for different Brexit 
scenarios: 
Some areas are not dependent on future negotiations, such as the 
settlement scheme to provide status to EU nationals after Brexit, 
meaning officials do not have to cope with multiple scenarios. But 
these are the exception. For others the uncertainty means that 
departments have to work on multiple plans in parallel. HM 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC), for example, needs to be ready 
for post-Brexit customs if there’s no deal in March 2019 or if talks 
end in failure come December 2020, as well as having plans for 
the Government’s two options for a possible future relationship. 
Each of the four plans, with their different constraints and 
requirements, would be, at best, extremely ambitious if they were 
the only scenario the department was working to.26 
Has the Government implemented “multiple plans in parallel” to 
prepare for all kinds of Brexit? Philip Rycroft, DExEU Permanent 
Secretary, told the Exiting the EU Committee on 4 September that Brexit 
                                                                                               
20  Politico, UK Cabinet chaos triggers countdown to Brexit explosion, 9 July 2018 
21  Dominic Raab, speech on Brexit no deal planning, 23 August 2018 
22  See The Times, Jacob Rees‑Mogg says Chequers Brexit deal may be worse than no 
deal, 7 July 2018. 
23  Politico, 5 July 2018 
24  The Guardian, 'Catastrophic' no-deal Brexit a real possibility, says Vince Cable, 11 
June 2018 
25  Ninth Report of Session 2016-17 
26  IfG, Preparing Brexit. How ready is Whitehall? Summary. Joe Owen, Lewis Lloyd and 
Jill Rutter, 10 June 2018 
”If you are asking me 
whether we are going 
to say to people here 
and now, “If there is 
no deal, you will not 
be able to do A, B 
and C,” I would say 
that preparedness for 
no deal is about 
making sure that 
Government, business 
and those who have 
to take actions to 
prepare for no deal 
are able to do that 
and to do so in a 
timely way, because 
some of these actions 
may take time to put 
in place”. 
 
Prime Minister to Liaison 
Committee, 18 July 
2018 
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planning, including for no deal, had been taking place across 
Departments for two years. 
New Cabinet sub-committee 
Damian Green, then First Secretary of State and Minister for the Cabinet 
Office, announced in October 2017 the creation of a new Brexit-
focused Cabinet sub-Committee - the European Union Exit and Trade 
sub-Committee (Domestic Preparedness, Legislation and Devolution) to 
oversee domestic policy preparations and implementation of Brexit; and 
changes to the existing EU Exit and Trade (Strategy and Negotiations) 
sub-Committee (an extension of the EU Exit and Trade (Negotiations) 
sub-Committee), to oversee the Brexit and future relations negotiations. 
The new sub-committees would “sit alongside” the EU Exit and Trade 
Committee and the EU Exit and Trade (International Trade) sub-
Committee which would continue as before. 
Brexit workstreams 
On 30 April 2018 in a letter to Meg Hillier, Chair of the Public Accounts 
Committee, DExEU published Departmental summaries of EU Exit 
workstreams, setting out the areas of work being undertaken (“policy 
areas requiring particular focus, the current number of workstreams for 
which each department is responsible, and some specific examples”). 
The National Audit Office, which has been reporting on the 
Government’s Brexit delivery, noted that DExEU’s “delivery plan 
guidance required departments to formulate delivery plans to support a 
preferred negotiation (or ‘day one deal’) or a ‘no deal’ outcome for each 
EU Exit work stream”.27 The DExEU summaries do not specifically 
indicate any no-deal planning, but this could be read into the 
“contingency outcomes” referred to in five instances. 
Philip Rycroft assured the Exiting the EU Committee on 4 September 
that political divisions in the Government were not holding up any Brexit 
planning workstreams. 
Machinery of government changes 
On 24 July the Prime Minister announced changes to the machinery of 
Government in the light of Brexit. DExEU would continue to lead on 
domestic preparations “in both a deal and a no deal scenario, all of the 
necessary legislation, and preparations for the negotiations to 
implement the detail of the Future Framework”. DExEU would recruit 
new staff and Cabinet Office officials coordinating work on 
preparedness would move to DExEU, “while maintaining close ties with 
both departments”. Theresa May herself would lead the negotiations 
with the EU, with Dominic Raab deputising and supported by the 
Cabinet Office, whose Europe Unit, headed by Oliver Robbins, would 
“have overall responsibility for the preparation and conduct of the 
negotiations”. Philip Rycroft told the Exiting the EU Committee on 4 
September that the changes would enable DExEU to focus on what 
comes after Brexit. 
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More staff 
Dominic Raab said in his speech on 23 August 2018 that the 
Government was increasing staffing inside and outside Whitehall: “The 
UK government now has 7,000 people working on Brexit preparations 
and funding is in place for another 9,000”, and “in relation to frontline 
services, such as the UK’s Border Force, we are currently recruiting an 
extra 300 staff in time for our exit, with plans in the pipeline to recruit 
1,000 more staff, so they are ready to deal with any increase in work”. 
Philip Rycroft said DExEU was under no budget restraints with regard to 
staffing and resources for Brexit planning.28 
‘No deal’ funding 
Chancellor Phillip Hammond set out the Government’s ‘no deal’ funding 
strategy in evidence to the Treasury Committee on 11 October 2017: 
[…] we do have planning for all scenarios, including a no-deal 
scenario. I am committed to funding Departments for the work 
they need to do in preparation, and we have already allocated 
£250 million to Departments from the reserve. But there will be 
points of decision where it will be necessary to make go or no go 
decisions around future programme spending to be ready on day 
one. I am clear that we have to be prepared for a no-deal 
scenario, unless and until we have clear evidence that that is not 
where we will end up. At the moment, although we of course 
hope for a different outcome, we cannot be certain of it. 
I am not proposing to allocate funds to Departments in advance 
of the need to spend. We should look in each area at the last 
point at which spending can begin to ensure that we are ready for 
day one of a no-deal scenario. That is when we should start 
spending hard-earned taxpayers’ money. Every pound we spend 
on contingent preparations for a hard customs border is a pound 
that we can’t spend on the NHS, social care, education or deficit 
reduction. I don’t believe that we should be in the business of 
making potentially nugatory expenditure until the very last 
moment, when we need to do so. We will be ready—we will 
spend the money in a timely fashion to ensure that we are 
ready—but we will not spend it earlier than necessary just to 
make some demonstration point. 
Asked whether the Treasury had “done a broader assessment of how 
much it would have to spend in the event of a no-deal scenario, and 
how much money could not be spent on other things”, and whether 
the Treasury was “expecting to have to reopen the 2015 Departmental 
spending reviews”, Mr Hammond replied: 
On the last point, no, because the money that is required to be 
expended against the contingency of a no-deal scenario will come 
from the reserve, so we will not reopen departmental spending 
settlements. In terms of quantum, it is a moveable feast. 
Obviously, one can plan for the most extreme scenario. Let me 
give you an example: it is theoretically conceivable that, in a no-
deal scenario, no air traffic will move between the UK and the 
European Union on 29 March 2019. However, I don’t think 
anybody seriously believes that that is where we will get to. 
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There are a range of outcomes, and at a point in time we will 
need to determine what a realistic worst-case scenario that we 
need to plan and invest for is. On that specific point, it is very 
clear that mutual self-interest means that, even if talks break 
down and there is no deal, there will be a strong compulsion on 
both sides to reach agreement on an air traffic services 
arrangement. 
In the November 2017 budget the Chancellor also made an additional 
£3 billion of funding available for departments and the devolved 
administrations over the next two years to implement plans for various 
exit scenarios, including ‘no deal’. 
The Prime Minister summarised funding for a deal or no deal Brexit in 
evidence to the Liaison Committee on 18 July: 
The Treasury set aside, over a period of two years, the sum of £3 
billion for preparatory work. That was allocated at the spring 
statement. My right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
explained the allocation for 2018-19 among Departments. As you 
might imagine, DEFRA is the Department that has £310 million 
allocated to it for that year. HM Revenue and Customs has £260 
million, the Home Office has £395 million. The other big amounts 
include £185 to BEIS, and then, obviously, other Departments 
have some allocated. Those sums are for work they are doing in 
preparing for the outcomes, and of course those outcomes are a 
deal or no deal. 
IT systems 
New IT systems will be needed to replace databases currently shared 
with the EU. Many of them are in the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), HM Revenues and Customs (HMRC), 
the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), 
Department for International Trade (DIT) and the Home Office. The UK 
will also be disconnected from various IT systems that cannot be 
replicated domestically because of their inherent cross-border basis, 
such as the VAT Information Exchange System (VIES), which is a core 
component of the system that allows goods to move within the EU 
without VAT liability being checked at the border. 
Developing new databases can be a lengthy process; an internal Cabinet 
Office report in 2015 leaked to Computer Weekly found that “the 
average time for a new digital service to reach public use – either fully 
live or in beta – was two years. The completed exemplars ranged from 
1.2 years to three years in duration”.29  
The technical publication The Register commented on DEFRA systems 
that could be at risk: 
Key programmes at risk of delays or failure were the department's 
import controls systems, the database replacement for the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals, the export health certificates, catch certificate for 
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marine caught fish for human consumption, and the system for 
veterinary medicines.30 
The Government is also relying on future technology-based solutions to 
the Irish border customs issues, despite these having been declared a 
partial solution at best by the EU. 
in  In a report published in April 201831 the Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC) was critical of the Brexit preparations of the Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and was particularly 
concerned about the lack of IT procurement that would be necessary in 
the event of no deal: 
We doubt the realism of the Department’s plans to deliver 
the numerous IT systems required to support the 
implementation of its Brexit work streams, especially when 
it has yet to start procurement. The Department needs to build 
upwards of 12 new digital systems, such as a database to register 
trademarks. We took evidence in January 2018, before 
publication of the Draft Withdrawal Agreement proposing a 
transition period to December 2020. Extraordinarily, the 
Department had not yet started to procure any of these systems 
despite them being required by March 2019 in the event of a no 
deal scenario. They may still be required if negotiations should 
break down. The Department said it hoped to begin procurement 
in the next few months and that it was confident that it could 
acquire and test the systems by March 2019. Given the 
government’s generally poor track record in delivering IT projects, 
we are extremely sceptical that the Department will be able to 
deliver these systems in time. 
In its response in May 2018 to the Foreign Affairs Committee report on 
the implications of no deal, the Government said it was continuing “to 
implement plans to ensure that we are ready for the UK’s exit from the 
EU, including procuring new systems, recruiting new staff and 
committing financial resources where necessary”.32  
But some reports suggest civil servants are preparing ‘manual 
workarounds’ in case the technology fails or is not available. The 
Commons Science and Technology Committee has launched an inquiry 
into the state of the digital government strategy, which will include 
consideration of the post-Brexit digital skills that will be needed. The 
Committee is asking for written evidence to be submitted by 28 
September 2018. 
The Government steps up ‘no deal’ preparations  
Boris Johnson, in his resignation letter on 9 July, said the Government 
had “postponed crucial decisions – including the preparations for no 
deal” in favour of pursuing what he called a “semi-Brexit”. Others in 
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32  Government response to Foreign Affairs Committee 9th Report, 23 May 2018. 
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the EU,33 the UK Government,34 opposition politicians35 and industry36  
thought more preparations were necessary. The Financial Times (20 July) 
reported on no-deal preparations by businesses across the UK, stating 
that “[a]s part of the preparations, some 250,000 small businesses will 
be asked to start making customs declarations, in a dry run for a hard 
Brexit”, and: 
UK businesses are already spending heavily on their preparations. 
Adam Marshall, head of the British Chambers of Commerce, said 
companies have been thinking through the potential impact of 
changes to cross-border trade, staffing, contracts, VAT and 
intellectual property. 
Overall, the Government believes it is being “responsible” about 
contingency planning.37 For example, in his response to the European 
Scrutiny Committee special report (14 June) David Davis said the 
Government was “on course to deliver a functioning border in a ‘no 
deal’ scenario that enables trade to flow, the Government to collect 
revenues, and the UK to have a secure border”. DExEU Minister Lord 
Callanan insisted (23 July) the Government was preparing for a range of 
Brexit scenarios, from ‘orderly’ withdrawal to ‘no deal’ - but not by 
recommending the stockpiling of processed food, as reported in The 
Sun on 10 July and several other newspapers.38 DExEU Minister Chris 
Heaton-Harris told the Commons on 19 July:  
Departments’ plans are well developed and designed to respond 
to all scenarios, including the unlikely possibility that we leave the 
EU without a deal. Some contingency plans have already become 
evident and more will become public over the coming weeks. 
He also said 300 extra staff had already been recruited to police UK 
borders and that there was “an ongoing programme to recruit a whole 
load more”.  
Dominic Raab said after his first meeting with the EU negotiator Michel 
Barnier on 26 July that the UK Government, like any “responsible 
government”, was planning for no-deal, but conceded it needed to step 
up its plans.39 He also told the Committee on Exiting the EU on 24 July 
(Q2472) that in the event of no deal, although there would be 
“uncertainty” in the short term, the UK would “still be able to thrive” in 
the long term. 
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Philip Rycroft outlined staff numbers to the Exiting the EU Committee 
on 4 September, saying DExEU had high quality staff with a “diverse 
range of experience and talent”. 
In a speech on 23 August on planning for the “unlikely event” of no 
agreement, Mr Raab said he would seek discussions with the EU over 
coordinated action to mitigate the effects of a no-deal Brexit (the Bank 
of England and European Central Bank are currently in talks). He also 
sought to dispel media rumours of stockpiling, shortages and a 
vindictive EU: 
So let me reassure you all that, contrary to one of the wilder 
claims, you will still be able to enjoy a BLT after Brexit. 
And there are no plans to deploy the army to maintain food 
supplies. 
I think it’s also worth saying that most of the worst case scenarios, 
being bandied around, imply that the EU would resist all and any 
mutual cooperation with the UK. 
In reality, I find it difficult to imagine that our EU partners would 
not want to cooperate with us even in that scenario in key areas 
like this, given the obvious mutual benefits involved. 
Dominic Raab updates the Commons on 
negotiations and no-deal preparations 
Agreement has been reached in most areas 
On 4 September Mr Raab updated the Commons on the progress of 
Brexit negotiations and the Government’s ‘no deal’ contingency 
planning. He said the negotiators had “injected some additional pace 
and intensity into the negotiations, as we reach the final phases” and 
that the “vast majority of the Withdrawal Agreement” had been 
agreed. Progress had been made on the outstanding issues to do with 
the protection of data and information, the treatment of ongoing police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, and ongoing EU judicial 
and administrative procedures after exit.  
Northern Ireland issues still unresolved 
Northern Ireland was still a major sticking point. They had continued to 
“work to complete a backstop” but he reiterated that the EU proposals 
were “unacceptable, because they would create a customs border 
down the Irish Sea”. He was determined to avoid a hard border but 
would “not permit a customs border down the Irish Sea, which would 
put at risk the constitutional and economic integrity of the United 
Kingdom, and of course, this can be done without compromising the 
EU’s core principles”. 
Bilateral meetings 
He outlined the 60 or more bilateral meetings ministers had had with 
their EU counterparts since the publication of the Brexit future relations 
White Paper on 12 July, saying the proposals had “received a wide 
range of positive and constructive feedback” and: 
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Equally, just as we have presented our proposals in a spirit of 
compromise, so too they have proved challenging in some 
respects for some in the EU. 
But, our friends across Europe are engaging seriously with our 
proposals on the substance. 
He acknowledged that there were “some risks to a ‘no deal’ scenario”, 
but said the Government’s approach demonstrated that it was “taking 
the action to avoid, to minimise and to mitigate these potential risks so 
we are equipped to manage any short-term disruption”. 
‘Opportunities’ provided by a no-deal Brexit 
He again pointed to “some countervailing opportunities” that a no deal 
scenario would bring”. 
• The UK could lower tariffs and negotiate and bring into effect 
new free trade deals straight away; 
• The “immediate recovery of full legislative and regulatory 
control, including over immigration policy”; 
• A “swifter end to our financial contributions to the EU”, while 
being “mindful” of legal obligations. 
‘Technical notices’ on no deal preparations 
On 18 July the Prime Minister told the Liaison Committee that over 
the course of the summer the Government would be releasing around 
70 ‘technical notices’ for British businesses and citizens - “those that 
need to know that information” - setting out how the public and 
business could prepare for the consequences of a no-deal Brexit.  
The Committee Chair, Dr Sarah Wollaston, tried to press the Prime 
Minister on the extent of advanced preparations for these possible 
consequences: 
Q93 Chair: […] there is still that growing possibility, I feel, that 
we could end up with a no-deal scenario; and my question was 
will you be laying out for the public what the consequences of 
that will be, very clearly?  
The Prime Minister: If we are in a no-deal scenario then we will 
lay out the consequences for the public.  
Q94 Chair: You won’t do it in advance.  
The Prime Minister: What we are doing at the moment is 
working for a deal, and that is the basis on which the Chequers 
agreement was made; it is the basis on which the White Paper is 
made; it is the basis on which we started discussions with the 
European Union. At this point what we are doing is saying we will 
ensure, as we step up our no-deal preparations, that those 
technical notices are issued over August and September so that 
those who need to have that information have that information. 
Chair: You have made that clear.  
The Prime Minister: With due respect, I think what you are 
asking me to do is to do something else, which is to set out the 
argument for no deal versus the argument for a deal, rather than 
actually saying we are working for a deal, and we will make sure 
that those who know—  
“While it is sensible 
for them to undertake 
contingency planning 
for ‘no deal’, both the 
UK and the EU must 
ensure that the very 
act of such 
preparations does not 
increase the likelihood 
of this outcome”. 
 
Lords EU Committee,  
Conclusions para 58, 
Brexit: deal or no deal,  
7 December 2017 
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Q95 Chair: Prime Minister, with respect, I am asking you to set 
out for the public—because I think sometimes the public don’t 
realise the scale of the issues that we would be facing, and the 
costs and the absolute necessity that we start planning now, 
because time is getting so short. So I guess my request to you is 
will you agree to publish this so that the public can see what the 
consequences are, and what you are planning for?  
The Prime Minister: What we will be doing is ensuring that 
more information is available on the preparations the Government 
are making for no deal, that we publish the technical notices so 
that those who need to make the preparations for no deal are 
able to do so.  
Q96 Chair: You have made that clear, Prime Minister. My concern 
was for the wider public understanding of what the consequences 
are.  
The first public information alerts - or ‘technical notices’ or ‘guidance’ - 
were published on 23 August on the DExEU website. Their publication 
was interpreted by many as a sign that the Government was taking no-
deal preparation more seriously, by others as an indication that the 
Government was panicking as the deadline for agreeing a deal 
approached.  DExEU Permanent Secretary Philip Rycroft told the Exiting 
the EU Committee on 4 September that the Notices were drawn up by 
individual departments but managed by DExEU, and that there had 
been close consultation with the devolved administrations. He would 
not answer a question from Hilary Benn about when the Government 
would notify businesses about the likelihood of a deal not being 
reached or whether DExEU had given any consideration to possible 
litigation or judicial review concerning the impact on commercial 
operations of not knowing about ‘no deal’ in advance of it actually 
happening. 
 
The Exiting the European Union Committee's Chair, Hilary Benn MP, 
commented on the Government's no deal plans on the Committee 
website:  
Ministers have left their No Deal planning very late in the day. A 
lot of questions remain to be answered, and they seem to be 
relying on continued co-operation with the EU without any 
indication of what would happen if this was not forthcoming. 
A failure to reach agreement with the EU will also mean no 
transition period so all this uncertainty could be just seven months 
away. 
These papers tell us three things. First, they confirm that No Deal - 
far from being better than a bad deal - would be very damaging 
economically. Businesses that export to the EU would face the 
cost and bureaucracy of customs, safety and security and rules of 
origin declarations for the first time, and in certain sectors, tariffs. 
Secondly, there is no guarantee for British citizens living in other 
EU countries about the future of their pension payments. 
Thirdly, there is still no clarity on how the return of a hard border 
in Northern Ireland will be avoided, and ministers have simply told 
businesses to seek advice from the Irish Government. This is an 
extraordinary abdication of responsibility. 
25 Commons Library Briefing, 10 September 2018 
Having wasted two years, these papers show exactly why No Deal 
is unacceptable and why ministers must now ensure that an 
agreement is reached with the EU which provides a transition 
period and protects jobs, trade and investment. 
Brexit legislation is passed 
The Government’s reply to the Foreign Affairs Committee report 
referred to the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill then going through 
Parliament and to other Brexit-related legislation “to prepare for all exit 
scenarios” (the Nuclear Safeguards Act, Sanctions and Anti-Money 
Laundering Act, Haulage Permits and Trailer Registration Act, and 
forthcoming bills on immigration, agriculture and fisheries).   
The European Union (Withdrawal) Act (EUWA) received Royal Assent on 
26 June 2018.40 Around 800 SIs will be made under the EUWA by 
February 201941 to provide for a temporary continuation of EU 
provisions in the UK, with or without a withdrawal agreement. The aim 
is to ensure there are no (or few) sudden shocks or holes in the statute 
book on Brexit day.  
Under the Act a European Statutory Instruments Committee (ESIC) has 
been set up in the Commons to check whether the choice of procedure 
to adopt certain Brexit-related SIs is appropriate. The degree of 
Parliament’s involvement depends on the type of procedure used. The 
proposed negative instruments can be found on the Government’s EU 
Withdrawal Act 2018 statutory instruments website, together with 
Explanatory Notes on each draft SI.  
The constitutional implications of a no-deal Brexit are discussed in detail 
in section 3 below. 
2.2 European Union preparations 
According to Michel Barnier42 there is currently agreement on 80% of 
the UK’s withdrawal terms. Matters still to be agreed include the 
protection of ‘geographical indications’, solutions for UK territories (e.g. 
the UK's Sovereign Bases in Cyprus, and Gibraltar, on which bilateral 
negotiations between the UK and Spain are ongoing) and the border 
between Ireland and Northern Ireland. According to one estimate, only 
5-6% more text has been agreed since March, when 80% agreement 
was first announced.43 In the absence of what the European 
Commission describes as “functional solutions” to the Irish border issue 
in particular, the EU has stepped up emergency “parachute” planning 
for the UK leaving the EU without a withdrawal agreement on 29 
March 2019. The Commission, the EU Presidency (Austria) and other 
Member States are also reported to be considering how the UK exit 
date could be extended if more time is needed to prepare.44  The 
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“The ‘no deal’ is not 
our objective. By the 
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a negotiator for no 
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the ‘no deal’, but it 
still cannot be 
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Michel Barnier, speech 
at European American 
Chamber of Commerce, 
10 July 2018 
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Financial Times commented that any EU unilateral contingency 
provisions “would be tailored to the bloc’s interests and would remain 
in force only until the EU develops the infrastructure to enforce rules for 
a no-deal Brexit that could last for years”.45 
European Parliament report 
In May 2018 the EP’s Constitutional Affairs Committee published an in-
depth analysis of the institutional, budgetary and policy implications of a 
‘hard Brexit’ for the EU (The Institutional Consequences of a ‘Hard 
Brexit’). The study looked at how UK withdrawal without a withdrawal 
agreement, transition arrangements or framework for future relations 
would affect each EU institution, the EU budget for the current 
Multiannual Financial Framework and EU policies in the areas of trade, 
security and justice. It provided “guidelines for the EU to be prepared in 
case such scenario were to materialise”. 
Commission Brexit Preparedness Group 
At the end of 2017 the Commission established a Brexit Preparedness 
Group composed of around a dozen civil servants and headed by Pascal 
Leardini. On the Brexit Preparedness website the Group posts 
‘preparedness notices’, legislative initiatives and other relevant activities. 
The notices “aim at preparing citizens and stakeholders for the 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom” and “set out the consequences in a 
range of policy areas”. The website provides further information on EU 
preparedness for no deal: 
In addition, EU decentralised agencies have published information 
in relation to the UK's withdrawal from the EU, for example 
the Community Plant Variety Office, the European Chemicals 
Agency, the European Medicines Agency and the European Union 
Intellectual Property Office. Furthermore, the three European 
Supervisory Authorities (the European Banking Authority, 
the European Securities and Markets Authority and the European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism have issued opinions and guidance. 
Amending EU legislation to take account of Brexit 
The Commission has been drafting amendments to EU legislation to 
take account of the UK’s exit in areas such as shipping, tariff 
obligations, energy, customs, aviation, health and safety, transport, 
citizenship46 and the “adaptation of hundreds of databases and IT 
systems managed by the Commission and national capitals”.47 
On 12 June Commission Secretary-General Martin Selmayr presented 
the European Parliament’s Brexit Steering Group with a list of 
amendments to laws and regulations in a document entitled Pending 
and planned legislative proposals for the purposes of Brexit 
preparedness (as of 12 June 2018).  
Commission official Pascal Leardini told the EP Committee on 
Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) on 2 July that the Commission would soon 
                                                                                               
45  Financial Times, Brussels steps up emergency planning for no-deal Brexit, 28 June 
2018 
46  MLex, 2 July 2018 
47  Politico, 3 July 2018 
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complete its identification of the legal acts needing adaptation. The acts 
would be “either preparedness acts, that serve to fill gaps in the 
legislation, or contingency measures to remedy negative impacts in the 
cliff-edge situation”. They would take effect in the event of a no-deal 
scenario, “including the unwanted but still possible cliff edge”. Politico 
reported: 
In addition to the practical contingency planning, Leardini said 
that officials are racing to develop legislation to close potential 
legal gaps. Some matters, he said, will require legislative acts and 
others like customs changes can be achieved via so-called 
delegated acts (legally binding acts that enable the Commission to 
supplement or amend nonessential parts of EU legislative acts). 
Leardini said his group has also issued 66 preparatory notes to 
private stakeholders, urging them to be ready for a potentially 
disorderly Brexit. These, he argued, are “purely informative and 
not speculative.” 
But Leardini said the Commission had “not done an overall impact 
assessment of what happens if there's no deal because there are too 
many variables”.48 
Brexit impact assessment 
On 19 July the Commission published a Communication (COM(2018) 
556 final), Preparing for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from 
the European Union on 30 March 2019, in which it set out the main 
consequences of a no-deal outcome: 
Box 1: Commission position on main consequences of UK withdrawal on 30 March 
2019 without a withdrawal agreement 
• The United Kingdom will be a third country and Union law ceases to apply to and in the United 
Kingdom.  
• Citizens: There would be no specific arrangement in place for EU citizens in the United 
Kingdom, or for UK citizens in the European Union. 
• Border issues: The European Union must apply its regulation and tariffs at borders with the 
United Kingdom as a third country, including checks and controls for customs, sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards and verification of compliance with EU norms. Transport between the 
United Kingdom and the European Union would be severely impacted. Customs, sanitary and 
phytosanitary controls at borders could cause significant delays, e.g. in road transport, and 
difficulties for ports. 
• Trade and regulatory issues: The United Kingdom becomes a third country whose relations with 
the European Union would be governed by general international public law, including rules of 
the World Trade Organisation. In particular, in heavily regulated sectors, this would represent a 
significant drawback compared to the current level of market integration.  
• Negotiations with the United Kingdom: Depending on the circumstances leading to the 
withdrawal without an agreement, the EU may wish to enter into negotiations with the United 
Kingdom as a third country.  
• EU funding: UK entities would cease to be eligible as Union entities for the purpose of receiving 
EU grants and participating in EU procurement procedures. Unless otherwise provided for by 
the legal provisions in force, candidates or tenderers from the United Kingdom could be 
rejected. 
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The Financial Times reported on 1 August that the EU was willing to 
“offer Britain a vague blueprint for future ties with the bloc — if it helps 
Theresa May avoid a “no deal” outcome and win parliamentary backing 
for a withdrawal treaty”. On 29 August Michel Barnier said the EU was 
“prepared to offer Britain a partnership such as there never has been 
with any other third country”.49 
The Commission has asked the other 27 EU Member States (the EU27) 
to accelerate their contingency planning for a no-deal Brexit, “warning 
of queues of freight at ports as well as implications for the 
pharmaceutical, financial services and aviation sectors”.50 
Several other EU States have been preparing contingency measures. A 
summary of EU27 planning is outlined in the Appendix to this paper. 
 
 
                                                                                               
49  Politico, Michel Barnier: EU will offer UK unprecedented deal, 29 August 2018 
50  The Times (Ireland), 14 July 2018 
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3. Constitutional implications in 
the UK 
3.1 Parliament’s role in the absence of a deal 
The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (EUWA) sets out a process 
by which Parliament could give Parliament a say in the event that no 
withdrawal agreement is reached and/or ratified. Section 13 of the Act 
makes provision for three no deal scenarios: 
• if Parliament is taken to have rejected either or both the 
withdrawal agreement and the framework for the future 
relationship between the UK and EU; 
• if the Prime Minister makes a statement before 21 January 2019 
that “no agreement in principle can be reached” on the 
“substance” of either or both of those two agreements; and 
• if “no agreement in principle” has in fact been reached on the 
“substance” of either or both of those two agreements. 
In each of these three scenarios, a Minister of the Crown will be 
required, within 21, 14 and 5 days respectively, to make a statement 
“setting out how Her Majesty’s Government proposes to proceed”. In 
each of these three scenarios, the House of Commons must then be 
given an opportunity to vote on “a motion in neutral terms, to the 
effect that the House of Commons has considered the matter of the 
statement”. 
The House of Lords in each case must also be given an opportunity 
within a specified period to consider a motion “taking note” of the 
statement.  
Can a motion in neutral terms be amended? 
A “motion in neutral terms” normally cannot be amended in the House 
of Commons. This is because Standing Order No. 24B provides that: 
Where, in the opinion of the Speaker or the Chair, a motion, That 
this House, or, as the case may be, the committee has considered 
the matter, is expressed in neutral terms, no amendments to it 
may be tabled. 
However, the House is free to agree to disapply Standing Orders. A 
statutory provision cannot be used to force a specific Standing Order to 
be used in relation to a particular motion.51 In a Written Statement on 
21 June (HCWS781), David Davis clarified: 
Under the Standing Orders of the House of Commons it will be 
for the Speaker to determine whether a motion when it is 
introduced by the Government under the European Union 
                                                                                               
51  When the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill was being scrutinised, the then Clerk of the 
House, Dr Malcolm Jack, stated that ‘decisions under or about the Standing Orders 
cannot be questioned by the courts or in any other place outside Parliament’: see 
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill, HC-436 
2010-12, 2011, ev19-21, paragraph 16. 
30 What if there's no Brexit deal? 
(Withdrawal) Bill is or is not in fact cast in neutral terms and hence 
whether the motion is or is not amendable. 
Legal effect of a motion 
As a matter of law, there are no consequences if one of the motions 
provided for in the three ‘no deal’ scenarios is rejected. The Act only 
requires that it shall be moved by a Minister of the Crown; not that it 
must be agreed to for the Government to proceed with its intended 
course of action. 
A matter of confidence in the Government? 
Depending upon the political circumstances, either Parliament’s motion 
(a) to approve a deal, or (b) in relation to a Government statement 
following a “rejected deal” or “no-deal”, could be taken to be a matter 
of “confidence” in the Government. 
Historically, a Government that lost a vote of confidence was expected 
to resign, or else its Prime Minister was expected to request that the 
monarch dissolved Parliament for a General Election.52 Since the 
passage of the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011, however, the calling of 
an early General Election has been a matter for Parliament to decide, 
rather than something the Head of Government can request of the 
Head of State. 
Box 2: Authorisation of early general elections and the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 
2011 
A General Election can now only be called “early” in two circumstances, either: 
 
• if a motion for an early general election is agreed either by at least two-thirds of the whole 
House (including vacant seats), i.e. 434 Members out of 650, or without division; or 
• if a motion of no confidence is passed and no alternative government is confirmed by the 
Commons within 14 days by means of a confidence motion. 
 
The first scenario happened on 19 April 2017, giving rise to the 2017 General Election. The second 
scenario has not happened since the FTPA was enacted. For further information on the Act, see 
Commons Briefing Paper 6111, Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, 27 April 2017. 
 
If the Government states that such a motion is a matter of confidence, 
this would not necessarily require a General Election under the FTPA. A 
confidence motion as required under the Act or a vote for an early 
General Election would still be required.53  
3.2 Operation of the EU (Withdrawal) Act if 
there is no transition period 
The UK has already legislated to seek to provide “legal continuity” as 
and when it leaves the EU. The European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 
                                                                                               
52  James Callaghan requested, and was granted, a dissolution of Parliament after an 
explicit motion of no-confidence in his Government was passed on 28 March 1979. 
53  For further information, see Commons Briefing Paper 2873, Confidence motions, 13 
May 2013, and Dr Catherine Haddon, Institute for Government, The (Not So) Fixed-
Term Parliaments Act, 14 April 2015. 
31 Commons Library Briefing, 10 September 2018 
both repeals the European Communities Act 1972 and makes 
arrangements to “transpose” much, but not all, of EU law as it exists on 
exit day, into domestic law. The Act also makes arrangements to allow 
the UK’s governments (plural) to make “corrections” to domestic law 
(including retained EU law) to make sure that it functions properly in 
light of the UK no longer being an EU Member State. 
The EUW Act operates ‘agnostically’ as to the existence or otherwise of 
a deal. It is intended to provide legal continuity regardless of the 
outcome of the Brexit negotiations. In practice, however, the manner in 
which legal continuity is achieved, and on what timescale, will depend 
on whether (and what type of) agreement is reached. The draft 
Withdrawal Agreement expects that a transition (or implementation) 
period will be part of any final agreement and that it will operate until 
the end of December 2020. During that transition period, EU law 
(including the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU - CJEU) will 
continue to have full force and effect. The UK will therefore be expected 
to provide domestic means of implementing EU law that comes into 
effect between exit day and the end of transition in its Withdrawal 
Agreement and Implementation Bill.54 
The key difference in a ‘no deal’ scenario is that no transition period 
would apply and the ‘default’ provisions of the EUW Act would come 
into effect from 29 March 2019. This would mean there would be no 
obligation, either in international law or domestic law, to ‘track’ or 
‘shadow’ changes in EU law from that point onwards. 
3.3 Devolution 
Temporary restrictions on devolved competence 
After exit day the devolved institutions will no longer be required to 
legislate compatibly with EU law. Section 12 of the EUW Act removes 
this requirement from the Scotland Act 1998, Government of Wales Act 
2006 and Northern Ireland Act 1998. 
However, in its place, the Act allows the UK Government to make 
regulations to restrict, on a temporary basis, the legislative and 
executive competence of the devolved institutions. These regulations 
can be used to prevent the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and 
Northern Ireland Assembly from “modifying” retained EU law in areas 
UK Ministers specify. The regulations cannot be made more than two 
years after exit day and no set of regulations can have effect for longer 
than five years. 
Changes to competence would take place on (or in the case of 
regulations, potentially some point after) exit day, regardless of whether 
there was a deal. However, if there is a deal, further arrangements for 
compliance with EU law by devolved institutions would be expected to 
be made in the Withdrawal Agreement and Implementation Bill. In the 
                                                                                               
54  The Government White Paper, Legislating for the Withdrawal Agreement between 
the United Kingdom and the European Union, Cm 9674, 24 July 2018, explains that 
a transition agreement will be delivered by legislating to delay the repeal of (parts of) 
the European Communities Act to a point after exit day. 
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absence of separate arrangements for a transition period, the UK 
Government would more likely seek to bring section 12 regulations into 
force from 29 March 2019 rather than from a later date. 
Common Frameworks 
The UK Government intends to bring forward legislation creating UK-
wide “common frameworks”. These aim to replace, in devolved policy 
areas, some of the restrictions imposed by EU law that harmonise 
practices and standards in all Member states. The Government wants to 
create these frameworks to safeguard the UK’s internal market, to 
protect common resource and security interests, and to prevent internal 
regulatory divergence from undermining its capacity to enter into 
comprehensive trade agreements with third countries. 
This legislation would be introduced regardless of whether the UK left 
with or without a deal, but there may be a greater urgency to legislate 
for these in the event of ‘no deal’. A transition period (and any further 
implementation periods in relevant policy areas) may reduce the urgency 
for these arrangements in the event of an agreement being reached. 
The Scottish ‘Continuity Bill’ 
The Scottish Parliament approved its own legislation for legal continuity 
in devolved areas in March 2018. The UK Withdrawal from the 
European Union (Legal Continuity) (Scotland) Bill was prevented from 
gaining Royal Assent in April 2018 because the UK Government 
exercised a power in the devolution statutes to refer the Bill to the 
Supreme Court.55 It contends that the Bill is outside the legislative 
competence of the Scottish Parliament and should therefore be declared 
void: “not law”. The UK Supreme Court considered the legal arguments 
over two days (24-25 July) before deciding in the autumn whether the 
“Continuity Bill” can go forward for Royal Assent. 
If the Continuity Bill is cleared for Royal Assent, this will have 
implications for legal continuity regardless of whether the UK reaches a 
deal with the EU. Among the arrangements in the Continuity Bill, for 
example, is a power for Scottish Ministers to “keep pace with” 
developments in EU law after exit day. No such power exists in the EUW 
Act for either UK or devolved ministers. 
In the event of a no-deal Brexit such a power could prove particularly 
important, since there will be no arrangements for a transition period. It 
will also have implications for the UK’s internal market, as some parts of 
the UK might continue to follow the substance of EU law more closely 
than others. 
                                                                                               
55  Under the devolution statutes the UK Government can refer a devolved Bill within 
four weeks of it completing its legislative stages but before it gains Royal Assent. 
Such a reference allows the UK Supreme Court to determine whether the Bill is 
within legislative competence. See s. 33 Scotland Act 1998. 
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4. Governance 
The European Union involves complex governance processes, as set out 
below. In the event of no deal, the UK will be outside those processes 
and there will be no agreement on how future relations between the 
UK and the EU should be managed, including how disputes should be 
resolved.  
 
In order to appreciate the implications of a governance vacuum, it is 
necessary to understand the current arrangements. 
4.1 Current governance of the UK-EU 
relationship 
In discussing the governance of both the current UK-EU relationship and 
the future UK-EU relationship, a clear definition of the concept is 
helpful. While there are various ways to explain ‘governance’, the 
Commission’s definition (echoing the terminology of the Council’s 
negotiating guidelines) is a useful starting point. It suggests that 
governance of any international agreement is made up of three 
components: 
1. Ongoing Management/Supervision 
2. Dispute Settlement 
3. Enforcement after dispute settlement 
As an EU Member State, all three components of governance of the UK-
EU relationship are currently dealt with via EU mechanisms. 
Ongoing management and supervision of the EU Treaties, or the 
Member States’ compliance with those, is carried out by several 
different institutions.  There are various ‘managerial’ bodies in the EU, 
with tasks ranging from ‘big picture’ management to ‘day to day’ 
management. 
The European Council, formally given legal personality in the Treaty of 
Lisbon, is the ‘big picture’ management institution. As the body where 
the EU Heads of State or Government meet at least bi-annually, it sets 
the direction of travel that it wishes other EU institutions to pursue.  It is 
also the body that can formally re-open Treaty negotiations.  
However, day to day ‘management’ as well as supervision of EU law 
falls to the European Commission.  Unlike most other international 
organisations, which do not have powers to produce ‘secondary’ 
legislation, the EU has legislative abilities that are either initiated or (in 
the case of tertiary legislation) exercised by the Commission.  It behaves 
like an executive in charge of ‘management’ in this sense, though its 
activities are steered by the political sign-posting of the European 
Council.  Its supervision powers are more specific and can give rise to 
the ‘infringement proceedings’ set out in Article 258 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). Under this procedure, the Commission 
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can take action against any Member State it believes is not complying 
with EU law.  
Supervision of compliance with the EU Treaties works in other 
directions, however. The Member States can also take action against 
each other (Article 259 TFEU) and the EU institutions (Article 263 TFEU), 
and the EU institutions can also accuse each other of ultra virus action 
(Article 263 TFEU).  Consequently, rather than speaking of a single 
‘supervisor’, the EU has a complex and multi-structural system of 
‘observing’ compliance with, and the functioning of, the Treaties, which 
is led (but not exclusively) by the Commission. 
Dispute settlement in the EU is first of all dealt with via the 
aforementioned infringement proceedings. If Member States are 
unresponsive to a Commission administrative action that sets out how 
they are perceived as not complying with their EU obligations, the 
Commission can take its case to the CJEU, which then issues a binding 
judgment either in favour of the Commission or the Member State.   
However, early in the EU’s existence, it was realised that the EU legal 
system would not only give rise to disputes between Member States and 
the EU, but also to disputes originating with individuals and companies 
who were either benefitting from or suffering from their Member States 
not having complied with EU law.  Such complaints may arise between 
such private parties and their Member State, or even between two 
private parties affected by an EU law provision. The Treaties have to 
date remained silent on the dispute settlement mechanism applicable to 
private parties with complaints rooted in the EU Treaties; it is clear only 
that they do not (generally) have standing before the CJEU.  Questions 
of dispute settlement stemming from EU law arose in national courts, 
however, and when the CJEU was asked how to address these disputes, 
the CJEU filled this gap in the Treaties with several seminal judgments. 
First, it established in Van Gend en Loos that private parties could rely 
directly on EU law provisions before domestic courts where those EU 
provisions met certain criteria: they were clear, precise and 
unconditional.56  Second, it established in Costa that EU law was 
‘supreme’ over domestic law, and so where a national court observed a 
clash between domestic and EU law, EU law took precedence.57  Third, 
it eventually found in Von Colson that even if EU law is not clear, 
precise and unconditional, domestic courts (under the duty of ‘sincere 
cooperation’ as set out in Article 4(3)TEU) must do everything within 
their power to interpret a national law in light of any EU law that a 
Member State was meant to comply with.58  
The consequence of this case law is that since 1963 there have been 
two concurrent streams of ‘dispute resolution’ within the EU.  The first 
is at the ‘macro’ level and involves disputes between the Member States 
and the EU institutions; these are resolved by the Commission through 
administrative processes or by the CJEU if those administrative processes 
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fail.  The second is at the ‘micro’ level and involves private parties 
making a claim in a domestic court, which applies CJEU-developed 
principles to ensure that they attain their EU law rights. 
Enforcement following dispute settlement is not EU-level 
enforcement; the judgment issued in private party complaints about a 
failure to comply with EU law is a purely domestic judgment and is 
enforced via whatever enforcement systems the Member States 
themselves have in place. The EU has no competence to dictate what 
those are.   
The EU (like most international organisations) has very limited 
enforcement powers with regard to failures to comply with CJEU 
judgments. If Member States are persistently unwilling to comply with a 
CJEU judgment, under Article 260(2) TFEU the Commission can bring a 
further case to the CJEU regarding non-compliance, and the CJEU can 
impose a ‘lump sum’ or ‘penalty payment’ if it finds for the 
Commission, with the CJEU itself determining the amount of penalty 
payment or lump sum (or both) that is appropriate in a given case (albeit 
with Commission input, as set out in its applications under Article 260 
TFEU).59   
Many other international agreements have enforcement mechanisms, 
such as an ability to suspend rights or ‘concessions’ gained under a 
treaty in response to persistent harmful non-compliance with treaty 
obligations.  The EU model does not, however; the consequences of this 
appear to be that there is no EU-level enforcement option that 
‘excludes’ a Member State from aspects of EU law as a punishment and 
source of pressure for its own non-compliance.  This has been 
considered in the past; the 1984 Spinelli Draft Treaty endorsed by the 
European Parliament included a sanctions mechanism that included the 
suspension of rights for ”serious and persistent violations of treaty 
provisions”.  The proposal was not adopted, however, and has not since 
been revisited. 
Does this mean that a Member State cannot be ‘excluded’ from EU law 
against its wishes, even if it continuously fails to comply with its Treaty 
obligations?  The argument has been made that public international law 
permits ‘sanctions’ options beyond those set out in Article 258-260 
TFEU – suspension of rights on a temporary basis seems impossible, but 
expelling a Member State is accounted for in a general principle of 
international law, namely pacta sunt servanda.  Article 60 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) permits the parties of a treaty 
to terminate the operation of a treaty vis-à-vis another signatory that 
has committed a ‘material breach’ of treaty provisions.  A ‘material 
breach‘ is defined as covering a “violation of a provision essential to the 
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty”, which appears 
to be a similar trigger condition as that applicable to the infringement 
proceedings under EU law. Logically, therefore, a first ‘material breach’ 
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of the EU treaties should be dealt with under the infringement 
proceedings.60   
However, various international lawyers have argued persuasively that 
where the EU’s own enforcement mechanisms do not work (and so 
there is consistent breaching of obligations), Article 60 of the VCLT 
covers a scenario that is not set out in the Treaties, and thus should 
apply.  The alternative would be the Member States effectively being 
forced to tolerate a regime that consistently fails to comply with 
promises it has made under the Treaty, and still being obliged to extend 
the benefits of EU law to that regime.61 As a final resort, Article 60 of 
the VCLT appears to permit ‘expulsion’ of sorts from the EU – but not 
before any complaining Member State or EU institution has taken 
recourse to Article 258-260 TFEU.  
4.2 Governance if there is no Withdrawal 
Agreement 
Withdrawal from the EU will mean the end of most of the architecture 
described above. The relevant institutions will no longer have the 
jurisdiction to provide oversight/management, dispute settlement or 
enforcement functions unless the UK and the EU specifically agree this 
in any agreement on a future relationship. 
Without such an agreement, and without an agreed Withdrawal 
Agreement that sets out its own governance structure (as discussed in 
this Commons Briefing Paper), there would be very little structure to the 
governance of the relationship between the EU and the UK. The 
framework of interactions would resemble that of the UK and any other 
third country: it would require diplomatic presence not only in the 
EU27, but presumably also in the EU seat, Brussels.  Management and 
supervision of the overall relationship would need to take place via a 
newly established UK ‘mission’ to the EU – but it is inconceivable that 
diplomacy alone would govern the relationship for any length of time, 
given the significant connections between the UK and the EU in 
economic, political and social terms. 
There are of course aspects of a no-deal EU-UK relationship that will be 
governed by existing international organisations and treaties that both 
the EU and the UK have ratified, each accompanied by their own 
dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms. EU-UK trade, for 
instance, would fall under the WTO’s remit, and disputes would be 
settled under the  WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding, which has 
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exclusive jurisdiction over WTO-related disputes (implications for trade 
are discussed in section 6 below). 
Where the UK and the EU have ongoing ‘relationships’ in areas not 
explicitly covered by existing treaties, in the absence of an overarching 
deal with the EU, the parties would have to establish treaty 
infrastructure underpinning those relationships themselves.  This would 
inevitably involve establishing governance mechanisms for the 
relationship as set out in these new treaties.  These may take the 
standard form set out by the Commission in its slides on governance, of 
having a joint committee, with representatives from both the EU and 
the UK, having supervision/management functions and ‘first stage’ 
dispute settlement functions, with second-level dispute settlement 
functions falling to binding arbitration.  
Alternatively, any new treaty may include a jurisdictional clause that 
allows any disputes about its interpretation or application to be referred 
to the International Court of Justice at request of either party.  A new 
court could also be established by any UK-EU treaties. 
Raphael Hogarth of the Institute for Government suggests that in the 
future relationship, the UK and the EU may pursue novel or hybrid 
dispute settlement and enforcement setups.  This is equally true for a 
no-deal relationship, but the key difference is that extensive governance 
structures tend to accompany international agreements that encourage 
or maintain close cooperation between countries.  Agreements 
surrounding a no-deal Brexit may not necessarily be characterised as 
such.  Any suggestion that a particular governance model or hybrid is 
likely to appear post-Brexit in the event of no deal would be purely 
speculative; the most that can be noted is that new governance 
structures would have to be adopted post-haste to take the place of the 
elaborate framework set up by the EU, and to manage the intertwined 
nature of UK-EU relations that on exit day will need careful unravelling, 
even without a deal. 
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5. Economic impact 
The economic impact of the UK leaving the EU with no deal – without a 
withdrawal agreement, transition period, framework for a future trade 
deal or ‘mini-deals’ in certain areas – is difficult to pinpoint with 
certainty, not least because there is no relevant precedent for a major 
developed economy leaving a large trading bloc, especially one as 
integrated as the EU’s Single Market and Customs Union. That being 
said, economic analysis and estimates can broadly highlight some of the 
likely consequences for the economy both in the near and long term. 
5.1 No deal WTO scenario over long term 
‘No deal’ would mean trade between the UK and EU economies being 
conducted under the terms of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). See 
section 6 for further information on trade.  
Generally speaking, economic modelling from the Government and 
others shows that as the cost of trading with the EU increases (via tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers), the greater the negative impact on the UK 
economy would be. In other words, a scenario where the UK trades 
with the EU on WTO rules is likely to result in UK GDP being lower in 
the long term than a scenario where the UK has a European Economic 
Area (EEA)-type arrangement or a free trade agreement (FTA).  
These ‘losses’ could be mitigated by improved UK growth prospects 
from trade deals with other non-EU countries and from other policy 
areas (such as growth-enhancing changes to UK regulation). However, 
the vast majority of economic modelling in this area shows that these 
potential benefits of leaving the EU with no deal over the longer term 
do not make up for the higher trade barriers with the EU (given its 
importance to the UK).  
For example, the Government’s “Cross Whitehall” analysis of leaving 
the EU, dated January 2018 and published by the Commons Committee 
on Exiting the EU, provides a summary of the analytical issues that go 
into modelling different Brexit trade scenarios. It also gives ‘illustrative 
profiles’ of the long-term impact on the level of GDP compared with 
staying in the EU. These show that the UK: 
• could see its GDP around 1.6% lower in 15 years under an EEA-
type scenario (staying in the Single Market) compared with what 
GDP would have been if the UK remained in the EU; 
• could see its GDP around 4.8% lower in 15 years under a Free 
Trade Agreement-type scenario compared with what GDP would 
have been if the UK remained in the EU; 
• could see its GDP around 7.7% lower in 15 years under a ‘WTO 
mitigated’-type scenario compared with what GDP would have 
been if the UK remained in the EU. Note this is a ‘smooth’ no deal 
scenario and not a ‘disruptive’ no deal. 
The analysis shows that the economy will grow in all scenarios, but that 
growth would be slower compared with staying in the EU. For instance, 
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instead of GDP going up by 25% in total over 15 years, the WTO 
scenario has it going up by around 17%.62 These figures are broadly in 
line with most of the analysis conducted by others, both before and 
after the referendum.63 
The analysis states that it is not a forecast as such (there are many other 
factors that will affect the economy over this time) but a comparison of 
these different scenarios on a consistent basis. The analysis came with 
heavy caveats; it was marked as “Draft Analytical Thinking with 
Preliminary Results”, for example.  
The analysis also suggested that borrowing could be around £80bn a 
year higher by 2023-34 if the UK leaves the EU with no deal. 
In summary, a ‘no deal’ scenario with no transition or future trade 
framework would, in the view of a large majority of economists, result 
in the UK economy growing more slowly than with other scenarios over 
the longer term. 
5.2 Short-term impact of ‘no deal’ 
This section highlights some of the possible short-term economic 
consequences of ‘no deal’ and looks at the factors that may play a role 
in determining their impact.  
As with the long-term impact discussed above, the immediate economic 
effects of a no-deal scenario are uncertain. For example, we do not 
know the precise circumstances that would lead to no deal and how 
financial markets, businesses and consumers, among others, would 
react.  
If the UK leaves the EU without any transitional arrangements or a 
framework for a trade agreement, the way trade between the UK and 
EU is conducted would change overnight. The UK would become a third 
country with regards to the EU. This is expected to result in the 
imposition of tariffs on UK exports to the EU and on EU imports to the 
UK.64 On average these tariffs are low, averaging around 3%, but for 
some goods, such as many agricultural products, they are higher.65 
A potentially more disruptive consequence would be non-tariff barriers. 
These include additional administrative paperwork, customs procedures 
and checks (for example, relating to rules of origin), technical 
requirements and regulatory standards.  For example, EU food safety 
law requires all meat products imported from countries outside the 
Single Market to be traceable to businesses that have been individually 
                                                                                               
62  EU Exit Analysis: Cross Whitehall Briefing (January 2018) published by DEXEU 
Commons Select Committee, 8 March 2018, page 16 
63  For example see: Angus Armstrong, Comparing Brexit forecasts: who should we 
believe on the economy?, UK in a Changing Europe, 16 June 2016; National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research, Deal, or no deal? The £2,000 question, 
16 February 2018 
64  On the assumption that the UK would not change its Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
tariffs under WTO rules.  
65  WTO, European Union tariff profile [accessed 17 August 2018] 
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approved by the European Commission’s Food and Veterinary Office.66 
In a no deal scenario, those approvals would not exist and therefore - 
barring any unilateral, and most likely temporary, derogation from that 
legislation for British products - UK lamb, beef and poultry exports could 
be refused entry into the EU from March 2019 onwards. The UK would 
also no longer be party to the trade agreements the EU has negotiated 
(see section 6.3 for information trade with non-EU countries). 
The impact of a no-deal scenario stretches beyond those who import 
and export goods and services. From the transportation to the financial 
services sectors, ‘no deal’ would have implications for businesses. 
Many economists expect the pound to fall in value in the event of ‘no 
deal’. If this did happen, the price of imports would rise, pushing up 
inflation (as it did following the EU referendum). In turn, the purchasing 
power of businesses and consumers would be squeezed. UK exports 
would become cheaper internationally, potentially moderating some of 
the effects of disruption to trading with the EU (depending on the 
extent to which they rely on imported goods and services, as these 
would have become more expensive). In this scenario there is a risk that 
confidence could fall with investments being deferred or scrapped and 
consumers cutting back on their spending.67 
An analysis of the possible effects of ‘no deal’ on the UK economy by 
the National Institute of Economic and Social Research think tank 
determined that it would be the disruption to trade with the EU that 
would have the biggest negative impact on GDP in the months 
following a no-deal Brexit.68 It states that GDP would “stall due to an 
immediate reduction in services exports to the EU”, mitigated 
somewhat by the expected fall in the value of the pound (supporting 
exports).69  
5.3 Factors that could influence the 
magnitude of the economic impact 
Certain issues may influence the degree to which the economy is 
affected by a no-deal departure from the EU. A few are summarised in 
this section. 
Preparedness 
The more prepared the Government, businesses and the wider public 
are for no deal, the greater opportunity there will be for steps to be 
taken to limit the economic disruption caused. The Government, like the 
EU, has now published around a third of its guidance to businesses and 
consumers on how to deal with a no-deal Brexit. Further guidance is 
                                                                                               
66  See article 12 of the Official Controls Regulation (Regulation 854/2004). The 
legislation allows this requirement to be waived for a specific country, but this 
requires a proposal by the European Commission and the approval of a qualified 
majority of Member States. That derogation can also be limited in time. 
67  UK in a Changing Europe, Cost of No Deal, July 2017 
68  NIESR, National Institute Economic Review No 245, August 2018, Box A, F12-13 and 
NIESR blog post, “How much would a ‘White Paper Brexit’ cost the UK economy?”, 
1 August 2018 
69  NIESR, National Institute Economic Review No 245, August 2018, Box A, F12-13  
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expected in September. However, due to the inherent bilateral nature of 
trade, the extent to which the UK can unilaterally prepare for disruption 
is limited. It has, for example, no control over how customs officials in 
France, the Netherlands and Belgium would treat UK imports in a no 
deal scenario, and any delays in clearing freight moving from the UK to 
the EU27 could also disrupt traffic in the other direction. The 
Government’s no-deal planning also relies to some extent on the EU 
acting unilaterally to avoid disruption, but this cannot be guaranteed. 
Timing 
How long before Brexit day will it be known that ‘no deal’ will happen? 
At least in principle, the longer there is to prepare for it, the more that 
can be done to plan for and adjust to such an outcome.  
In December 2017, the House of Lords EU Committee stated that the 
later a no-deal outcome is known, the more damaging it is likely to be: 
It is clear that the later ‘no deal’ emerges as the outcome of the 
negotiations, the more damaging its effects will be. To hold out 
the prospect of a ‘no deal’ outcome until the eleventh hour, and 
even to suggest that the clock could be ‘stopped’ to allow 
negotiations to continue beyond that point, even when there is 
no obvious legal mechanism to do so, would be irresponsible. For 
one thing, it guarantees that uncertainty for business and citizens 
will continue, and even increase, as ‘Brexit day’ approaches.70 
How long ‘no deal’ lasts 
Even in the event of a no-deal outcome, some form of deal may be 
agreed subsequently, even if it takes the form of a basic functional ‘bare 
bones’ deal. The Government also appears to envisage that, even in 
absence of a Withdrawal Agreement, there may be some ‘mini deals’ 
ahead of the UK’s exit from the EU – for example in relation to air traffic 
rights – to avoid some of the most immediate disruption to transport 
and trade links. 
There may be economic pressures for talks following no deal. Possible 
economic effects in the UK have been described above, but EU Member 
States could also be impacted to a lesser degree, particularly in Ireland.71 
5.4 The financial settlement 
The March 2018 draft Withdrawal Agreement sets out how the UK and 
EU will settle their outstanding financial obligations to each other. The 
matter was discussed during the first phase of exit negotiations under 
the heading of the ‘financial settlement’. The political agreement 
reached on the settlement was set out in the Joint Report between the 
UK and the European Commission.  
The financial settlement was labelled in the media as the UK’s ‘exit bill’ 
or ‘divorce bill’. The Library briefing Brexit: the exit bill provides further 
                                                                                               
70  House of Lords EU Committee, Brexit: deal or no deal, 7 December 2017, para 59 
71  IMF, Euro Area Policies: Selected Issues, 19 July 2018, section on Long-term impact 
of Brexit on the EU 
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details about what has been agreed and how the negotiations 
proceeded.  
What has been agreed? 
The agreement reached on the financial settlement stipulated that the 
UK would participate in the EU Budget as if it were still a Member State 
from March 2019 until 31 December 2020, and contribute afterwards 
towards existing financial commitments that remain outstanding on that 
day, including the pension liabilities of EU staff. The settlement also 
provides that: 
• the UK will, over time, wind up its financial involvement with the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) but remain liable for a share of 
any contingent liabilities that crystallise in relation to EIB lending 
that took place before 30 March 2019;72 
• the UK will continue to participate in the European Development 
Fund, which is legally separate from the EU budget, until the 
current round ends at the end of 2020.73 
All the text in the draft Withdrawal Agreement covering the financial 
settlement is coloured green, meaning it has been agreed by the 
negotiators and will only be subject to technical legal revisions.    
What is the legal status of the financial settlement? 
The terms of the settlement will only become legally binding once the 
Withdrawal Agreement is ratified by the EU (by votes in the EP and 
Council) and the UK. If there is no Withdrawal Agreement the political 
agreement reached on the financial settlement will not be legally 
binding.  
Financial obligations if there is no deal? 
There is a great deal of uncertainty about what happens to the 
outstanding UK-EU financial obligations if there is no deal. It is likely 
that politics and the appetite for an ongoing EU-UK relationship will 
largely dictate the extent to which the two parties honour the 
agreement reached over the financial settlement. The relevance of the 
financial settlement to the future UK-EU relationship is considered in 
section 5.4.  
In evidence to the House of Lords EU Committee on 29 August, 
Dominic Raab said there was still a “question around quite what the 
shape of those financial obligations were” if the UK left with no deal, 
and that the UK “always pays its dues”. He did not say the UK would 
pay nothing, which some thought he implied when he said no deal 
would bring a “swifter end” to UK payments to the EU Budget.  
The financial settlement brings together a range of financial items, not 
just those that arise from the UK’s participation in the EU Budget. For 
instance, it sets out how the UK’s financial relationship with the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) will be wound up and how the UK will 
                                                                                               
72  National Audit Office, Exiting the EU: The financial settlement, 20 April 2018, para 
2.28 
73  See also the European Scrutiny Committee’s Report of 25 April 2017. 
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continue to contribute to the European Development Fund. Below we 
consider what ‘no deal’ may mean for some of the significant individual 
items included in the financial settlement, in the absence of any further 
political agreement. 
UK participation in the EU Budget 
Items in the financial settlement that arise from spending and liabilities 
agreed while the UK was an EU Member State include spending under 
the current long-term EU budget (the 2014 – 2020 ‘Multiannual 
Financial Framework’ or MFF), outstanding liabilities (largely those 
related to pensions) and contingent (as yet uncertain) liabilities, for 
example relating to the EU’s macro-financial loans to Ukraine, Georgia 
and Moldova.  
The Lords EU Financial Affairs Sub-Committee considered the UK’s legal 
liability for these items if there is no Withdrawal Agreement in early 
2017.74 Legal expert witnesses to the Committee had different opinions 
on the legal status of these items. However, the Committee concluded 
that without a Withdrawal Agreement Article 50 TEU allows the UK to 
leave without being liable for outstanding financial obligations.75 The 
Committee also concluded that individual EU Member States may seek 
to bring a case against the UK for outstanding payments under public 
international law, but also that “international law is slow to litigate and 
hard to enforce. In addition, it is questionable whether an international 
court or tribunal could have jurisdiction”.76   
As discussed in section 5.4, the Lords Committee said that the political 
and economic consequences of the UK leaving without making any 
payment “are likely to be profound”.77  
The Institute for Government has also suggested that if the UK refused 
to make any payments to the EU, then redress may be sought through 
the International Court of Justice or the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration.78  
Under the financial settlement, the UK would continue to be eligible to 
receive EU funding from the 2019 and 2020 EU Budgets as if it were 
still a Member State, while for CAP payments it would continue as 
normal, for discretionary grants such as like research funding the UK 
might receive less, even if it remains legally eligible for them. See section 
5.5 on EU funding discusses the impact of no deal on this funding.  
European Investment Bank 
Currently, only EU Member States can be shareholders of the EIB, so it is 
likely that the UK will cease to be a member of the EIB, whether there is 
a ratified Withdrawal Agreement or not. The financial settlement 
explains how the UK’s financial involvement in the EIB will be wound 
up. It sets out: 
                                                                                               
74  House of Lords EU Committee, Brexit and the EU Budget, 4 March 2017 
75  ibid., paras 135-137 and para 159 
76  ibid 
77  ibid 
78  Institute for Government, The EU divorce bill, March 2018 
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• the schedule for the gradual return of €3.5 billion of paid in 
capital to the UK; 
• that UK will provide a guarantee to the EIB equal to its callable 
capital (up to €39 billion) – an amount the UK currently agrees to 
provide if required. The guarantee will decrease as EIB loans 
associated with it mature. 
What happens in a no deal scenario with respect to these financial 
aspects is not clear. It seems likely that a subsequent negotiation would 
have to take place between the UK and EIB to settle the matter. 
UK participation in the European Development 
Fund 
The European Development Fund (EDF) is the EU’s main instrument for 
providing overseas development assistance to countries in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific. For historical reasons, it is separate from the 
general EU Budget in a legal and accounting sense. The EDF is broken 
down over time into ‘EDF funds’. The UK’s spending through the EDF 
contributes towards its commitment to spend 0.7% of gross national 
income (GNI) on overseas aid.79 
The financial settlement says that the UK will remain part of, and will 
contribute to, the EDF until the close of the 11th EDF fund in December 
2020. The UK also has a share of the EDF’s Investment Facility. This 
funding will be returned to the UK as the investments end.  
Each EDF fund is set out in a separate treaty – called an ‘internal 
agreement’ – outside the EU Treaties.80 Strictly speaking, the EDF 
internal agreements are not subject to the Article 50 process. Article 50 
relates to the EU Treaties and provides that if there is no deal the EU 
Treaties will cease to apply in the UK after 29 March 2019, but the EDF 
internal agreements will not cease. This suggests that in the event of no 
deal the UK’s legal obligation to make contributions to the EDF would 
persist in a legal sense, unless the UK can end its involvement in the 
internal agreements some other way. 
Whatever happens, it is unlikely that the UK’s total spending on 
overseas aid will decrease.  In 2016, £1.5 billion of the £13.4 billion 
spent by the UK on overseas aid went through the EDF.81 Continuing to 
meet the statutory target for UK overseas aid of 0.7% of GNI would 
necessitate channelling any spending no longer going through the EDF 
to other overseas aid programmes.  It is reasonable to anticipate that 
about 10% of the UK’s 2019-20 aid budget will potentially be available 
for reallocation in the event if a no-deal Brexit.  The UK is also 
considering seeking participation in the EU’s development programme 
from 2021 onwards – the Neighbourhood, Development and 
                                                                                               
79  For information on the UK’s aid target, see Commons Briefing Paper 3714, The 
0.7% aid target: June 2016 update, 20 June 2016. 
80  European Scrutiny Committee, Documents considered by the Committee on 25 April 
2017, 28 European Development Funds 
81  House of Lords Library Briefing, Brexit: Overseas Development Assistance, 6 February 
2018 
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International Cooperation Instrument – although the legal parameters 
for any such involvement are yet to be decided by the EU institutions.82 
Politics and future EU-UK relations 
In reality, politics and the appetite for an ongoing EU-UK relationship 
are likely to dictate the extent to which financial commitments are 
settled if there is no deal.  
For example, the UK Government has said that after Brexit it would like 
to participate as a third country in some EU programmes and agencies, 
such as the next research and innovation programme (Horizon 2020 is 
the current programme) and the European Defence Fund.83 If there is 
no deal it seems unlikely that the EU would allow the UK to participate 
in any of its programmes unless a financial settlement outside the 
Withdrawal Agreement can be agreed.  
There are other areas where the UK would favour an ongoing 
relationship with EU, and in the event of ‘no deal’, coming to an 
agreement on the financial settlement could help to facilitate such co-
operation.  
The Lords Committee concluded that “the political and economic 
consequences of the UK leaving the EU without responding to claims 
under the EU budget are likely to be profound”.84 
EU and UK views on the financial obligations 
The EU and UK set out their views on the financial obligations before 
and during negotiations on the financial settlement. Their opinions may 
offer some insight into how each might respond if there is no 
Withdrawal Agreement. 
Broadly speaking, for the European Commission the financial settlement 
is about ‘settling the accounts’85 –   without a deal it would presumably 
consider them ‘unsettled’. The Commission published a position paper 
on the principles of the financial settlement in June 2017 which went 
into some detail about individual obligations. 
Since the referendum, the UK Government has stated its intention to 
negotiate a settlement “in accordance with the law and in the spirit of 
the United Kingdom's continuing partnership with the EU”.86 The UK 
has also recognised that financial obligations between the two parties 
exist. In July 2017 former Secretary of State David Davis acknowledged 
that “the UK has obligations to the EU, and the EU obligations to the 
UK, that will survive the UK’s withdrawal”.87 The Prime Minster has said 
                                                                                               
82  The European Scrutiny Committee is expected to publish a report on the UK’s post-
Brexit involvement in EU development programmes on 18 September 2018. 
83  The Government White Paper on the future relationship between the UK and the EU 
proposes continued UK participation in several EU programmes and agencies.  
84  House of Lords EU Committee, Brexit and the EU Budget, HL Paper 125, 4 March 
2017, paras 135-137 
85  Speech by Michel Barnier at the press conference on the adoption of the 
Commission's recommendation on draft negotiating directives, 3 May 2017 
86  Prime Minister’s letter to Donald Tusk triggering Article 50, 29 March 2017, page 4 
87  HC Deb13 July 2017, c15-16WS 
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that “the UK will honour commitments we have made during the 
period of our membership”.88  
During the first phase of withdrawal negotiations it was clear that the 
UK and EU had different views on the legal position of the financial 
obligations being discussed. David Davis said the Government was 
convinced there was no legal obligation for most of it and viewed it as a 
political rather than legal obligation.89  
5.5 EU funding  
If the UK does stay involved in some EU agencies and programmes such 
as Horizon 2020 and the European Defence Fund, it would be as a 
‘third country’ and with a financial contribution.  
Negotiations over the future EU-UK relationship will determine which 
EU programmes and agencies the UK will participate in and how it will 
contribute financially to them. Some programmes are already open to 
‘third countries’ – often these are programmes with cross-border or 
collaborative elements. The European Scrutiny Committee believed that 
negotiating participation in any of the regulator agencies integral to the 
architecture of the Single Market would be “especially difficult”.90 
Discussions about UK participation in EU programmes are complicated 
by the fact that these follow the EU‘s seven-year budgetary cycle, of 
which the current one ends in December 2020. The legal – and financial 
– frameworks for the programmes from 2021 onwards are still subject 
to negotiations in the European Parliament and the Council as part of 
the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework. The outcome of those 
EU-level negotiations will determine the broad parameters for UK 
participation as a third country in specific programmes. 
There is a precedent for determining the size of third countries’ 
contributions to EU programmes. Broadly speaking, third countries 
make contributions based on the EU’s budget for the programme and 
the size of the third country’s economy relative to the size of the EU 
economy plus the third country’s economy. Negotiations will determine 
whether the UK contributes according to this precedent.  
Clearly there is uncertainty about which EU programmes the UK may 
participate in and how the associated costs will be calculated. For 
illustrative purposes the European Scrutiny Committee has estimated 
the potential gross cost of the UK participating in six EU programmes, 
all of which the Government has shown some interest in participating 
in.91  
The estimates – which the Committee say are “necessarily extremely 
provisional” – are based on the precedent for third countries’ 
                                                                                               
88  PM's Florence speech: a new era of cooperation and partnership between the UK 
and the EU, 22 September 2017 
89  Lords EU Committee, Uncorrected oral evidence Scrutiny of Brexit negotiations, 31 
October 2017 
90  European Scrutiny Committee, 34th Report of Session 2017-19, 10 July 2018, para 
6.8  
91  ibid 
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contributions described above. The estimates should be treated with 
some caution, as: 
• the UK has not yet negotiated third party participation in any of 
the programmes; 
• they are based on provisional EU budgets for the programmes 
during 2021 – 2027 that may change; 
• the UK and EU may agree alternative approaches for calculating 
the UK’s contribution; 
• the estimates are gross contributions – they don’t account for 
funding the UK might receive from the programmes, which 
would mean a lower net contribution. For instance, the UK has a 
strong record in securing funding from the EU’s research and 
innovation programmes,92 which if continued would mean a 
significantly smaller net contribution.93 
 
 
In the event of ‘no deal’, it is highly unlikely that the EU27 would 
countenance UK participation in a new round of EU programmes as a 
third country until – at the very least - the financial settlement in the 
draft Withdrawal Agreement had been revived. Otherwise, they would 
effectively be allowing the UK to forego paying what they see as its 
financial commitments accrued during its EU membership. 
 
Close integration with the Single Market 
If the UK-EU future relationship results in the UK remaining closely 
integrated with all or part of the Single Market, then it is likely that the 
EU will request a financial contribution to the economic development of 
the poorer EU Member States. Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein, which 
are in the EEA but not the EU, contribute funding to the EEA grants as a 
condition of their participation in the Single Market. Norway also 
                                                                                               
92  Commons Library briefing, Brexit: UK Funding from the EU, has data on the funding 
received by the UK from EU programmes.  
93  The European Commission has proposed a mechanism for the 2021-2027 
framework programme for research that would ensure that the UK does not 
become a net recipient from the programme if it participates as a third country. 
€ billion £ billion
Framework Programme for Research 2.20 1.90
Euratom Research Programme 0.06 0.05
ITER nuclear fusion project 0.14 0.12
EU Space Programme (Galileo & Copernicus) 0.04 0.03
European Defence Fund 0.30 0.27
Neighbourhood & International Cooperation Instrument 2.00 1.79
Total per annum 4.8 4.2
notes:
source:
European Scrutiny Committee. Thirty-fourth report of session 2017-19, Table 2
Potential gross UK contribution to select EU programmes, 2021-2027
The European Scrutiny Committee estimates that the UK's 
participation in six EU programmes could result in average gross 
payments of £4 billion per year
The UK's gross payment is calculated by using the provisional EU budget for each programme and applying a 
16% proportionality factor. The 16% relates to the UK's share of EU+UK GDP
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provides Norway grants.  Switzerland, which is not part of the EEA, but 
has bilateral trade agreements with the EU, makes enlargement 
contributions.  
The size of any contribution would depend on the extent to which the 
UK remains integrated with the Single Market. The Government has 
stated on many occasions that the UK will leave the Single Market. If 
the UK were required to make payments, it is unlikely these would go to 
the EU Budget – the EEA, Norwegian and Swiss programmes are 
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6. Trade  
The UK is currently party to over a thousand international agreements 
with third countries as a member of the EU. These cover trade, 
regulatory and policy co-operation in a range of areas, including 
fisheries, agriculture, the nuclear sector and transport (including aviation 
agreements). How many of these are pertinent to the UK is as yet 
unclear. There is little information available on what the Government’s 
intentions are regarding continuity of arrangements covered by the EU’s 
non-trade agreements.95 But leaving the EU without a deal would mean 
a radical change in UK trade relationships with the EU and the rest of 
the world.96  
6.1 Trading under WTO rules 
Trading under the WTO rules is the ‘default’ option, which would mean 
that the tariffs on trade in goods apply to trade between the UK and 
the EU and between the UK and the rest of the world (see also section 
5.1). The UK is a founding member of the WTO in its own right, but as 
an EU Member State it is in practice represented in the WTO by the 
European Commission. After Brexit the UK will no longer be 
represented by the EU and will be a fully independent member of the 
WTO. The UK will need to update the terms of its WTO membership, for 
example by establishing its own ‘schedule’ of trade commitments at the 
WTO.97 This process is not expected to be straightforward.98  
The WTO represents a rules-based trading system, based on multiple 
multilateral agreements between member states. Its General Agreement 
on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) governs how tariffs are applied and 
addresses non-tariff barriers (quotas, rules of origin and various other 
legal or bureaucratic trade restrictions). The leading principle of non-
discrimination requires WTO members not to treat any member less 
advantageously than any other: grant one country preferential 
treatment, and the same must be done for everyone else. There are 
exceptions for free trade areas and customs unions like the EU, and a 
preference schemes for developing countries, and anti-dumping duties 
(which are not determined on a non-discrimination basis). Beyond these, 
the tariff and treatment that applies to the ‘most-favoured nation’ 
(MFN) must similarly apply to all. 
Based on the application of the MFN principle of the WTO, the EU 
would have to apply the same tariff to imports from the UK as to 
imports from any other nation that has no preferential trade agreement 
                                                                                               
95  For further information on the EU’s trade and other agreements, see House of 
Commons Briefing Paper 8370, UK adoption of EU external agreements after Brexit, 
24 July 2018, and House of Commons International Trade Select Committee report 
on Continuing Application of EU trade agreements after Brexit, 28 February 2018. 
96  The UK in a Changing Europe, Cost of No Deal, 20 July 2017  
97  The UK will almost certainly have to establish its independent position at the WTO, 
irrespective of whether there is a deal with the EU.  
98  P. Ungphakorn, Nothing simple about UK regaining WTO status post-Brexit, 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 27 June 2016 
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with the EU in the event of no-deal. The same would apply to all other 
countries importing goods from the UK.  
Without a deal the UK’s trade in services with the rest of the world 
would be governed by the WTO General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS). The MFN principle applies to trade in services in the 
same way it applies to trade in goods, albeit with more options for 
exceptional treatment. Members can tailor their commitments under 
GATS in line with their national policy and schedule their commitments 
to a handful of sectors or choose to provide market access in a wide 
range of services.  
Leaving the EU, and the customs union in particular, would allow the 
UK to pursue its own trade interests and forge its own free trade 
agreements. What will trade look like after a no-deal Brexit? The next 
section looks at the UK in relation to the EU and the rest of the world. 
6.2 UK trade with the EU 
As an EU Member State, the UK is part of the EU Single Market and 
customs union. The EU, taken as a whole, is the UK’s largest trading 
partner. In 2017 UK exports to the EU were £274 billion (44% of all UK 
exports). UK imports from the EU were £341 billion (53% of all UK 
imports).99 Services accounted for 40% of the UK’s exports to the EU in 
2017.   
All the trade within the Single Market takes place (up to the point of 
exit) without paying tariffs or facing quota restrictions on goods. The 
Single Market also aims to eliminate non-tariff barriers such as differing 
technical specifications and labelling requirements. 
With regard to trade in services, the Single Market provides the freedom 
to establish and run a company in any Member State. This is facilitated 
by mutual recognition of professional qualifications, freedom of 
movement of people and capital, and harmonisation of various rules.  
No deal in March 2019 means the UK will be a third country to the EU 
for the purposes of trade. From exit day onwards, its relations with the 
EU will be governed by general public international law and both the UK 
and EU will start trading on the basis of WTO rules. The EU will be 
obliged to treat the UK no more favourably than any other country that 
has no preferential trade agreement with the block.100 
Under the WTO the UK would no longer be obliged to follow the rules 
applied by the EU. There would be no requirement to implement EU 
legislation, although UK businesses would still have to comply with EU 
rules in order to export to the Single Market. 
Trade in goods 
The EU customs union sets the Common Customs Tariff (CCT): all 
members of the customs union apply the same set of tariffs on goods 
imported from outside the EU. UK exports to the EU would face the 
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EU’s CCT and imports into the UK from the EU would face whatever 
tariffs the UK decided to impose. All exports from outside the EU are 
subject to the Rules of Origin (RoO) checks, even if they come from a 
country which has a trade agreement with the EU. This ensures that a 
correct tariff is applied and goods do not enter the EU customs union 
illegally via a low tariff country. As exporters from a third country, UK 
companies will immediately face such checks on all goods exported to 
the EU. 
Trading under WTO rules means that the maximum tariff that can be 
applied to goods coming from the UK is the MFN rate. The EU’s MFN 
tariffs have generally fallen over time. In 2015 the EU’s average tariff 
was 2.6% for non-agricultural products.101 This is an average figure; 
tariffs on some individual products are higher. The EU tariff on cars, for 
example, is 10%. While the EU tariffs are low on average, they are still 
substantial for some sectors, particularly agriculture. The average EU 
tariff on sugar and confectionery, beverages and tobacco, is around 
20%.102 This could be potentially economically disruptive, as it would 
increase the cost of the UK products in the EU. However, the MFN 
principle would prevent the EU from levying discriminatory or punitive 
tariffs on goods from the UK, or vice versa. 
Non-tariff barriers 
As a third country the UK could face various non-tariff barriers to trade, 
including administrative and bureaucratic delays at customs, technical 
barriers to trade, import licensing, standards and rules of origin. 
A Commission Brexit ‘preparedness notice’ for a no-deal scenario 
indicates, for example, that imports from the UK entering its territory 
may be subject to customs controls. Businesses will have to submit 
customs declarations and may be required to provide guarantees to 
cover potential customs debts.103 
Manufacturers or importers established in the UK will no longer be 
considered as EU economic operators. A former EU distributor will 
become an exporter and will have to comply with a new set of 
conformity assessments.104  
UK industrial products are currently subject to the standards and 
requirements of EU product legislation on general product safety, public 
health, environmental safety or energy efficiency requirements, for 
example. However, a no-deal Brexit may introduce new bureaucratic 
requirements to prove compliance. 
The import of certain goods from the UK and the export of such goods 
to the UK will become subject to import/export licensing. The EU 
imposes such restrictions on goods going to and coming from third 
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countries to protect health and safety and the environment. This affects 
goods such as waste, hazardous chemicals, genetically-modified 
organisms, live animals, products of animal origin, and some plants and 
plant products, such as wood packaging. The existing licences issued by 
the UK authorities will cease to be valid.105 
 
The licensing requirements will also apply to controlled goods, such as 
firearms and dual-use items that can be used for both civil and military 
purposes.106  
 
The Government’s ‘technical notice’ Trading with the EU if there’s no 
Brexit deal and VAT for businesses if there’s no Brexit deal clarify that 
the obligations for businesses that trade with the EU would be broadly 
the same as those that apply to companies currently trading with 
countries outside the EU. Businesses would have to register as UK 
economic operators, submit customs declarations on imports and 
exports, and might have to pay tariffs or fulfil other administrative 
requirements.107 Importers of goods from the EU would have to 
correctly classify these goods in order to apply the right UK import 
tariff.108 
Rules of origin 
The EU has preferential trade arrangements with a range of other 
countries. UK inputs (materials or processing operations) currently count 
as ‘EU content’ for the purpose of determining if imports benefit from 
preferential tariffs the EU has agreed with those countries. As of the 
withdrawal date, in the absence of any other arrangement, goods 
originating in the UK that are incorporated in EU goods exported to 
third countries will no longer qualify as ‘EU content’. EU exporters will 
no longer be able to cumulate the UK share in the product and may 
thus miss out on the benefits of preferential tariffs.109 
Trade in services 
Without an agreement, the UK’s trade in services with the EU will be 
governed by the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
Within the EU Single Market, economic operators  are free to establish 
and run a business in any Member State and can also provide services 
from their ‘home’ Member State in any other Member State. 
Professional qualifications acquired in one Member State are recognised 
across the Single Market. Freedom of movement of people and capital, 
harmonised rules on VAT, intellectual property rights and data 
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protection all reduce the barriers to providing services across the EU. 
Many Single Market for Services measures are facilitated by the so-
called Services Directive. This Directive aims to remove the legal and 
administrative barriers to cross-border service provision. It does this 
using various mechanisms, including: 
• abolishing “discriminatory requirements” placed on people 
establishing businesses in other countries, including residency 
requirements or nationality requirements; 
• removing other “burdensome requirements”, such as complex 
authorisation schemes, economic needs tests, or business size and 
health checks; 
• requiring Member States to establish a Single Point of Contact so 
businesses can access all relevant information easily.110 
 
The Directive also removes a range of barriers to consumers accessing 
services in other EU countries or accessing services provided by non-UK 
EU companies in the UK.111 Under a no-deal scenario, these provisions 
would cease to apply to UK operators in EU Member States. 
 
There is a view among researchers that the WTO has made less progress 
in service liberalisation than the EU’s single market for services has to 
offer. GATS constitutes a broad framework for the liberalisation of trade 
in services rather than setting compulsory rules.112 According to 
researchers at the London School of Economics (LSE), “since the WTO 
has made far less progress than the EU in liberalising trade in services, 
[no deal] would mean reduced access to EU markets for UK service 
producers”.113 Emerging work at the OECD suggests that, on average, 
EU barriers to services sector trade with third countries are four times 
greater than those which apply inside the Single Market.114 
The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) has noted that if no deal is 
agreed, the WTO rules would not guarantee the same level of access to 
the EU market for services industries as there is now. The single market 
for services provides for “positive integration” measures (e.g. mutual 
standards), which GATS is lacking. This concerns harmonisation of rules 
or the mutual recognition of rules by default. A CBI report said: 
The barriers services businesses could potentially face include 
nationality requirements for service providers, requirements for 
businesses to have a minimum number of locally-resident staff for 
different roles, restrictions on the number of establishments and 
foreign ownership, and authorisation requirements that are 
subject to economic needs assessments. 
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[…] 
Companies in some of our most successful exporting sectors 
would be unable to export specific types of services to the EU at 
all. Those industries include airlines, broadcasters, and a range of 
financial, professional and business service providers.115 
According to a study by UK in a Changing Europe, in a no-deal scenario 
UK service exporters would also suffer from the loss of 
passporting rights for financial services, as well as access for other 
service providers (legal and accountancy services, etc).116 
Financial Services 
UK dominance in Europe 
The UK’s financial services sector is the dominant financial centre in 
Europe and arguably the world.  As such, the links between it and firms 
in the EU run deep and broad with all the main European banks and 
insurance companies operating in London.  They operate here, as UK 
companies do in Europe, under a system of ‘passports’. Any company 
authorised in any EU Member State can operate in any other EU 
Member State under its ‘passport’.  It is the potential immediate and 
sudden loss of this ‘passport’ that is the biggest potential problem 
arising out of ‘no deal’. 
Temporary permissions regime 
In December 2017 the Government announced its intention to 
introduce a temporary permissions regime, if necessary, which would 
allow EEA firms to continue operating in the UK for a time-limited 
period after the UK has left the EU without a deal. This temporary 
regime would be introduced later and would be bolstered by the main 
regulators (the Financial Conduct Authority and Bank of England) being 
given the power to implement changes to their rulebooks to permit it to 
become effective in support of whatever legislation is passed. 
The main Treasury document is: HM Treasury’s approach to financial 
services legislation under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 
(published 9 August 2018).  Extracts from this are shown below: 
• The UK will continue to implement new EU law that comes 
into effect and the UK will continue to be treated as part of 
the EU’s single market in financial services. This will mean 
that access to each other’s markets will continue on current 
terms and businesses, including financial services firms, will 
be able to trade on the same terms as now until 31 
December 2020. 
• Given the highly regulated nature of financial services, the 
volume of trade between our markets, and our shared 
desire to manage financial stability risks, we would need a 
stable process for maintaining equivalent regulatory 
outcomes as legislation evolves – including a system to 
resolve disagreements at regulatory and supervisory levels – 
alongside an open, collaborative relationship between 
supervisors that protects our respective financial systems 
and our taxpayers from financial stability risks. 
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As well as the issuance of SI’s to translate current EU law into UK law – 
an issue common to all areas of legislative activity – the Treasury has set 
out other steps to be taken: 
• HM Treasury also plans to delegate powers to the UK’s 
financial services regulators to address deficiencies in the 
regulators’ rulebooks arising as a result of exit, and to the 
EU Binding Technical Standards (BTS) that will become part 
of UK law. Such sub-delegated powers will be subject to 
broadly the same constraints as HM Treasury’s use of the 
Act’s powers, as well as additional mechanisms to ensure 
robust HM Treasury oversight. An SI to achieve this will be 
laid before Parliament now that the EUWA has received 
Royal Assent. Further information on regulatory changes to 
BTS and regulators’ rules for EU exit will be provided by the 
financial services regulators in due course. 
• The government is continuing this work to ensure that the 
UK will have a functioning legislative and regulatory 
framework in all scenarios. As part of this, HM Treasury 
intends to legislate to provide the financial services 
regulators with powers to introduce transitional measures 
that they could use to phase in any onshoring changes.  
• This means that firms do not need to prepare now to 
implement onshoring changes in the event no deal is 
reached with the EU.  
• Firms should continue to plan on the assumption that an 
implementation period will be in place from 29 March 
2019 – and, therefore, that they will be able to trade on 
the same terms that they do now until December 2020. 
They will need to comply with any new EU legislation that 
becomes applicable during this period. 
Treasury approach to ‘no deal’  
The document addresses the point about what happens if there is no 
‘deal’ (paras 1.17 – 1.20):  
• In the unlikely scenario that the UK leaves the EU without a 
deal, the UK would be outside the EU’s framework for 
financial services. The UK’s position in relation to the EU 
would be determined by the default Member State and EU 
rules that apply to third countries at the relevant time. The 
European Commission has confirmed that this would be 
the case. 
• In light of this, our approach in this scenario cannot and 
does not rely on any new, specific arrangements being in 
place between the UK and the EU. As a general principle, 
the UK would also need to default to treating EU Member 
States largely as it does other third countries, although 
there are instances where we would need to diverge from 
this approach, including to provide for a smooth transition 
to the new circumstances. The principles that would lead to 
deviations from this approach are set out below.  
• In some areas, correcting deficiencies to reflect this 
environment would be relatively straightforward. The UK’s 
world-leading financial sector is overseen by HM Treasury 
and underpinned by a strong legislative framework with 
world-class regulators (the Bank of England/Prudential 
Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority). This 
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means that the responsibilities of EU bodies could be re-
assigned efficiently and effectively, providing firms, funds 
and their customers with confidence after exit.  
• In this scenario, EU financial services firms operating in the 
UK would broadly become subject to the same supervisory 
regime that the UK already applies to other third countries 
– a regime that is shaped by the highly global, cross-border 
nature of financial services and the UK's robust regulatory 
framework as set out in legislation, including in the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), the 
Banking Act 2009 and the Bank of England Act 1998. This 
existing UK financial services legislative framework provides 
powers for extensive cooperation with global regulatory 
bodies. When the UK is no longer an EU Member State, 
and so the EU obligation of reciprocal cooperation no 
longer applies, this existing framework could be relied upon 
to ensure this important cooperation continues in this 
scenario. 
On 5 September the Treasury published the Draft Payments and 
electronic money (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations and The Credit 
Transfers and Direct Debits in Euro (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 
2018. The Explanatory Notes set out how the SI would create a 
temporary permission regime in a no-deal scenario: 
The passporting system relies upon domestically implemented EU 
legislation – in the UK, the PSRs. If the UK leaves the EU without a 
deal, there will be no agreed legal framework upon which the 
passporting system can continue to function. As a result, without 
a deal, any references in UK legislation to the EEA passporting 
system will become deficient at the point of exit. To correct this 
deficiency, this SI seeks to create a Temporary Permissions Regime 
(TPR) akin to that contained within the EEA Passport Rights 
(Amendment, etc., and Transitional Provisions) (EU Exit) 
Regulations 2018 for FSMA regulated firms. 
There is a general webpage dedicated to further Government 
announcements and another on financial services legislation under the 
EUW Act which will be amended as further decisions are made.   
Bank of England comments on ‘no deal’ 
The Bank of England commented on the Government’s approach to 
responding to the no deal possibility: 
We do not expect firms providing services within the UK’s 
regulatory remit to have to prepare now to implement these 
changes. HMT has set out that it intends to provide regulators 
with powers to grant transitional relief, where appropriate, to 
ensure that, in a scenario in which an implementation period is 
not in place, firms and FMIs have sufficient time to comply with 
the changes. 
Against the possibility that the implementation period does not 
take effect on the 29 March 2019, HMT today confirmed that it 
will bring forward legislation under the EUWA shortly to create 
temporary permissions and recognition regimes. This will allow 
firms, including non-UK central counterparties, to continue their 
activities in the UK for a time-limited period after the UK has left 
the EU even if there is no implementation period. Those firms that 
wish to continue carrying out business in the UK in the longer 
term will also be able to use this time limited period to seek to 
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obtain full authorisation (or recognition) from UK regulators 
without disruption to their business. 
Derivatives and ‘no passports’ issues 
The derivatives market has been identified by the Governor of the Bank 
of England as the ‘big issue’ for the UK and EU to solve post Brexit 
day.117 Speaking to the Treasury Committee in July 2018 the Governor 
outlined the problem, saying that as it stands, contracts left to maturity 
and unaffected by life time events would still be valid, but: 
The crucial point here is that on the day of leaving, the contract 
can still be serviced; however, life-cycle events will start to 
accumulate and, arguably, they will accumulate quite rapidly in 
the event of a cliff-edge Brexit because one would reasonably 
expect the volatility in markets to go up. How big is that potential 
risk? We have done the due diligence on that. For a mid-size firm 
there are about 1,000 life-cycle events a month. For a large 
derivative counterparty, there are up to 250,000 a week. If you 
think about it in the world of derivatives hedging underlying 
positions, with the inability to conduct these life-cycle events and 
an environment where there is volatility, the risk—the inability to 
dynamically hedge—increases with time, and you see a financial 
stability risk developing fairly quickly, in our opinion. We shared 
that opinion publicly through the FSR and directly with our 
counterparts in the EU.118 
He also drew attention to the ‘no passport’ problem applying to cross- 
border clearing houses, where the EU has not come up with an 
equivalent temporary permissions regime: 
… as it stands at present, the large, UK-based clearing houses 
would no longer be authorised clearing houses by the EU 
following the Brexit date. Therefore, the actions of European 
counterparties that had cleared in those clearing houses would be 
ultra vires; they would not be authorised to use those clearing 
houses. Those clearing houses would know that in advance and 
so the European counterparties would have to close out those 
positions in advance. The question is how rapidly that could be 
done. The orders of magnitude are much higher—it is a notional 
£60 trillion-plus of exposure—than they are in the uncleared 
space. That process, which the Bank of England oversees as the 
regulator of these clearing houses, would have to begin prior to 
the Brexit date. 
I want to make two final points. First, the UK Government have 
signalled their intention and developed statutory instruments, 
which they will lay before Parliament as soon as is practical. Given 
the timing of the summer recess, that is likely to be in the fall, but 
it will be done in a timely way. Those statutory instruments will 
solve the UK side of this issue—both authorisation of EU CCPs 
and authorisation of the EU counterparties. The European Union 
has not yet indicated a solution to this. 
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The combination of the ‘no passport’ issue and the derivatives issue is 
particularly troublesome for the insurance industry.  This briefing from 
the Association of British Insurers sets out the problem: 
1. When the UK leaves the Single Market, UK-based providers will 
no longer be able to rely on ‘passports’ and the right of 
establishment to service existing cross-border financial contracts 
throughout the European Economic Area (EEA). There will also be 
an identical impact on EEA providers who will be unable to service 
existing financial contracts with UK-based parties. This issue is 
often referred to as the contract continuity problem.  
2. This will, for example, impact general insurance, long-term life 
insurance, pension schemes, medium and long-dated derivatives 
contracts, revolving credit facilities, and may also affect general 
customer terms of business, prime brokerage and custody 
arrangements.  
3. The extent of this issue is significant and will affect both UK 
and EEA consumers. According to the Bank of England, 
approximately six million UK insurance policyholders, 30 million 
EEA insurance policyholders, and around £26trn of outstanding 
uncleared derivatives contracts could potentially be affected. The 
issue will also affect contracts relating to segregated mandate 
business under the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID) II. In particular, failure to find a solution to derivatives 
contracts could potentially lead to significant financial stability 
risks.  
4. Honouring existing obligations to customers is a key priority for 
the industry in the UK and the EU, and it is continuing to do all it 
can to address the issue. However, while service providers are 
preparing to take steps to mitigate the impact of the loss of 
passporting rights, it is highly unlikely that this will be adequate to 
fully address the contract continuity issue by March 2019.  
5. As a result, it is imperative that action by service providers is 
coupled with action from policymakers and regulators in the UK 
and EU to mitigate this ‘cliff edge risk’. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) flagged in its Article IV statement that a 
resolution would be “most efficiently achieved through 
coordinated EU and UK legislation.  
• It is critical that the UK and EU implement the transitional 
period that was agreed at a political level at the European 
Council meeting in March 2018. Furthermore, it is also 
important for UK and EU regulators to issue commitments 
about the future treatment of these contracts to act as a 
regulatory ‘back stop’ in the event that the transitional 
period fails to materialise.  
• Any UK/EU solution should also be underpinned by 
ongoing supervisory cooperation between UK and EU 
regulators. The new European Central Bank (ECB) and the 
Bank of England (BoE) technical working group on risk 
management, announced on 27 April 2018, would be an 
ideal forum to discuss solutions to this issue.  
• The early announcement of grandfathering arrangements, 
either for a time-limited period or potentially until maturity, 
would allow for contract continuity which will deliver the 
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best results for UK and EEA customers, as well as European 
competitiveness more broadly.119 
Public procurement 
Becoming a third country could mean no mutual rights of access to 
public procurement markets in the UK and the EU – although many 
contracts may in practice still be open. In such a scenario the EU rules 
on public procurement would no longer apply and EU Member States’ 
authorities would have to apply the same rules to a potential UK 
supplier as to any other business based in a third country with which the 
EU did not have an agreement on procurement.120 
This ‘cliff-edge’ and possible exclusion of UK bidders from procurement 
procedures in the EU can be largely avoided by joining the General 
Procurement Agreement of the WTO (GPA). The UK is currently a party 
to the GPA by virtue of its EU membership, but the Government has 
submitted an application to re-join as an independent party.121 This 
would ensure continued UK access to the EU27 procurement market for 
most tenders above certain thresholds. The GPA would not give the UK 
the same full access to EU procurement markets that it currently enjoys, 
however.122  
Commenting on the differences in scope between the EU Procurement 
directives and the GPA, Professor Sue Arrowsmith of the University of 
Nottingham states that some of them are of limited importance for the 
UK: 
The scope of procurement covered for the EU/UK under the GPA 
is narrower than the scope of covered procurement under the EU 
procurement directives in relation to a few utility sectors, coverage 
of private utilities, the defence sector, some services, (possibly) 
concessions, and certain private contracts subsidised by 
government. The GPA also does not include below-threshold 
procurement. However, some of these differences are of limited 
importance in the UK context. Further, the procurement that does 
fall into the gaps between the directives and GPA, at least above 
the directives’ thresholds, could easily be added to the GPA UK if 
desired.123 
For further information on the UK and the GPA, see the Commons 
Library briefing on The Trade Bill. See also National Audit Office, Report 
by the Comptroller and Auditor General, Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy, Competition and Markets Authority, 
Exiting the EU: Consumer protection, competition and state aid, HC 
1384 Session 2017–2019, 6 July 2018. 
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Consumer protection 
BEIS has contingency plans if the UK loses access to EU-wide market 
surveillance and enforcement systems, but it will have a considerable 
task to implement them in the event of a no-deal scenario.  
• To support its market surveillance capability, the UK currently 
relies on an EU-wide rapid alert system to identify unsafe 
products. BEIS sought a ministerial direction in March 2018 to 
spend £2.4 million on a replacement system. This was behind 
schedule but, following the direction, BEIS reports being on 
track to deliver a minimum capability by March 2019 in a no-
deal scenario (paragraphs 2.19 to 2.21).  
• National Trading Standards has identified product safety checks 
on imported goods as an issue that may be affected by EU Exit if 
provision is not made for the free movement of goods in a 
future UK–EU economic relationship. The borders in Kent could 
be some of the most affected by Brexit because the vast majority 
of goods imported through there are from the EU and not 
currently subject to product safety checks. Kent Trading 
Standards has estimated the impact on its workforce of different 
scenarios, including no deal, and has escalated this to their 
funding providers. There is no requirement in law that product 
safety checks must be carried out at the border and, to date, no 
changes have been made to the infrastructure at Dover to 
expand capacity for product safety checks (paragraph 2.24).  
• Trading Standards services and the CMA are planning to work 
bilaterally with EU Member States on enforcement, as they 
currently do with non-EU countries, if there is no deal. 
Appropriate protocols already exist, but outside EU structures 
the authorities expect cross-border enforcement to take longer 
and be more expensive, and the UK authorities cannot mandate 
another country to cooperate (paragraphs 2.22 to 2.23).  
6.3 Pursuing an independent trade policy 
As an EU Member State the UK cannot operate its own independent 
trade policy. Through its membership of the EU, the UK is currently a 
party to around 60 EU trade agreements with other countries.124 In the 
event of a no-deal Brexit, the UK will no longer be party to these 
agreements. At the same time, the UK will immediately be able to 
pursue its own trade policy and sign new agreements. 
The Government has taken various steps to prepare for an independent 
UK international trade policy. These are designed to cover a range of 
possible outcomes, including no-deal. 
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New UK legislation 
The Government has introduced the Trade Bill 125 and the Customs 
Bill126 which both aim to prevent disruption in trading arrangements and 
allow the UK to continue its existing trade policy as far as possible 
immediately after Brexit. The Trade Bill has provisions for the 
transitioning of EU trade agreements. The customs legislation under the 
Customs Bill will mostly follow the EU Customs Code. Neither of the 
Bills are intended to deal with future trade agreements with the EU or 
other countries.  
In a no-deal scenario, there would be significant time constraints in an 
otherwise ongoing process in which the UK is developing the principles 
of its trade policy.  
Trading with third countries 
The UK is a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in its 
own right. However, as noted above, on leaving the EU it will 
need to update the terms of its WTO membership.127 
WTO schedules  
In order to re-establish its autonomy from the EU in the WTO, the UK 
must take several procedural steps. In particular, it must agree 
‘schedules’ for goods and services. These country-specific commitments 
refer to maximum tariff levels and tariff rate quotas (TRQs - quantitative 
restrictions on imports) on goods and levels of agricultural subsidies.128  
The Department for International Trade has stated that the Government 
plans to replicate as far as possible its current commitments after 
Brexit.129 The Commission and the UK have mutually agreed to 
apportion the UK’s TRQs based on recent years’ trade flows.130 On 24 
July 2018, the UK notified its draft schedule for goods commitments to 
the WTO and within three months it should be clear if any WTO 
member has an objection.131 If no country disagrees with the 
apportionment of the schedules, they will be treated as final and no 
negotiations will be needed.132 However, formal objections can be 
expected as several major agricultural exporters, including the US, 
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Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada and Thailand, have expressed 
disagreement with the proposed quota s between the EU and the UK.133 
The Government believes a failure to certify the schedules before March 
2019 would not be a problem: 
Should the goods and services schedules be uncertified as we 
leave the EU, we do not anticipate there to be any problems – it is 
not uncommon for WTO members to operate on uncertified 
schedules for periods of time.134 
For services schedules the UK has to comply with the GATS obligations 
and specify its commitments for each particular service sector, detailing 
the levels of market access and treatment under national laws.135 The 
UK is preparing a list of UK-specific exemptions from the MFN 
Treatment under the GATS.136 These unamendable lists of exemptions – 
a part of the services schedule - allow the extension of more favourable 
treatment to particular countries in particular service sectors for a 
limited period of time.137  
Public procurement and third countries 
The UK is currently party to the WTO Agreement on Government 
Procurement (GPA) through its EU membership. Under the GPA, many 
large public sector procurement opportunities must be opened up to 
suppliers in countries which are the parties to the agreement. The 
Government has already formally requested to re-join the GPA after 
Brexit and has submitted a market access offer similar to the EU’s 
terms.138 Re-joining the GPA would ensure that the UK maintains a 
similar level of access to the government procurement markets of (non-
EU) third countries. The GPA does not, however, cover the enhanced 
terms of access which the EU has negotiated for operators of its 
Member States under its free trade agreements with third countries like 
Canada and Japan.139 This would be a matter for the UK’s future 
bilateral trade treaties with these countries. 
‘Rollover’ of existing EU trade agreements 
As part of an orderly withdrawal, the Government would like the 
transitional adoption or ‘rollover’ of all the EU’s trade agreements and 
other preferential trade arrangements with third countries. The 
Government published a Technical Note of February 2018 on continued 
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application of EU international trade and other agreements during the 
envisaged transition/implementation phase by agreement of all the 
parties concerned. This would enable trade arrangements with third 
countries that the UK is currently party to as an EU Member State to be 
replicated in UK-third country agreements when the UK leaves. This 
would not preclude a fuller revision of these agreements in the longer 
term to create a more bespoke trading arrangement.  
The EU agrees to rollover in principle 
At the March 2018 European Council, the EU agreed to notify other 
parties to international agreements that the UK is to be treated as a 
Member State during the transition period for the purposes of these 
agreements.  However, this remains a request and it is possible that the 
third countries concerned may not agree.  
The Government’s bilateral engagement 
The Government said in January 2018 that it had engaged with 70 
countries covered by over 40 EU international trade agreements and 
had received a positive reaction to its objective of ensuring continuity in 
these trading relationships. 
An International Trade Committee (ITC) report on Continuing 
Application of EU trade agreements after Brexit published in February 
2018 warned of trade with 70 nations “falling off a cliff edge” if the 
Government did not act quickly to roll over the EU’s trade deals. It said 
there was an urgent need for clarity “over the number, type, scope, 
extent and importance of the EU's trade-related agreements” and 
warned that substantive amendments to the rolled-over agreements 
were almost certain to be required. The Government told the ITC in May 
that it was working bilaterally with partner countries to “to ensure 
continuity of effect for our international agreements beyond the 
Implementation Period”.140 Commons Briefing Paper 8370, The UK 
adoption of the EU's external agreements after Brexit, 24 July 2018, 
provides a more in-depth account of the issues.141 
Liam Fox told the ITC on 11 July 2018 that agreements in principle had 
been reached with third countries about continuing trading 
arrangements, but that many countries were waiting to see if there 
would be a transition (implementation) period first, with a view to using 
the extra time to negotiate a more bespoke agreement (rather than 
simply rolling over the existing arrangements). It was the Government’s 
intention to have those agreements in place before Brexit.142 But Trade 
minister George Hollingbery told the ITC on 4 September that it is “not 
an absolute given” that all the EU trade agreements would be 
“transitioned” before exit day (MLex, 4/9) 
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Government guidance 
The Government’s ‘no deal’ guidance published on 23 August included 
technical notices on “Classifying your goods in the UK Trade Tariff if 
there’s no Brexit deal” and “Trading with the EU if there’s a no Brexit 
deal”.  Both refer to separate technical notice on “Trade Agreement 
Continuity”. However, “Trade Agreement Continuity” has not been 
published at the time of writing. 
Classifying your goods in the UK Trade Tariff if there’s no Brexit deal”  
states that “the UK intends to continue offering unilateral preferences 
to developing countries, and to seek to transition all EU Free Trade 
Agreements for day 1 in order to ensure continuity for both goods 
imported to the UK, and for UK exports” and that further information 
on preferential trade under the UK’s existing trade agreements will be 
captured in the Trade Agreement Continuity technical notice. 
 
Proposed UK-SADC agreement 
On 28 August 2018, coinciding with a visit to South Africa, the Prime 
Minister announced that a new UK-Southern African Economic 
Partnership would be ready as soon as the current EU-Southern African 
Development economic partnership (covering the same six countries:  
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa,  Eswatini/Swaziland and 
Mozambique)143 ceases to apply to the UK.  
UK Trade Minister George Hollingbery and Botswanan trade minister 
(representing the five Southern African Customs Union countries and 
Mozambique) issued a joint statement on 29 August, which referred to 
the importance of a UK-EU agreement on a post-Brexit transition period 
and continued cumulation between the UK, EU and all parties to the 
agreement in ensuring continuity to trade.  It stated:  
We take note of the progress achieved regarding the UK and EU’s 
agreement on a time-limited implementation period between the 
EU and UK following the UK’s departure from the EU, and in 
particular the intention for the UK to be treated, for the purposes 
of EU international agreements, as an EU Member State for the 
duration of the implementation period between the EU and UK. 
The SACU (Southern African Customs Union) and Mozambique 
Trade Ministers indicated that they look forward to receiving 
formal confirmation of the same via the proposed notification, 
and to continuing to receive regular updates on progress from the 
UK on the EU-UK negotiations under Article 50 of the Treaty of 
the European Union on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. SACU 
and Mozambique emphasise the importance of continued 
cumulation between all the parties in promoting continuity and to 
avoid disruption in trade, and urge both the UK and the EU to 
recognise the importance of cumulation in the discussions on a 
post-Brexit EU-UK arrangement. 
Tariff rate quotas, rules of origin and cumulation 
As highlighted in the ITC report, it will not be possible to simply 
replicate the terms of some of the EU’s trade agreements, as they 
include arrangements for tariff rate quotas (TRQs) and rules of origins 
requirements which would need amending to make them more specific 
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to the UK. TRQs involve allowing imports of a fixed quantity of certain 
goods at a lower tariff rate, with a higher tariff applied to anything 
above this.  A UK-specific free trade agreement may require a new TRQ 
calculation, although the UK’s exit would also create problems for the 
EU, as it would most likely want to recalculate its TRQs with third 
countries to take into account the UK no longer being part of the 
calculations.  TRQs are also an issue in establishing separate UK and 
EU27 schedules at the WTO post-Brexit, with a number of third 
countries objecting to the proposals made by the UK and the EU.144  
Trade agreements also involve rules of origin (RoO), whereby the origin 
of goods must be proven for them to qualify for preferential treatment 
in respect of customs duties.  The application of origination status can 
be widened by means of provisions for ‘cumulation’, whereby 
components or inputs from outside a country can be treated as 
originating from there for the purpose of RoO.  
The ITC report cited evidence from Mike Hawes of the Society of Motor 
Manufacturers and Traders, who explained that “most free trade 
agreements tend to have a minimum [domestic content] threshold of 
55% to 60%” for automotive goods. Therefore, he said, merely 
copying and pasting the EU-South Korea free trade agreement, for 
example, would not benefit the UK “because we would not qualify for 
the preferential trading arrangements …. unless you could agree 
cumulation with the European context, which is what we currently 
enjoy”.  
The ITC report refers to the suggestion made by several witnesses and 
submissions to its inquiry that “diagonal” cumulation arrangements 
should be established allowing inputs from any of the three parties 
concerned (the UK, the EU and the third country in a trade agreement) 
to count as originating content.  
One route to this would be for the UK separately to join the Regional 
Convention on Pan-Euro-Mediterranean Rules of Origin (the PEM 
Convention), to which it is currently party as a member of the EU. This 
allows for diagonal cumulation between all signatories, provided there 
are trade agreements in place between all the contracting parties 
concerned.  However, as the UK Trade Policy Observatory pointed out in 
its evidence to the inquiry, “the EU can be quite difficult in in agreeing 
to diagonal cumulation” and typically only does so if all countries 
involved have free trade agreements among themselves”.  
UK trade arrangements with EFTA and Turkey 
Arrangements with the EFTA countries and Turkey would require a 
more substantial renegotiation. EFTA Members Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway participate in the Single Market through the EEA 
Agreement and Switzerland participates in aspects of the Single Market 
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through a series of bilateral agreements. Turkey is in a partial customs 
union with the EU. These agreements are based on extensive 
acceptance of the EU’s regulatory and customs regimes. Trade with 
these five countries constitutes 6.2% of the UK’s external trade. The 
Government has established a ‘trade policy dialogue’ with Norway and 
a Trade Working Group with Turkey.145 
Impact of ‘no deal’ on rollover 
As of November 2017, EU bilateral and multilateral trade agreements 
covered 88 countries and accounted for 13% of UK trade.146 The UK 
will no longer be part of those arrangements in the case of no deal. 
A transition period would give the Government time to work on 
bespoke agreements, but ‘no deal’ would mean no transition period. 
The threat of ‘no deal’ presents the Government with considerable time 
pressure and it is uncertain if countries would agree to a temporary 
bilateral rollover of the agreements, as they would be cautious of 
missing out on an opportunity to renegotiate preferred terms in case 
the no deal scenario becomes a reality. Asked on the Andrew Marr 
programme on 2 September 2018 whether the new trade deals 
replicating the trading arrangements with third countries would be in 
place for Brexit day, Liam Fox said:   
That remains our aim. Of course a lot of countries are waiting to 
see exactly what [the UK] relationship will be with the European 
Union. But not one of those countries have said to us that they 
don’t want to get a trade agreement with the UK. 
Responding to Andrew Marr’s follow up question as to whether it 
would still be possible to get all these deals ready for the minute after 
the UK leaves the EU, Fox said: “It’s possible but it’s ultimately 
dependent on both parties agreeing”. 
The Institute for Government has suggested the Government prioritise 
agreements which should be in place before leaving the EU as part of its 
no-deal planning: 
‘No deal’ planning has to assume that those arrangements will 
not be in place. That means the UK needs to prepare a priority list 
of countries and agreements, renegotiated and re-ratified by 29 
March 2019 – and it needs to warn business of the consequences 
if those agreements are not in place. The Government claims it is 
making good progress on third country agreements, but it needs 
to be much more transparent to give business confidence this is 
really happening.147 
If the Government is successful in agreeing new rolled-over treaties with 
third countries to replace EU agreements, then it may be able to 
implement these irrespective of whether it reaches a deal with the EU 
on withdrawal and future relations. But a failure to agree on the future 
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relationship is likely to complicate matters where third countries are 
awaiting confirmation of the UK’s future relationship with the EU before 
concluding new agreements with the UK.  
Rules of Origin 
It would also not be possible to apply diagonal cumulation 
arrangements in relation to rules of origin (RoO), creating difficulties for 
the UK in meeting the current RoO requirements in EU trade 
agreements with third countries if it attempted to replicate these in UK-
specific trade agreements.  Given the complex supply chains with 
components coming from across the EU in sectors such as the car 
industry, this might require the threshold for domestic content in RoO 
to be revised significantly downwards.  
In addition, concluding agreements with countries that have a 
particularly close relationship with the EU, such as the EFTA countries 
and Turkey, would be difficult in the absence of clarity over the future 
UK-EU relationship. In evidence in January 2018 to the ITC, Dr Holger 
Hestermeyer (Shell Reader in International Dispute Resolution at King’s 
College London) said the UK would need to negotiate new agreements 
with these countries which would “differ substantially from the current 
arrangements”.   
Possible continuity of aspects of Mixed Agreements 
Around a quarter of the EU’s international agreements have been 
classified as mixed agreements because they cover competences shared 
by the EU and Member States. This means that they have been ratified 
separately by individual EU Member States as well as approved at EU 
level. It is possible that some aspects of these agreements could 
continue to apply in the event of the UK leaving the EU without a deal, 
but there is some debate about this. While EU-exclusive competence 
agreements will cease to apply to the UK once it leaves the EU, some 
legal experts have suggested that aspects of mixed agreements could 
continue to apply. However, the EU has stated that all agreements will 
cease to apply.148 
In the absence of definitive information about the state of play of 
negotiations with third countries on the rollover of existing trade and 
other co-operation arrangements, the areas of co-operation covered 
and the Government’s assessment of which of the EU’s international 
treaties require replacement in order to avoid disruption of relations, it is 
difficult assess whether the necessary arrangements will be in place by 
March 2019.  
New trade deals 
In addition to its work on existing EU trade agreements, the 
Government is exploring options for new free trade agreements (FTAs) 
after leaving the EU: 
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We have established working groups and high level dialogues 
with a range of key trade partners, including the United States, 
Australia, China, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), India, 
Japan and New Zealand. 149 
In July 2018 the Department for International Trade announced 
consultations on the UK’s first bilateral trade agreements with Australia, 
New Zealand and the USA, as well as potentially joining the Trans-
Pacific Partnership.  
But trade negotiations are time-consuming and complex, and while it is 
an EU Member State the UK cannot officially negotiate and sign future 
trade deals. Even the legality of holding preliminary consultations on 
future deals has been debated, although the Government has been 
conducting bilateral discussion, as outlined above.150 The draft 
withdrawal agreement allows the UK to negotiate and sign new trade 
agreements during the transition period, but not to implement then 
until after transition. But with no deal and no transition period, formal 
negotiations and/or the conclusion of new agreements could not 
happen until after March 2019, meaning new trade agreements with 
third countries would not be in place. 
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7. Customs 
The effects of ‘no deal’ are expected to be most tangible at the UK 
border. At the moment of leaving the EU customs union without a deal, 
the border between the UK and the EU would become a customs 
border. This is likely to mean more customs controls, potentially 
involving increased costs and delays for business. 
The port of Dover processes up to 10,000 incoming and outgoing 
freight vehicles a day. Currently, 99% of those originate in the EU and 
are processed in around two minutes. Customs checks on non-EU trucks 
take on average 20 minutes. An additional two-minute delay per freight 
vehicle in the ferry terminal would cause a 17-mile queue at Dover. The 
ports lack the physical space to accommodate the goods waiting to be 
processed. This written Evidence from the Port of Dover to the 
Commons Public Accounts Committee illustrates the urgent need for 
contingency measures for no deal.151 Also, manufacturers who make 
use of complex cross-border supply chains and “just-in-time” delivery of 
parts might be forced to make adjustments.152 
Disruption to trade because of uncertainty around customs procedures 
in the case of no deal is possible. But having contingency plans ready is 
essential on both the UK and the EU side of the border. These concern 
investment in infrastructure, IT systems and manpower.  
 
The Government’s no deal guidance to businesses that trade with the 
EU aims to “minimise delays and additional burdens for legitimate 
trade”.153  
The Customs Bill 
The Taxation (Cross-Border Trade) Bill (the Customs Bill) provides for a 
range of negotiation outcomes, including a contingency scenario for a 
no-deal outcome. The Bill covers the implementation of customs, VAT 
and excise regimes, and sets out the steps the Government would take 
to minimise disruption for businesses and travellers. The operational 
arrangements for future international agreements on trade and 
provision for customs import and export duties would have a significant 
operational impact on the work of HMRC.154 
Concerns about management of borders 
The main issues and challenges for the management of the border after 
Brexit were highlighted in a report by the National Audit Office in 
October 2017, which noted that “the number of decisions that have to 
be made over whether to permit people and goods to cross the border 
could increase significantly (potentially 230% and 360% 
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respectively)”.155 The Public Accounts Committee (PAC), which is 
monitoring HMRC’s operational preparedness for a no deal scenario, 
expressed concerns at the end of 2017 about the Government’s earlier 
assessment that risks to border activity would remain unchanged 
immediately post-Brexit: 
Government departments are assuming that the risks to 
managing the border will not change immediately when the UK 
leaves the EU, and that border checks will therefore be the same 
after March 2019 as they were before.[..] 
Particularly in the event of a no-deal scenario, the border could be 
exposed to risks on day 1 of the UK’s departure. Officials are 
relying too much on there being a transitional period in order to 
have the time to develop the new systems and infrastructure that 
may be required.[..]156 
HM Revenue and Customs preparedness 
A cross-government Border Planning Group (BPG) led by HMRC’s Chief 
Executive, Jon Thompson, was established in early 2017 and tasked with 
the co-ordination of Brexit-related border challenges. In October 2017, 
the Treasury confirmed that this group had been allocated a budget of 
£2.5 million for the year 2017-18.157 According to the Treasury: 
The Border Planning Group has reviewed all border locations 
(ports, airports and the Channel Tunnel) to understand the 
implications at these locations of controls and checks; and 
concluded that there are a number of locations, especially ‘Roll On 
- Roll Off’ ports (for example, Dover), where significant extra 
controls and checks would be difficult to accommodate without 
affecting the flow of traffic and people.158 
The BPG also co-ordinates work with organisations such as local 
authorities and non-governmental organisations responsible for 
managing or enabling the border (port and airport operators, carriers, 
agents and others). Plans are being developed on a location by location, 
port by port basis.159 
As for ‘no deal’ planning, Jon Thompson recently explained to the PAC: 
If, when we get to October, we will exit the European Union in 
March 2019 and go on to WTO rules, the Government will have 
to make some choices about what objectives take primacy at the 
border. A choice will need to be made between the free flow of 
trade, the security of the United Kingdom and the raising of 
revenue. I think it is fair to say that you will not get an optimal 
system in April 2019 across those three objectives. You will have 
to prioritise…160 
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In response, the PAC wrote to HMRC stating: 
We have previously reported that the Border Planning Group’s 
assumption that the risks to border activity remained unchanged 
immediately post-Brexit is a risky approach, and this remains a 
concern. We are also not convinced that HMRC is sufficiently 
prepared for the different possible Brexit outcomes, for example, 
in terms of the potential new infrastructure that might be needed 
at ports.161 
The PAC had previously noted that the new Customs Declaration 
Service, which the HMRC started planning and implementing before the 
EU Referendum, was at risk of not being fully operational by the 
planned date of January 2019.162 In July 2018 the BPG told the PAC 
that work had been done on risk mitigation and that an upgrade of the 
current customs declaration system was being tested. By the end of 
September it should be clear whether the system would be cope with a 
no deal scenario.163 
Regarding recruitment of new personnel at HMRC and Border Force, 
Jon Thompson recently reported: 
I have been reasonably clear that, in these various scenarios, we 
will need somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 additional staff. 
We recruited 1,113 by the end of May. [..] We will continue to 
recruit en route to the 4,000 to 5,000. Of those the estimation is 
that 3,000 people need to be trained—2,500 HMRC colleagues 
and 500 Border Force. [..] 
Asked if an optimal staffing solution would be found by April 2019, Jon 
Thompson said: 
The answer is, it is not. It will not be optimal, but from 2019, in 
the scenario that you are exploring of day one, no deal, we would 
continue to mature the system through 2019 and 2020—get 
more people and so on and so forth. We believe you would have 
a functioning border, but it would not be an optimal situation.164 
The Treasury has acknowledged “the practical difficulties to 
accommodate significant extra controls and checks without affecting 
the flow of traffic and people”, and said that therefore:  
… the Government is taking a pragmatic approach to border 
controls to ensure the flow of traffic at the border, and to 
implement controls and checks as they can be accommodated.165 
To minimise disruption in transit procedures, the parties to the Common 
Transit Convention (CTC) are preparing to invite the UK to re-join the 
Convention soon after leaving the EU. This would enable the UK to 
remain in the EU’s common transit procedures with EFTA Members as 
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well as Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey. The CTC allows exporters to 
avoid customs checks until goods reach their destination country, so 
goods travelling to and from the UK and passing through the EU and 
into third countries would avoid paying EU duties.166 
Case study 1: impact on the automotive sector 
Profile of the sector 
Automotive production in the UK is a high profile and successful 
industry typical of many ‘just in time’ manufacturing sectors. It is part of 
an international supply chain and its manufacturing plants operate a 
low-stock, high-volume model that requires constant component 
delivery. The sector has relatively high levels of productivity, high 
investment and many high-skilled workers.  
The sector in the UK is dominated by foreign-owned manufacturers 
based at large, high value plants mostly in the Midlands and the North 
East.167 
The sector:168  
• employed 162,000 people, 1% of total employment in Great 
Britain in 2016;169 
• generated economic output (in terms of Gross Value Added) of 
£16.6 billion, 0.8% of the UK’s economic output in 2017;170 
• is 20% more productive than the overall manufacturing industry 
and 35% more productive than the average for the UK 
economy;171 
• exported vehicles worth £44 billion in 2017; this was 13% of UK 
goods exports and 54% of vehicle exports were to the EU.172 
The sector is highly integrated with complex supply chains involved in 
the production of almost all the components of motor vehicles. The 
Automotive Council (a high-level forum composed of industry leaders 
and Ministers) estimates that “44% of parts used to make UK cars 
come from UK suppliers”.173 The Financial Times suggests that even this 
figure may overestimate the proportion of UK-made components: 
Of [the] 30,000 components in modern vehicles, each one may 
contain 30 sub-components and have passed through 15 
countries during the course of its production... With many of the 
parts going into Tier One components coming from overseas, it is 
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therefore highly likely that the true UK make-up of vehicle 
components is far lower than 44%…174 
The importance of supply chains to this industry means that the impact 
of a no-deal Brexit could be significant. The main possible impacts can 
be divided into (i) the impact of tariffs, (ii) the impact of non-tariff 
barriers to trade, and (iii) the changing regulatory regime. 
Tariffs 
While the UK is in the EU’s customs union, no tariffs are charged on 
cars and automotive components (or any manufactured goods) that are 
imported from or exported to the EU. In a no deal scenario, it is 
assumed that EU-UK trade would be arranged under WTO rules 
governing trade between trade partners with no FTA.  
This would mean the imposition of tariffs on trade in goods between 
the UK and the EU. UK exports to the EU would face the EU’s tariffs and 
imports into the UK from the EU would face whatever tariffs the UK 
decided to impose.175 The average tariffs imposed by the EU on the 
import of cars is 9.8%, and the average tariff for motor vehicle parts is 
3.8%.176 
If tariffs are imposed on car exports to the EU or component imports 
from the EU, then the cost of manufacturing cars in the UK would 
increase. Honda, a major car manufacturer with plants in the UK, 
commented to the Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) Select 
Committee that the imposition of tariffs “would make UK 
manufactured vehicles ‘uncompetitive’”.177 The BEIS Select Committee 
concluded that: 
…it is difficult to see how it would make economic sense for 
multinational volume manufacturers – the bulk of the UK 
automotive sector – to base production in the UK in a no deal or 
WTO tariff scenario.178 
Section 6.2 above provides further information on tariff issues in a no-
deal scenario. 
Non-tariff barriers 
Non-tariff barriers are practical, administrative or physical obstacles that 
make trade more difficult. The automotive sector in the UK could 
experience non-tariff barriers in the form of “delays at the new UK-EU 
border and…additional administrative requirements” in the event of a 
no deal Brexit.179 
The ‘just in time’ model that the automotive industry operates means 
that stock is delivered to the assembly line as it is needed. Only a very 
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limited number of spare parts are stockpiled – manufacturers tend not 
keep more parts than are needed for the immediate future. Delays in 
the delivery of stock could prevent cars from being manufactured at the 
pace required to maximise efficiency and retain competitiveness.  
Honda commented to the BEIS Select Committee that “a 15-minute 
delay could add around £850,000 per year in costs” to annual 
production at their Swindon factory.180 
Regulatory standards 
Differing regulations that determine how a manufactured good is 
produced or tested are a type of non-tariff barrier. All cars sold or 
registered in the EU are subject to strict safety and other regulations. 
New cars must be issued with a Certificate of Conformity to prove that 
they meet EU regulations. Certificates of Conformity can only be 
provided by a ‘type-approval authority’ in an EU Member State. In the 
UK the type-approval authority is the Vehicle Certification Agency 
(VCA).181 
If there is no deal and the UK immediately assumes third country status 
in relation to the EU, the European Commission has said the VCA will 
lose its status as a type-approval authority.182 Manufacturers would have 
to seek approval from a type-approval authority in another EU country, 
which could be costly and may add to the time taken to gain approval. 
The Society of Motor Manufacturers and Technicians commented to the 
BEIS Select Committee that the type-approval authorities in other EU 
Member States might lack the capacity to provide certification for UK 
manufactured vehicles in addition those manufactured in their own 
country.183 
Case study 2: professional and business services 
sector 
Profile of the sector 
The professional and business services sector includes industries that 
provide specialist, knowledge-intensive services to businesses. It includes 
legal services, accountancy, advertising, architectural services, 
engineering and management consultancy. It is a large sector and one 
in which the UK has a high international reputation. 
The professional and business services sector: 184 
• includes 645,000 businesses, 24% of all businesses in the UK in 
2017;185 
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• employed 4.1 million people, 14% of employment in Great Britain 
in 2016.186 
• generated economic output (in terms of Gross Value Added) of 
£198 billion, 11% of the UK’s economic output in 2017.187 
The professional and business services industry provides essential 
services to all parts of the economy. Employees are typically highly 
skilled professionals. Businesses in this sector range from very large firms 
operating throughout the world and providing a range of services (such 
as the ‘Big Four’ accountancy firms or the ‘magic circle’ law firms), to 
small and medium sized enterprises that support a specific kind of 
business in one region of the UK.188 
Service industries in the EU  
Professional and business services businesses are subject to the EU’s 
Single Market for Services, which is not as far reaching as the Single 
Market for Goods. The core principles of the Single Market for Services 
are:189 
• the freedom to establish and run a company in any Member 
State;  
• the freedom to provide services across Member State borders; 
• mutual recognition of professional qualifications (qualified 
service professionals are recognised as such throughout the EU 
without having to re-qualify). 
 
The Single Market for Services also allows freedom of movement of 
people and capital, and harmonises rules in VAT, intellectual property 
and data protection, all of which reduce the barriers to providing 
professional and businesses services in other EU Member States.190 
Section 6.2 above provides further information on the Single Market for 
Services. 
Impact of no deal: regulatory frameworks 
In the event of a no-deal Brexit, UK professional and business services 
companies operating only in the UK are unlikely to see any major direct 
impact. These services are largely regulated on a domestic basis, so EU-
wide rules have only a limited impact.191  
In areas where the regulatory framework is harmonised by EU 
Directives, a no-deal Brexit is also unlikely to have any immediate 
impact. For example, statutory audit is specified under the Audit 
Directive [2006/43/EC] and UK regulations will probably remain 
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unchanged for some time after withdrawal, whether or not a deal is 
reached. Any divergence would probably happen over several years.192 
However, a no deal scenario could have an immediate impact on UK 
companies operating or seeking to operate in the EU, and on EU 
companies operating or seeking to operate in the UK. Without a deal, 
these businesses would be viewed as third-country businesses, which 
means that EU Directives would not automatically apply to them. What 
rules do apply would depend on the company law in each Member 
State, so it is possible that some Member States would allow UK 
businesses to provide services as now, but this is not guaranteed.193 
Mutual recognition of qualifications 
Another important area for the professional and business services sector 
in which ‘no deal’ could have a major impact is the mutual recognition 
of professional qualifications in the EU and the UK. It is possible that UK 
professionals working in the EU would no longer be recognised as 
having valid professional qualifications; this would depend on the 
Member States’ existing rules on the recognition of qualifications 
awarded by third countries. 
The European Commission has said that with no deal the UK’s third 
country status would mean:194 
[t]he recognition of professional qualifications of United Kingdom 
nationals in an EU-27 Member State will be governed by the 
national policies and rules of that Member State, irrespective of 
whether the qualifications of the United Kingdom national were 
obtained in the United Kingdom, in another third country or in an 
EU-27 Member State.  
The Commission also notes that this would apply to non-UK EU citizens 
in the UK (whose status would depend on the sector-by-sector rules in 
the UK regarding third country qualifications), and those EU citizens 
holding professional qualifications awarded in the UK but working in 
other EU countries.195 
See section 9.2 below for more information on free movement and 
recognition of qualifications. 
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8. Northern Ireland and the Irish 
border 
Many of the possible effects of ‘no deal’ on the Irish border and trade 
with Ireland are the same as those that would arise from UK - EU trade 
in general and at other ports/entry points for goods traffic. 
But there are two unique characteristics that make the Irish border more 
complex. The first is the nature of that border - it is the only land border 
the UK shares with the EU.196 The border is currently “invisible and 
seamless across its 310 mile/500 km length”.197 The second is the 
history of violence and conflict in the region, which was largely brought 
to an end with the signing of the 1998 Belfast/Good Friday Agreement. 
This means there are particular sensitivities about the erecting of border 
infrastructure and implementing checks on goods crossing the border. 
This is why the UK government has committed to “no new physical 
infrastructure at the border and no new checks or controls at the 
border”.198 
The EU and the UK Government share a commitment to avoiding a hard 
border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Although the two-sides 
have yet to reach an agreement on how best to avoid checks and 
infrastructure at the border, the types of solutions suggested, which 
include the use of technology, some degree of regulatory alignment and 
some sort of customs agreement, are likely to be absent in a no-deal 
scenario. 
8.1 Customs checks 
If the UK implements a new customs regime under WTO rules, what 
checks at the Northern-Irish border would it be required to conduct and 
could it waive some or all of them? The EU has consistently said that 
checks would be required on the Irish border if the UK leaves the Single 
Market and customs union. Michel Barnier said in February 2018, that 
such checks would be “unavoidable”.199 
It has been reported that the Irish Prime Minister, Leo Varadkar, 
suggested in July 2018 that even with ‘no deal’, checks and 
infrastructure at the border would not be required. The Irish Times 
reported: 
Mr Varadkar said that such a “doomsday scenario” would mean 
that the “commitments of others” would be relied upon to 
prevent a hard border. […] “Also, president Juncker and my EU 
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colleagues have on many occasions said that they wouldn’t 
require us to put in place a physical infrastructure and customs 
checks on the Border between Northern Ireland and Ireland,” he 
said.200 
However, the Irish Revenue Commissioners subsequently confirmed that 
they were making preparations for “full customs checks” on UK-Irish 
trade “in case no deal is reached on Brexit.”201 
The Prime Minister’s EU Advisor Oliver Robbins, in oral evidence to the 
Exiting the EU Select Committee on 24 July, acknowledged the 
European Commission’s position that checks and controls would be 
necessary (Q2451) and said that if it came to that situation, there would 
be a “strong debate between the two sides as to what was necessary 
there”, that both sides would “have to reflect on their responsibilities 
and make the appropriate measures and preparations”. 
Seamus Leheny, Northern Ireland Policy Manager at the Freight 
Transport Association, has written about the possible effects of customs 
checks on goods traffic crossing the Northern Irish border: 
Commercial goods vehicle traffic across the Irish border was 
estimated at 4,677,772 vehicle movements for the year 2016, 
according to analysis of TII data by Irish Revenue & Customs This 
works out at a staggering 12,788 commercial vehicle movements 
daily across the border. 
It’s also worth highlighting that compared to 2014, commercial 
vehicle traffic across the Irish Border has increased by 21.4%. This 
clearly demonstrates that both economies, north and south, 
continue to become more reliant on one another as our supply 
chains become more entwined. 
Even if customs checks were to be imposed on cross border traffic 
at the minimum 1% level, then, we would see around 128 
physical inspections of goods vehicles daily. The impact of such 
checks would be additional costs for transport operators, delays 
and missed schedules.202 
He also describes how the logistics of goods transport adds further 
complexities: 
Many cross-border freight movements are consolidated loads: for 
example you could have one lorry carrying forty different 
consignments, each one unique with different points of origin and 
destination. This could mean a check on one pallet of goods on a 
truck could have consequences for dozens of other businesses.203 
The reason most trade experts believe the UK will need to impose 
customs checks on goods coming into Northern Ireland is because of 
the MFN principle, which applies to all WTO agreements (see section 6.1 
above).204 Countries can side-step this principle if they sign free trade 
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agreements with each other or form customs unions, as the WTO 
permits those as ‘exceptions’ to the MFN rule. 
One proposal to avoid infrastructure and checks on the Irish border in a 
no-deal scenario is for the UK to waive checks on goods as they enter 
Northern Ireland. However, if there is no deal, there is also no UK trade 
agreement with the EU, so many trade experts have argued that if the 
UK applied no customs tariffs or checks to EU goods coming across the 
Irish border, MFN requirements mean it would have to do the same for 
all goods coming in from other nations. Aoife O’Donoghue, Professor of 
International Law at the University of Durham, told Channel 4 News: 
If the UK chooses not to impose any tariffs on goods coming 
across the [Irish] border… that would mean that the UK is giving 
the EU (because Ireland is the EU in this context) complete open 
access. So its most favoured nation tariff is zero. That means it 
would have to give a zero tariff access to every single country in 
the WTO.205 
Dr Lorand Bartels, an international trade academic, gave evidence to the 
European Scrutiny Committee (ESC), and was asked what would 
happen if the UK did waive all customs and regulatory checks at the 
Northern Irish border. He suggested that while this would be a problem 
legally, the UK might receive a waiver from the WTO: 
I can only speak about what that would mean legally. It would be 
something of a problem, essentially. The reason is that it would be 
granting the EU preferences that would not be shared with other 
WTO members. I do not think, I should say, that the WTO should 
in reality present this as a major problem. First of all, I have to 
insist as a WTO lawyer that WTO rules are binding and are law.  
However, the reality is that it takes a long time to enforce them. It 
requires countries to complain. They might not see any value in 
complaining. More importantly, though, it would be appropriate 
to ask for a waiver of the WTO to cover this sort of situation, and 
there is a very good chance, given the circumstances of the 
Northern Irish border, that that waiver would be forthcoming. It is 
a technical problem but one that is relatively easily solved. Again, I 
do not know what this actually means on the ground.206 
Federico Fabbrini, Professor of European law at Dublin City University, 
has suggested that the EU could use a previously unused provision in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to remove the need 
for customs checks (but not regulatory checks) in Northern Ireland: 
In the event of a hard Brexit, therefore, contingency plans would 
need to be put in place from the EU side to deal with the sudden 
emergence of a customs border between Ireland and Northern 
Ireland. […] [A]n option that the EU could consider … would be 
to trigger Article XXIV(3) GATT, which introduces the so-called 
“frontier traffic exception” from the MFN principle. Under this 
never-used clause of the GATT, ordinary WTO customs rules “shall 
not be construed to prevent: a) advantages accorded by any 
contracting party to adjacent countries in order to facilitate 
frontier traffic”. Pursuant to this reading, the EU could declare the 
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entire territory of Northern Ireland to be a frontier zone to the EU 
customs union; thereby removing the need for customs controls 
(at least on the EU side) but not the need to SPS checks. Clearly 
this solution would not be problem-free, as it would create a 
loophole in the impermeability of the EU external customs border, 
which could be exploited for illegal purposes. Nevertheless, it 
should remain in the armory of the EU to deal with a thorny 
issue….207 
The ESC also asked Dr Bartels about this exception. He thought it could 
not be extended to the whole of Northern Ireland, as that was not its 
original intention: 
The frontier travel exception is another one [exception] but it does 
not take you very far. The discussions on the frontier traffic 
exception at the time that the rule was drafted made it fairly clear 
that, where we were talking about situations where you had had 
a border running through a city, the traffic that counts as frontier 
traffic is about goods that are produced and consumed within a 
small distance of that border. The figure that was given by the 
United States, which drafted this provision, was 15km either side 
of the border. Essentially what we are talking about is market 
traffic.  
[…] It is not designed to cover whole territories. It is really just for 
market traffic on the border in those sorts of special 
circumstances. It is not really anything more than that. With all 
due respect to my colleague, what he has said has been 
somewhat misunderstood and too much reliance has been placed 
on it.  
[…] Quite clearly, the frontier traffic exception is of no particular 
use here except, if you really wanted to push it, to actual frontier 
traffic that extends in a very, very small zone either side of that 
frontier.208 
David Collins, Professor of International Economic Law at City University, 
London, also told the ESC that this exemption could not cover the 
whole territory of Northern Ireland, but he did say it could help alleviate 
some issues for local goods traffic, explaining: “this is the basis for the 
discussion in some circles about having a two-tier checking system, one 
for local traffic and then another for larger traffic that might have an 
international destination”.209 
Sabine Weyand, the EU Commission’s Deputy Chief Negotiator, told the 
Exiting the EU Committee in September, that such a border zone would 
not satisfy EU concerns about the integrity of the single market: 
You referred to the exemption from MFN provisions in the WTO. 
Now this refers to tariff issues. Indeed you can create an economic 
zone 20 km around the border or wherever, but that does not 
address the issue we face on the island of Ireland.  
Here we are talking very practically about—imagine—an import of 
shrimps from an Asian country where they treat shrimps with 
antibiotics, which are prohibited in the EU because they can lead 
to blindness. Now this shipment arrives in Liverpool and is 
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destined for the market in Northern Ireland and also the EU27. At 
what moment and how do we check that there are no residues of 
prohibited antibiotics? A 20 km zone does not address this issue. 
That is one example.  
The second example is bicycles imported from China on which the 
EU levies anti-dumping duties. Maybe the UK in the future decides 
not to have such anti-dumping duties because you want to have 
your own system on this, so how can we ensure that bicycles, 
arriving in Liverpool again or somewhere else, do not end up 
undermining the anti-dumping duties that the EU is levying? How 
can we avoid that this becomes an entry point into the single 
market? Again, WTO rules on exemptions, of 20 km, do not 
address this issue.  
The third issue—and a very important one—is VAT. How can we 
ensure that VAT is levied correctly? That is a major source of 
revenue for all our member states and is also a major source of 
fraud in the EU but also in the UK. Therefore, we will need to 
have a system where we can protect the integrity of the single 
market and the customs union, in a situation where we do not 
have a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland.  
It is on these very precise and concrete issues that we need to find 
a solution.210 
In the same evidence session, Michel Barnier said that not only were 
checks unavoidable, but there was no neat distinction between customs 
and regulatory checks: 
In the light of your Government’s decision to leave both the single 
market and the customs union, it is obvious that we need to find 
ways and means to set in place a number of checks on goods 
entering Ireland. Without any checks, that would be a breach in 
the single market and customs union. Without checks, we cannot 
guarantee the safety of goods entering into the European Union 
and circulating in it, and vice versa obviously for the British 
market, as far as you are concerned, because the external border 
of your market would be there now.  
In the joint report of December and then in a letter from Theresa 
May in March, the British Government committed itself to 
respecting the integrity of the single market and the customs 
union and the place occupied therein by Ireland. On the ground, 
ladies and gentlemen, it is impossible—this is nothing new—to 
distinguish between customs checks and other regulatory checks. 
The two kinds of checks are intrinsically linked in the technical 
physical organisation of what happens when things are checked 
on that border for the single market.211 
The Prime Minister, in her evidence to the Liaison Committee in July 
2018, suggested that the Government would not automatically impose 
border controls and checks if there were no deal: 
Q4 Hilary Benn: Can you confirm that no deal would mean a 
hard border in Northern Ireland? It’s a very simple question. If 
there is no deal, there will be a hard border.  
The Prime Minister: There isn’t the sort of simple answer to that 
that you are looking for, if I may say so.  
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Q5 Hilary Benn: Really?  
The Prime Minister: Obviously, if we were looking at the 
question of no deal, the United Kingdom would need to consider 
what action we would take in those circumstances, and the Irish 
Government and the European Commission would need to 
consider what action they would take in those circumstances.  
Q6 Hilary Benn: But you have put a huge amount of effort, 
including in your White Paper, into coming up with a proposal to 
avoid a hard border— presumably because, as you said to the 
House of Commons on 9 July, “The friction-free movement of 
goods is the only way to avoid a hard border between Northern 
Ireland and Ireland”. Therefore, if there is no deal, there can’t be 
friction-free movement of goods, and therefore there would be a 
hard border, wouldn’t there?  
The Prime Minister: If there is no deal, there will be decisions for 
the United Kingdom Government to take about the action that it 
takes at its borders. The European Commission is very clear that if 
there is no agreement in relation to customs arrangements, there 
will have to be checks at the border, but, as I say, when you come 
to a circumstance— whatever the circumstances were—we would 
obviously need to look at the situation in which that deal was 
being put in place, the arrangements in which that lack of a deal 
was being put into place, and so forth.  
Q7 Hilary Benn: But we are talking about no deal. You have just 
acknowledged that the Commission has said that checks would 
have to be put in place on the European side. Therefore there 
would be a hard border, and that would be the consequence of 
no deal. I suppose the question is, why would that be worth it? 
You have often said, “We’re prepared to contemplate no deal,” 
although you do not want that outcome. Why would that be a 
price worth paying for Northern Ireland?  
The Prime Minister: If I can just recap on what I said, in my first 
answer in relation to this, I said that if we were in a no-deal 
situation we would obviously have to consider what action we 
were taking, not just in relation to the Northern Ireland border but 
more generally; the European Commission would have to consider 
what action it was taking with its responsibilities for customs, and 
indeed individual Governments would have to consider the action 
that they were taking in those circumstances.  
As you know, the proposals that the European Commission have 
put forward so far have been based on the assumption that, if 
you do not have that frictionless trade, there is that border in 
place. What I am saying is if we were in the circumstances of no 
deal, all the parties concerned would have to consider what action 
they would take.  
8.2 Regulatory checks 
With or without a deal, the Government intends to leave the Single 
Market. The Single Market, as well as removing tariffs and quotas on 
goods trade between Member States, also removes non-tariff barriers to 
trade, such as differing technical specifications and labelling 
requirements (see section 6.2 above).  
The Northern Ireland Affairs Committee report on the land border 
between Northern Ireland and Ireland describes how this regime allows 
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goods to pass across the border currently and the possible effects of the 
UK leaving the Single Market: 
To facilitate the free movement of goods, the Single Market 
operates under the principle of “mutual recognition”. This means 
that any good lawfully produced in one member state can be sold 
in any other. To make this work, the EU has adopted harmonised 
regulatory standards which ensure that all member states observe, 
at a minimum, the same product standards. We heard that 
mutual recognition is “more than just having similar rules”, it 
relies on judicial enforcement and keeping national legislation in 
each member state constantly in alignment. When the UK leaves 
the Single Market, it will no longer be bound by the Single 
Market’s regulatory standards for goods or accept the powers of 
the EU institutions, which means UK and EU goods could cease to 
benefit from mutual recognition in each other’s markets. 
Regulatory differences can create barriers to trade because the 
greater the variance in regulations the more checks are required 
on goods traded between countries. For example, if the UK were 
to diverge from EU prohibitions on genetically modified food or 
chlorine-washed chicken it would become necessary to ensure 
that these goods do not cross the border into the EU via 
Ireland.212 
The debate over what would happen to goods traffic crossing the 
border in a no-deal scenario centres on whether the UK would be 
treated as a third country by the EU or not. While the UK would not be 
part of the Single Market, it would have in place all the EU regulatory 
requirements. But because it would not be legally obliged to maintain 
those requirements, the EU is likely to insist on checks to ensure 
compliance. The EU’s preparedness notices assume that the UK will be 
treated as a third country. The new requirements for businesses seeking 
to export to the EU, particularly on health and food safety, are 
extensive. 
According to the Institute for Government (IfG), “[c]ustoms checks 
account for less than half of the border formalities“ and regulatory 
checks are more “onerous” than customs checks.213  The European 
Commission has produced a slide showing that most checks and 
controls on goods entering and exiting the EU are not related to 
customs duties.  
Live animals, food and other agricultural products, are amongst the 
most regulated goods and therefore have the most rigorous regime of 
checks and controls. Regulatory checks would have a heavy impact on 
Irish border traffic because of the large volume of trade in these 
products across the border. 
The Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, in their 
report Brexit: Trade in food, looked at the volume of trade in these 
goods across the Irish border and the potential impact of a harder 
border: 
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111.The trade in live cattle and sheep, and beef and lamb across 
the Northern Ireland/Republic of Ireland border takes place on a 
daily basis, with approximately 390,000 live lambs crossing the 
border annually. The Livestock and Meat Commission for 
Northern Ireland told us that the Northern Ireland sheep industry 
was particularly exposed to the effects of more complicated 
border arrangements, with approximately 45% of all lambs born 
in Northern Ireland exported to the Republic of Ireland each year. 
In 2016, the value of this live trade was approximately £31.5 
million. 
112.The dairy industries in Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland act as one through the supply chain, and dairy products 
cross the border several times between the farm gate and the 
consumer. Republic of Ireland dairy co-operatives own 
approximately 60% of the processing capacity in Northern Ireland. 
Exports to the Republic of Ireland were approximately 15% of 
total sales of the Northern Ireland dairy industry in 2015. 
113.Witnesses told us that it was essential that two-way access 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland remained 
“without tariffs and free from burdensome non-tariff 
administrative measures”. Dairy UK said that a hard border would 
be the least desirable option for the dairy industry.214 
The report also describes the regime for third countries to export live 
animals and animal products to the EU: 
104. Any consignment of animals or animal products from third 
countries to the EU, may only enter the EU at a designated border 
inspection post (BIP). All such consignments of imported animal 
food products are subject to a documentary, identity and possibly 
physical examination at the first point of entry into the EU, and all 
consignments must pay a hygiene inspection charge depending 
upon the type and amount of the commodity being examined. 
These charges are harmonised, laid down in EU legislation and 
quite independent of any customs dues payable. 
[…] There are no control points at the land border between the 
Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.215 
In the event of no deal, if the EU insists on such checks, and in the 
absence of border inspection posts, it is unclear how such products 
could enter Ireland from Northern Ireland. 
Seamus Leheny explains in more detail the checks on animal products, 
and the requirements if there were no special agreement between the 
UK and the EU to bypass them: 
Customs checks on things like tariffs is only the tip of the iceberg 
in terms of checks, and there is potentially an even bigger 
problem facing supply chain logistics on the Island of Ireland. 
Council Directive 97/78/EC of 18 December 1997 states that food 
products of animal origin, including meat, entering the EU shall be 
subjected to veterinary checks. There are three elements to these 
checks: 
1 – Documentary Checks: Verifying the veterinary certificates and 
documents accompanying the consignment. 
                                                                                               
214  Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, 3rd Report - Brexit: Trade in 
Food, HC 348, 18 February 2018 
215  Ibid 
85 Commons Library Briefing, 10 September 2018 
2 – Identity Checks: Check to ensure products in vehicle match 
those described in documents. This will mean physical inspection 
of vehicle to check seal numbers. 
3 – Physical Check: Here the consignment is physically inspected, 
and this can include examining the packaging, checking 
temperatures, sending samples for to a lab analysis, or even 
smelling or tasting a product. 
The EU stipulates the frequency of checks as follows: 
 
Veterinary checks must take place at the physical point where 
goods enter the EU so without some special agreement, veterinary 
checks and the associated infrastructure would have to be put 
into place at the Irish Border in order to protect the integrity of 
the European food supply chain. This would result in every such 
load having to stop to lodge documents, ID checks and potentially 
a physical inspection. 
The UK may also have to reciprocate such checks for goods 
entering Northern Ireland and Great Britain as potential future 
trade partners will want to limit the UK market from the supply of 
similar EU products that they wish to sell us instead.216 
Professor David Collins, however, believes that WTO agreements to 
which the EU are a party would prevent such a regime of checks being 
imposed on UK exports. He wrote in The Spectator in August 2018: 
While EU leaders like to threaten us with hints that our exports 
would be unsellable in the EU, the fact is that non-tariff barriers 
such as arbitrary health and safety inspections and borders would 
be prohibited under the WTO’s Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) 
and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreements. The UK intends 
to retain conformity with EU regulations following Brexit, at least 
for the time being, meaning that the existing low levels of health 
and safety risks to the public in UK products will not change in the 
days after Brexit. There would, as a result, be no grounds for the 
EU to exclude our goods from its markets. 
The WTO’s new Trade Facilitation Agreement obliges the EU to 
maintain borders which are as frictionless as possible, using 
modern technologies such as pre–arrival processing of documents 
and electronic payments. Discrimination against foreign products 
through all sorts of internal regulations is forbidden. These rules 
are enforced by a well-respected international tribunal which has 
a high rate of compliance and cannot be overruled by the 
European Court of Justice.217 
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Professor Collins’ view is not shared by the majority of trade experts. 
Financial journalist Therese Raphael disagrees that regulatory goods 
checks are prohibited by WTO agreements: “Prohibited is a strong 
word. In fact, the WTO tells members to enter into consultations, but it 
doesn't force them to recognize another's standards”.218 She also 
disputes Collins’ representation of what the WTO Trade Facilitation 
Agreement requires: 
Similarly, the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement aims at 
frictionless borders, but the idea that it could be used to prevent 
border infrastructure in Ireland after a no-deal Brexit is fanciful. 
Every developed country has signed up to it, including some 
famously non-porous borders, which tells you something about its 
teeth. 
While EU members may individually want to recognize British 
goods as compliant, the EU's Customs Code imposes more 
onerous procedures and checks on third-party goods than those 
member states are subjected to. For example, U.K. exporters 
would have to complete, among other forms, a Single 
Administrative Document, with 54 parts, for each declaration. 
They would lose access to the New Computerized Transit System, 
the IT system that facilitates trade. 
This isn't the EU deciding to be obstreperous or imposing new 
barriers; it's a legal thing -- or, as Stojanovic put it in a 
conversation, it's literally a case of "computer says no." The U.K. 
will be treated like any other outside country. 
The U.K. government could take the EU to a dispute resolution 
body to complain that its standards haven't been automatically 
recognized. But good luck with that; the EU would fight any 
attack on its single market rights vigorously and it would all take a 
very long time to resolve.219 
Dmitry Grozoubinski, a former WTO negotiator for Australia, supports 
this view and has said:  
The SPS and TBT agreements call for technical regulations to be 
evidence based, to serve a policy objective and to minimally distort 
trade. They do NOT prevent, for example, the EU from requiring 
certification by an EU authority (which, absent an agreement, UKs 
won't be). 
Peter Ungphakorn, a former senior information officer with the WTO 
Secretariat, looked specifically at what the WTO’s Trade Facilitation 
Agreement says about checks on goods: 
Basically, the Trade Facilitation Agreement is irrelevant to the 
question of whether the UK and EU can check each other’s 
goods. […] 
The agreement is important. The main purpose is to slash the 
costs of trading by cutting red tape when goods cross borders. So 
it calls for streamlined procedures, paperwork handled 
electronically and as simply as possible, and so on. It also breaks 
new ground by allowing developing countries to promise to 
reform their procedures on condition they receive aid to 
implement it. 
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Because customs and other procedures in developing countries 
tend to be slow and cumbersome, it’s these countries that stand 
to gain the most from implementing the agreement. 
But it would be wrong to say the agreement is targeted at only or 
even mainly developing countries. Far from it. There are important 
provisions that developed countries like the EU and UK have to 
respect or face legal challenges. 
It’s just that the provisions dealing with electronic paperwork and 
streamlined procedures don’t fall into that category. They are 
written in a way that only requires countries to do their best to 
comply. And what “doing their best” means is left up to them.220 
But Dr Bartels’ view (which he acknowledges is not shared by all his 
colleagues or the EU) is that the UK’s current alignment with the EU’s 
regulations on goods could mean checks are not technically required 
straight away post-Brexit: 
If on Brexit day the regulations that the UK has are considered by 
law and in fact the EU to be no more burdensome than necessary 
to achieve the EU’s objectives, and that is because they are the 
same as the EU’s regulations, I cannot see how that changes on 
Brexit day plus one. Down the track, things change, of course, 
and there are other aspects to this. One has to also look at the 
rules on checking for regulatory compliance and that depends on 
trust and there are slightly different rules that apply to that.  
Just in terms of the underlying standards, yes, that is my view. I 
should say that it is an unpopular view, in Brussels and elsewhere 
and among my colleagues, but that is my view.221 
However, he also thought the EU would still probably impose regulatory 
checks on goods coming into the EU in the event of no deal, saying 
“you cannot stop that. It is the EU’s border. It is going to protect it”.222 
There is no clarity at present as to exactly how goods traffic across the 
border will be managed in the event of no deal. The UK Government’s 
own guidance on what would happen has little or no detail at present 
on regulatory/ sanitary and phytosanitary checks, although it is expected 
to publish more information in the coming weeks. Currently, there is 
one section on trading across the Irish border in the technical note on 
‘Trading with the EU if there's no Brexit deal, which reads: 
The Irish government have indicated they would need to discuss 
arrangements in the event of no deal with the European 
Commission and EU member states. We would recommend that, 
if you trade across the land border, you should consider whether 
you will need advice from the Irish government about 
preparations you need to make.223 
VAT would also need to be collected on goods travelling from Northern 
Ireland to the Republic Ireland, and vice-versa, in the event of a no deal 
scenario. There is already a VAT border between Ireland and Northern 
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Ireland, as VAT and excise are not fully harmonised across the EU, 
meaning that both territories apply different levels of VAT to different 
goods. However, the need for infrastructure at the border has been 
abolished, by the introduction of an EU common regulatory framework 
under which businesses can sell goods with 0% VAT on the 
understanding that it will be paid by the recipient business. This 
arrangement relies on the VAT Information Exchange System (VIES) via 
which information on cross-border movements of goods is transmitted 
between the EU’s national tax authorities. In contrast, customs officials 
at the EU’s external border have a duty to ensure that the correct Value 
Added Tax (VAT) is paid on imports.224 The Government also accepted, 
in its technical note on the “temporary customs arrangement”, that “to 
avoid a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, the 
application of common cross-border processes and procedures for VAT 
and excise would be necessary”.225 
8.3 Impact on trade and the economy 
The latest HMRC regional trade statistics show that Northern Ireland 
exported £2.8 billion worth of goods and services to Ireland - around 
33% of the region’s exports - and imported £2.1 billion of goods and 
services from Ireland - 28% of its imports.226 According to the IfG, agri-
food accounts for close to 40% of Northern Irish exports to Ireland.227 
The organisation InterTradeIreland228 commissioned the Economic and 
Social Research Institute (ESRI), an Irish think tank, to conduct analysis of 
the impact of Brexit on the Irish border. ESRI looked at several different 
scenarios, including one where trade between Ireland and the UK would 
be based on WTO rules. The resulting imposition of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers in this scenario could result in Irish trade to Great Britain falling 
by 12%, British trade to Ireland falling by 6%, Irish trade to Northern 
Ireland falling by 14%, and Northern Irish trade to Ireland falling by 
19% - resulting in a total reduction in cross-border trade of 16%.229 
However, they also a modelled a scenario where, as well as these trade 
barriers being imposed, there was a 10% fall in the value of the pound 
sterling (this is similar to the fall in the pound immediately after the EU 
referendum). Most economists believe there will be a significant drop in 
the value of the pound if the UK leaves the EU with no deal. The fall in 
sterling in ESRI’s analysis would, for British and Northern Irish trade, 
partly mitigate the effects of the trade barriers being imposed, but it 
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would worsen the outcome for Irish exports to Britain and Northern 
Ireland. 
 
In this scenario Irish trade to Great Britain would fall by 20%, British 
trade to Ireland would remain broadly similar ( at +0.3 %), Irish trade to 
Northern Ireland would fall 21%, and Northern Irish trade to Ireland 
would fall 11% - so there would be a total fall in cross-border trade of 
17%.230 
 
The study also looked at trade of different categories of goods. It 
predicts that the volume of trade in agri-foods in particular would see 
large falls. In a no-deal scenario231 they foresee that trade in meat and 
fish from Ireland to Northern Ireland could fall by 65%, while from 
Northern Ireland to Ireland it could fall 26%. Figures for dairy products 
were a fall of 66% and 52% respectively. A few categories of goods 
could see some increases in trade volumes from Northern Ireland to 
Ireland; for example, machinery and electrical goods might rise 6%.232 
If the Government were to unilaterally waive customs and regulatory 
controls for goods entering the UK via the land border with Ireland, 
there would be a potential loss of revenue from the non-collection of 
import duties, VAT and excise. Jon Thompson, Chief Executive of 
HMRC, discussed this issue with the House of Lords EU External Affairs 
Sub-Committee. He talked of the ‘trilemma’ that faced the government 
for all of the UK’s external borders:  
Ministers would need to make a decision about the free flow of 
trade, the security of the United Kingdom and the raising of 
revenue, because those are the current three objectives at the 
border. In the scenario you are setting out [no deal], some choice 
may have to be made between those three objectives in the run-
up to April 2019.233 
Mel Stride, financial secretary to the Treasury, acknowledged this trade 
off to the same Committee.234 Mr Stride emphasised to the Sub-
Committee that there were already checks in place at the moment in 
Northern Ireland away from the border to prevent excise fraud, and this 
capacity could be used in the event of no deal: 
People assume that in Ireland there are no checks or interventions 
going on with goods going across, but of course there are. There 
is a substantial amount of trafficking, fuel laundering and tobacco 
smuggling. There are interceptions inland in Northern Ireland, so it 
is not the case that we would not have the ability to function in 
that particular environment, but there would clearly be some very 
significant restrictions.235 
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The Financial Times reporting on the Committee’s evidence session said, 
“the revenue losses have the potential to be large if the UK does not 
collect taxes at the border”.236 
8.4 Movement of people 
The movement of people across the Irish border has remained a 
relatively uncontentious part of the negotiations and poses fewer issues 
compared to the movement of goods. This is largely because of the 
Common Travel Area (CTA) between Ireland and the UK. The CTA 
allows British and Irish nationals to travel freely within the CTA without 
being subject to passport controls. The CTA is based on bilateral 
agreements and domestic legislation in the UK and Ireland that should 
be largely unaffected by Brexit. Both sides in the negotiations have 
agreed articles relating to the CTA in the draft Withdrawal Agreement. 
Another factor that makes the movement of people simpler in any 
Brexit scenario is that both Ireland and the UK are outside the Schengen 
Area.237  
Bernard Ryan, Professor of immigration law at the University of 
Leicester, told the Lords EU Committee that the continuation of CTA 
arrangements post-Brexit would be compatible with EU law:  
There is no apparent legal reason why the Republic of Ireland 
should not retain the benefit of Protocols 19 and 20 [Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union] after Brexit, so as to 
permit bilateral co-operation with the United Kingdom outside the 
Schengen Zone.238 
In theory, a no-deal Brexit should not imperil such co-operation. For 
more information on the CTA see Library Briefing Paper: The Common 
Travel Area, and the special status of Irish nationals in UK law. 
However, the CTA only applies to Irish and UK citizens. Arrangements 
for non-CTA nationals are more complex. Although there are minimal 
immigration checks for journeys started within the CTA, non-CTA 
nationals must have the relevant immigration permission for the country 
they are seeking to enter. 
There is also the issue of frontier workers - EU citizens who live in one 
Member State and work in another. The Irish journalist Tony Connelly, 
in his book on Brexit and Ireland, explains how Brexit could affect their 
status: 
For those who are neither Irish nor British citizens, and who live 
and work on different sides of the Irish border, the prospects are 
particularly uncertain. Unlike citizens of Ireland and the UK, they 
are not protected by the provisions of the Common Travel Area. 
Under EU rules, such people are regarded as ‘frontier workers’. 
That means they enjoy certain rights, such as access to medical 
services-including the right to a medical card-on the side of the 
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border where they work. There are similar rights regarding social-
welfare and pension payments. 
When Britain leaves the EU, those rights will fall. That would 
mean, for example, Lithuanian lorry drivers or mushroom 
harvesters who live in the North and work in the South (or vice 
versa) will no longer be regarded as frontier workers protected by 
EU rights. It is understood, however, that their particular situation 
will be looked at during the two-year withdrawal negotiations.239 
The draft Withdrawal Agreement protects the rights of frontier workers, 
allowing EU and UK citizens to exercise their rights up to the end of the 
transition period (see Articles 9, and 22-24). It also allows frontier 
workers to exit and enter the UK and Ireland for work without requiring 
a visa,240 although it does require workers to have either a passport or 
official identification card to cross borders. But if there is no deal, none 
of these provisions will be in force, meaning that frontier workers could 
find themselves in a legal limbo. 
8.5 Security concerns 
The UK Government’s position paper on the Irish border states that “the 
invisible and open border between Northern Ireland and Ireland is, as 
the Irish Government has said, arguably ‘the most tangible symbol of 
the peace process’”. The paper also notes that the Belfast (‘Good 
Friday’) Agreement included a specific commitment to “the removal of 
security installations”.241 
 
George Hamilton, Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland (PSNI), said in an interview with the Guardian in February that 
any infrastructure on the border would become a target for dissident 
republicans: 
“Our assessment is that they would be a target because it would 
be representative of the state and in their minds fair game for 
attack. I would assume that that assessment is shared by senior 
politicians and officials who are negotiating Brexit. 
“While I am chief constable I do not want to enter the political 
debate over Brexit but I still think it’s fair to comment on some of 
its implications and scenarios. And a hard border from a policing 
perspective would not be a good outcome because it would a 
create a focus and a target.” 
He said fixed frontier customs and security posts would expose 
PSNI officers to greater danger than they already face from anti-
peace process republican paramilitaries. 
“Anything that makes the police presence predictable in places 
where terrorists are active of course raises the threat and increases 
the harm to my officers. We deal with risk every day and we are 
good at it but unfortunately the terrorists only have to be lucky 
once and get a result with catastrophic consequences. I think it 
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would be a poor use of police resources if we are going to have to 
protect physical infrastructures at the border.” 
Mr Hamilton thought hard border installations “could have a negative 
political impact” in Ireland and Northern Ireland, “re-emphasising the 
context and the causes of the conflict” and so creating tensions and 
challenges that the Good Friday Agreement had helped to dispel. 
Determined dissident republicans, he said, might regard such 
infrastructure on the northern side of the border “as a representation of 
the UK state”. He thought he might need more policing resources: 
Asked if his force’s strength of 6,700 officers could properly police 
the 300-mile Irish border, Hamilton said that unless there were 
extra numbers recruited resources would have to taken away from 
other areas of policing. 
“There would be an increased demand due to a hard border and 
a pull of resources towards that which means either an uplift in 
police funding or else we would have to have reduced levels of 
service in other areas.” 
In a May 2018 paper on the Irish border, the think-tank Policy Exchange 
argued that concerns about Brexit affecting peace in Northern Ireland 
were overblown:  
The weak arguments that Brexit somehow endangers peace or 
undermines the Good Friday agreement have been allowed to 
take hold. Neither argument bears much examination, but 
importantly they have received minimal examination – and have 
been repeated unthinkingly in the British media. Sinn Fein’s Gerry 
Adams and Colm Eastwood, leader of the nationalist SDLP, have 
both stated that no general breakdown in peace is likely. Adams 
instead stresses the dangers to human rights from Brexit although 
few lawyers appear to agree with him.  
The real danger is not any general return to the Troubles but 
rather that border infrastructure can be attacked, and officials 
attempting to protect or replace it may be put at risk. It is this risk 
which motivates the UK Government to promise a border with no 
infrastructure at all. Of course, the huge attention drawn to the 
border issue in the media makes it almost inevitable that dissident 
republicans would attempt some attack. This may however be a 
short-term danger. Once Brexit is complete, with no-one stopped 
at the border and with no visible infrastructure, any danger is 
likely to subside.242 
Suzanne Breen, a Northern Irish journalist, argues in the Belfast 
Telegraph that even if infrastructure were put in place, while it might 
serve as a reminder of previous partition, the security threat is much 
reduced from the past: 
There are many legitimate concerns around Brexit and its effects 
on both sides of the border. But claiming it's a ticking time bomb 
for the peace process is quite simply scaremongering. 
The customs checkpoints which existed along the border for 
almost half a decade after partition played no part in violence 
erupting here in 1969. 
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That IRA campaign was firmly rooted in the denial of civil rights - 
jobs, housing and political equality. A return to the border as we 
knew it from the 1970s onwards - with British soldiers in 
watchtowers on the hillsides above checkpoints - is not on the 
cards. 
Of course, the introduction of any infrastructure will serve as a 
reminder - and perhaps an uncomfortable one for some - that 
partition and the border still do exist. But the youth of 
Ballymurphy or the Bogside will not go out to kill or be killed 
because of customs controls. 
And who exactly are expected to wage any new armed campaign 
anyway? The Provisionals' war is over. Dissident republicans are 
having some success in recruiting young people in working-class 
nationalist areas, but I guarantee that none of those joining up 
are citing Brexit and the possibility of customs posts as their 
reasons.243 
The IfG summarised the findings of a May 2018 study from Queen’s 
University Belfast on Northern Irish attitudes to border checks: 
‘There is substantial and intense opposition to possible North-
South border checks [of the kind that would be required if the UK 
were to become a third country with no special arrangements] 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland and to East-
West border checks between Northern Ireland and Great Britain.’ 
The report found that around 60% of people surveyed would 
support peaceful protests against checks on the border. It also 
noted that there is little support for violence against border 
infrastructure, with ‘only 5% of the population as a whole… fairly 
or very supportive of vandalising border technology’. But the 
authors found that in focus group discussions, ‘there are strong 
expectations that protests against either North-South or East-West 
border checks would quickly deteriorate into violence.’244 
8.6 Energy 
There has been an all-island electricity market on the island of Ireland 
since 2007. Although Northern Ireland is a net exporter of electricity (i.e. 
it exports more than it imports), it still relies on electricity imports from 
Ireland when there is insufficient local electricity generation capacity. 
The Financial Times reported in July that ‘no deal’ could have a 
significant impact on the energy market in Northern Ireland, and the 
Government had drawn up emergency plans that could mean electricity 
generators being requisitioned to provide power for the region: 
Thousands of electricity generators would have to be requisitioned 
at short notice and put on barges in the Irish Sea to help keep the 
lights on in Northern Ireland in the event of the hardest no-deal 
Brexit, according to one paper drawn up by Whitehall officials.  
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That could involve bringing back equipment from far-flung 
countries such as Afghanistan – where the UK is still part of Nato-
led operations – said people familiar with the paper’s contents.245  
However, the Single Electricity Market (SEM) is based on bilateral 
agreement between the UK and Ireland, so according to ESRI, “should 
the UK leave the EU, the previous bilateral agreements would remain in 
force”.246 But some experts say the SEM is, in turn, reliant on the EU’s 
own Internal Energy Market (IEM – see section 12.1 below), so there 
could be consequences for the UK. Robert McCormick, general 
manager of the System Operator for Northern Ireland (SONI) which 
operates the electricity system in Northern Ireland, told the House of 
Lords EU Committee that “If GB is not part of the IEM, onward trading 
[from Northern Ireland] with Europe will be extremely difficult (if not 
impossible)”.247 
Other experts giving evidence to the Committee thought the SEM 
should be able to function even if the UK was no longer in the IEM.248 
If a no-deal scenario did result in disruption of energy supplies across 
the border, there would be significant impacts on both Ireland and 
Northern Ireland. A European Parliament report in November 2017 
described Ireland’s dependency on UK gas supplies: 
Gas supplies are of crucial importance to Ireland because gas plays 
a central role in electricity generation. Because of this, any 
interruption to supply could have very serious consequences. 
Nearly all of the gas used in Ireland comes through the 
interconnectors with the UK.249 
The Government’s position paper on Northern Ireland and Ireland states 
“the continued ability to trade gas between Great Britain and the island 
of Ireland is also critical for security of supply and efficient market 
operation”.250 
The UK is a net importer of gas from Europe, so it in turn relies on gas 
imports from mainland Europe, which could also be threatened by a no-
deal scenario. 
If there is no deal, tariffs on energy supplies would probably not be 
imposed by either side. The EP report (see above) stated that “for WTO 
members the EU has no tariff on electricity or gas imports”,251 but also 
warned: 
Gas and electricity markets are complex service markets, not 
simple commodities markets, and the EU is in the process of 
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streamlining the interface between national market designs to 
create a single energy market.252 
8.7 Other areas 
There are other areas of cross-border cooperation that would be 
affected by ‘no deal’. The UK and EU Brexit negotiators have conducted 
a joint ‘mapping exercise’ to identify cross-border policy areas that could 
be affected by Brexit and have reportedly found 142 of them. These 
142 areas are all a subset of the six areas of North-South economic co-
operation identified in the Good Friday Agreement: transport, 
agriculture, education, health, environment and tourism. 
The December 2017 Joint Report says the mapping exercise: 
[s]hows that North-South cooperation relies to a significant extent 
on a common European Union legal and policy framework. 
Therefore, the United Kingdom’s departure from the European 
Union gives rise to substantial challenges to the maintenance and 
development of North-South cooperation.253 
In evidence to the Lords EU Committee, Dominic Raab was asked if he 
would share the conclusions of the exercise. He replied that the 
“exercise has been going well”, but that he would “need to get a final 
readout of the timeframes”. This suggests it is still work in progress.254 
There is more detail on the effect of no deal on transport across the Irish 
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9. Free movement of people, 
healthcare, social security and 
pensions 
9.1 Free movement of people 
A significant number of so-called ‘citizens’ rights’ will be affected by 
Brexit.  The primary one is the free movement of persons’ rights, 
whereby currently any EU national can work in, live in or provide 
services in any EU Member State, providing they meet the conditions set 
out in the EU Treaties and Directive 2004/38/EC (the ‘Citizenship 
Directive’).  These primary ‘residency’ rights are complemented by a 
variety of further rights, co-ordinating social security coverage for 
mobile EU nationals and enabling them to access healthcare, education 
and so on.  
 
This section will address the primary ‘residency’ rights and how they 
would be affected by a ‘no deal’ Brexit; secondary rights stemming from 
the primary free movement of persons rights are discussed in the 
subsequent sections. In particular, it is unclear whether UK nationals 
would continue to be covered by the EU legislation that helps 
coordinate social security in the EU27 – nor is it clear whether they 
would be able to continue to access UK social security benefits in the 
EU27 Member State they currently reside in.  
The following sections look both at EU nationals living in the UK and UK 
nationals living in the EU27. 
EU nationals living in the UK 
EU nationals resident in the UK at the moment of ‘withdrawal’ will be 
covered by one of two legal regimes in the absence of a concluded 
Withdrawal Agreement.  This is dependent on the speed with which the 
UK Parliament legislates to bring the negotiated ‘citizens’ rights’ chapter 
of the Withdrawal Agreement into force in the UK – which it can do 
entirely separately from actually concluding that agreement with the EU. 
Settled Status 
If the ‘citizens’ rights’ legislation is domestically implemented by 29 
March 2019, this would mean the rights of EU nationals in the UK, from 
30 March 2019 onwards, would actually be those rights agreed with 
the EU in the draft Withdrawal Agreement. All EU nationals resident in 
the UK at the date of withdrawal would be eligible for either ‘settled 
status’ itself – a new ‘permanent residency’, and a purely UK domestic 
status – or for the pathway to ‘settled status’, called ‘pre-settled status’, 
whereby they can qualify for ‘settled status’ by exercising relevant EU 
Treaty Rights for a period of five years. 
The EU Treaties themselves will no longer be binding on the UK at this 
time, but domestic legislation that refers to these Treaties will 
nonetheless be legally valid.  Consequently, as set out in the Home 
Office’s statement of intent on ‘settled status’, EU nationals exercising 
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Treaty rights will be entitled to a temporary or permanent status 
document and will continue to qualify for those documents providing 
they meet the three conditions necessary under the proposed ‘settled 
status’ legislation: 
• identity: they hold an EU nationality (or are a qualifying family 
member of an EU national); 
• eligibility: they are resident in the UK as ‘eligible’ (meaning 
Treaty-rights exercising) EU nationals; 
• suitability: they pass a criminality check. 
The ‘settled status’ statement of intent makes clear that the status 
entitles qualifying EU nationals and their family members to “the same 
access as they currently do to healthcare, pensions and other benefits in 
the UK”.  This means in practice that access to all domestic public 
services that EU nationals can currently access if resident in the UK will 
continue.  
Recent UK Government statements have suggested that it is the UK’s 
intention to implement the ‘settled status’ regime regardless of whether 
a deal is successfully concluded with the EU.   
On 11 July 2018, Minister of State for Immigration Caroline Nokes gave 
evidence to the Exiting the EU Committee on the ‘settled status’ regime 
in the event of no deal: 
Chair: […] What happens to people who have been given settled 
status—because you have rolled it out and they have made an 
early application—if we end up with no deal?  
Caroline Nokes: I keep our commitments in this offer to EU 
citizens very seriously indeed. The Prime Minister has been very 
clear that we want EU citizens who are here to be able to stay 
here, and we recognise the very significant contribution they 
make to our communities and, indeed, to our economy. This is an 
international obligation that I take very seriously. We do not 
anticipate that there will be no deal, and in the event of no deal I 
personally hope that we will uphold everything that we have said 
and make sure that we deliver on our commitment to EU citizens.  
Chair: That is very helpful. The Government are spending quite a 
lot of money preparing, just in case there is no deal; but leave that 
on one side. I take it from what you said that Government are 
saying to anyone listening who is an EU citizen, “Look, whether 
there is a deal or not we are going to do right by you and you will 
be able to stay”. I think that clarity will be quite helpful, because if 
there is not clarity and people say, “We are preparing for no deal. 
No deal is a possibility”, it could create anxiety, as I am sure you 
would accept, on the part of the 3 million European citizens 
currently in the UK if they felt there was any doubt about their 
continuing right to reside in the UK.  
Caroline Nokes: Once we have opened the scheme and 
someone has achieved settled status, it is the equivalent of 
indefinite leave to remain. We would not be able to take that 
away from them. If they have it they will be able to keep it. 
This echoes the statement made by Home Secretary Sajid Javid before 
the Lords EU Select Committee on 21 June 2018: 
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Lord Judd: Can you guarantee to us that the agreement on EU 
citizens’ rights that has been reached with the EU will be 
honoured, even if the UK is unable to reach an acceptable deal 
with the EU 27 under Article 50? 
Sajid Javid MP: The Prime Minister has been clear on this issue 
from day one, and I shall repeat her words. She said that EU 
citizens living lawfully in the UK will be able to stay. No matter 
what happens, if you are living lawfully in the UK you will be able 
to stay. Our focus has been, understandably, that we will get a 
deal—I am confident about that—and we are working on that 
basis. We have already reached agreement with the EU on 
citizens’ rights, in both the December and March agreements. 
That is what we are working on in honouring through this scheme 
and that is where our focus has been. 
If there is no ‘settled status’ 
Should Parliament for any reason not legislate to bring the proposed 
‘settled status’ regime into effect before 29 March 2019, the status of 
EU nationals resident in the UK on exit day will continue to be 
determined by the current legislation applicable to EU and EEA 
nationals.  The Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2016 will, under the EU 
Withdrawal Act 2018, be ‘retained’ and so remain in force unless 
repealed by either the ‘settled status’ legislation or any other future 
legislation. 
Again, it is irrelevant that the EEA Regulations refer to Treaties that the 
UK is no longer bound by upon withdrawal from the EU: they confer 
rights within the UK to nationals of Member States, defined as the 
Member States of the EU, and consequently will continue to cover all EU 
nationals resident in the UK in the same way they do now.  The related 
‘primary’ rights that EU nationals hold, such as the ability to access 
healthcare services, are rooted purely in domestic law that references 
the concepts in the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2016. So, for 
example, EU nationals exercising Treaty rights are generally considered 
to be ‘ordinarily resident’ in the UK and can on that basis access the 
NHS without payment under the NHS Act 2006.  
This legislation is likely to be replaced with alternative immigration rules 
for EU nationals, either if a deal is concluded or in the absence of a deal. 
The ‘settled status’ regime is only intended to cover those EU nationals 
who were resident in the UK before its formal withdrawal 
(transition/implementation period included) from the EU.  Any EU 
national moving to the UK outside that time period will need to be 
covered by a to-be-proposed domestic immigration regime.  The Home 
Affairs Committee’s interim report on future migration from the EEA 
published on 31 July 2018 stresses that in the absence of a government 
White Paper on immigration or an Immigration Bill, there is “little 
indication” of what this future immigration regime will look like.  In the 
event of a deal, the future immigration regime may be the product of 
negotiations between the EU and the UK; in the absence of a deal, it is 
likely to be a purely domestic policy consideration. 
However, the comments made by Sajid Javid (as cited above) make clear 
that it is not the Government’s intention to remove existing statuses 
from any EU nationals currently resident under EU law, and it can be 
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assumed this will apply even if the ‘settled status’ legislation is not 
implemented. While it is therefore likely that the Immigration (EEA) 
Regulations will be repealed and replaced with domestic legislation that 
does not cross-reference the EU Treaties, the Government’s position is 
that resident EU nationals should be granted a temporary or indefinite 
leave to remain in the UK under UK law. 
Dominic Raab emphasised on 21 August that the rights of EU nationals 
to at least “stay” in the UK would be protected in the event of ‘no 
deal’: 
We hugely value the contribution of EU citizens here in the UK 
and I am confident that in the unlikely eventuality that we don't 
have a deal, we will move swiftly to secure their position. It is 
inconceivable we would do anything other than make sure that 
they are legally in a position where they're secure to stay. … we 
are talking about real people...and we have got a moral 
obligation. There's no question that we're going to see EU citizens 
turfed out. We've made that clear in the past. I've made that clear 
in the past, I'm happy to give that reassurance today.255 
This reassurance, however, does not address what rights EU nationals 
will hold in the UK if no deal be reached and if there is no legislation in 
place for ‘settled status’. 
Other rights and unknowns 
Unless the Government’s position changes significantly, all rights 
described as ‘primary’ – e.g. the ability to live in, work in, study in and 
access public services in the UK – will be retained, at least in the short 
run, by EU nationals living in the UK, even in the event of ‘no deal’.  
However, the situation with respect to secondary rights – particularly 
those relating to rights that are dependent on not only UK public 
services, but also public services in the EU27 – is significantly different. 
This is discussed in the sections below. 
The position for EU nationals who are ‘visiting’ rather than ‘resident’ will 
also change as a result of Brexit.  Regarding access to healthcare, for 
example, at the moment EU national visitors to the UK are not charged 
for using the NHS under an exemption in the NHS (Charges to Overseas 
Visitors) Regulations 2015. But this exemption applies to those present 
in the UK and having rights stemming from secondary EU law, such as 
the social security coordinating Regulation 883/2004/EC.  It is not clear 
if the concepts contained in that Regulation (such as a ‘home Member 
State’ or a ‘host Member State’) will continue to operate logically in the 
UK, even if the Regulation itself is ‘retained’.  The UK would have to 
identify itself (presumably in domestic legislation) as a ‘host Member 
State’ in order for that regulation to continue to operate with respect to 
the UK post-Brexit..  Other rights mutually agreed for ‘short-term’ EU 
national visitors (as opposed to EU nationals exercising free movement 
rights for longer than three months) are likely to experience similar 
problems without domestic amending legislation. 
A further question that remains unanswered by the current legislative 
proposals relates to the future of non-EU EEA and Swiss nationals in the 
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UK.  As the current withdrawal negotiations are taking place with the 
EU27 alone, while the EU free movement of persons rights are also 
applicable to the non-EU EEA states under the EEA Agreement and to 
Switzerland by means of bilateral agreements, the rights of non-EU EEA 
and Swiss nationals are not addressed by the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement.  On this point, the Home Office’s statement of intent on 
‘settled status’ gives the following insight: 
Whilst the agreement with the EU does not cover the citizens of 
the non-EU European Economic Area states (Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway) and Switzerland, we have been clear that we want 
to secure a similar deal for citizens of these states living in the UK 
and for UK nationals living there. Talks with all four states are 
progressing well 7 and pending final agreement being reached 
with each on the detail of the arrangements, the Government 
intends that the scheme described in this Statement of Intent will 
be open to other EEA citizens and Swiss citizens (and their family 
members) on a similar basis as for EU citizens.  
UK nationals in the EU 
The legal situation of UK nationals resident in one of the EU27 Member 
States at the time of UK withdrawal is much less certain. While they are 
intended to be covered by the Withdrawal Agreement, and this will 
preserve a significant number of their rights, their status in the absence 
of a Withdrawal Agreement is dependent on domestic law in each of 
the EU Member States. The Withdrawal Agreement, if concluded, will 
produce a single regime that all Member States will apply to EU 
nationals – but reports to date (from, among others, the European 
Parliament) suggest that the Member States are not making significant 
strides in preparing to implement that legislation or produce any other 
legislation in the event of a no-deal Brexit. 
This is problematic for UK nationals resident in the EU27. The legislation 
in each of the EU27 currently gives UK nationals rights to reside purely 
on the basis that they are ‘EU nationals’. They do not have specific 
rights to reside as UK nationals, much as (for instance) German 
nationals do not have specific rights to reside in the UK under the 
Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2017.  However, while EU27 nationals 
will still be ‘Member State nationals’ for the purposes of UK domestic 
laws following Brexit, UK nationals will no longer be ‘Member State 
nationals’ for the EU27.  
In the absence of a Withdrawal Agreement, the basis on which UK 
nationals would have a right to reside in the EU27 State they currently 
live in would abruptly change on 30 March 2019.  The Commons 
Exiting the EU Committee published a report on the rights of UK and EU 
nationals on 23 July 2018, which commented on this specifically: 
If there is no agreement on ongoing free movement after the 
transition period ends, then the rights of UK citizens currently 
resident in the EU may be determined by EU rules on third country 
nationals (rules that apply to nationals of non-EU member states). 
Jane Golding, British in Europe, said there are different pieces of 
legislation that apply to third country nationals: 
‘The conditions are far more stringent and in no way compare 
with being an EU citizen, and there is no right of free movement. 
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There is a limited form of mobility. Then there are very big holes in 
this third-country national regime as far as self-employed people 
are concerned. There are a number of pieces of legislation that 
cover employees, but far fewer for self-employed people who are 
providing cross-border services. There are very big holes there.’ 
The Committee called on the EU27 to make a similar guarantee to that 
made by the UK Prime Minister, even in the event of no deal.  
Steve Peers, Professor at the University of Essex, has argued that 
‘citizens’ rights’ should be ring-fenced from the rest of the negotiations 
so as to ensure continuity of rights for eligible UK and EU nationals. 
However, in the absence of any ringfencing, he has made a separate 
argument for a unilateral EU-wide regulation that echoes what the 
‘settled status’ legislation does. He argues that the EU has the power to 
legislate on this issue and should do so for the sake of legal certainty. To 
date, however, no such legislation has been proposed (let alone 
adopted) at EU level. 
9.2 Mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications 
Automatic recognition in UK but not necessarily 
reciprocated  
As just one example of the influence of EU law on domestic work 
entitlements, under EU Directive 2005/36/EC on the mutual recognition 
of professional qualifications, EEA healthcare professionals with a 
qualification from an EEA country have their qualification automatically 
recognised when applying to be registered with a relevant professional 
regulator. Regulators include the General Medical Council (GMC), 
Nursing and Midwifery Council (NMC) and General Dental Council 
(GDC). 
Mutual recognition of qualifications is written into UK legislation and 
regulations governing doctors, nurses and other healthcare 
professionals, as well as a variety of other regulated professions set out 
in the EU Directive. This would probably be retained in UK law in the 
case of a no-deal Brexit, allowing UK regulators to automatically 
recognise EEA nationals’ qualifications; however, as discussed below, 
the conditions under which recognition of EEA qualifications operates 
can be amended by Parliament at will in the event of ‘no deal’. 
‘No deal’ would mean that the qualifications of UK-trained medical 
professionals would no longer be automatically recognised when 
registering to practise in the EU27, unless equivalent provisions were 
swiftly introduced into national legislation by other EU countries.  
The BMA has argued that continued mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications is crucial for hiring EU nationals to work in the health 
service, with any changes to this being particularly felt in Northern 
Ireland, whose health service employs a large number of healthcare 
professionals from Ireland.256 
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It is important to note as well that, although UK regulators may 
continue to be allowed to unilaterally recognise EEA nationals’ 
qualifications, the UK would lose access to the current EU-wide alert 
system. This notifies UK regulators at the pre-registration stage of EU 
health professionals where concerns have been raised about their fitness 
to practise.   
English language testing 
The Government has commented to the Health Select Committee that 
after leaving the EU it would consider introducing more stringent pre-
registration English language testing for healthcare professionals, which 
they are not currently allowed to do under the EU Directive on mutual 
recognition. Therefore, the Government may choose to amend the law 
on recognition of EU healthcare qualifications, rather than retain it in its 
current form. In its response to the Committee’s report on Brexit and 
health and social care, the Government set out its view on the need for 
a balance between language stringency and avoiding bureaucracy: 
The primary purpose of regulating healthcare professionals is to 
ensure public safety. Some regulatory bodies have concerns that 
MRPQ (Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications 
Directive) limits the action they can take when registering EEA 
professionals, particularly by restricting tests of language 
competence. The Department agrees that a balance needs to be 
struck between managing this risk in a proportionate way and 
ensuring that the flow of skilled and valuable healthcare 
professionals into the NHS is not impeded by unnecessary levels of 
bureaucracy.257 
More information can be found in the Commons Briefing Paper, 
Language testing for healthcare professionals, 7 March 2018. 
9.3 Reciprocal healthcare 
Current reciprocal healthcare arrangements 
The EEA Member States and Switzerland co-ordinate the provision of 
social security including healthcare under Regulation 883/004. The 
Regulation includes rules on the reimbursement of healthcare costs 
between Member States in the following main circumstances:  
• for visitors using the European Health Insurance Card (EHIC) for all 
necessary care during temporary stays in another Member State;  
• for state pensioners and their dependants who have moved 
abroad, the state that pays their state pension is responsible for 
paying the costs of their healthcare – known as the S1 route; 
• for a person who has been authorised to undergo a planned 
medical treatment in another Member State, costs are paid by the 
Member State that has referred them – known as the S2 scheme; 
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• for a dependant (usually a spouse or child) of someone who lives 
in another EEA Member State or someone from another EEA 
Member State working in the UK. 
What the draft Withdrawal Agreement provides 
The (draft) Withdrawal Agreement aims to protect reciprocal healthcare 
arrangements for UK nationals resident in the EU before the end of the 
transition period (and vice-versa), so long as they continue to live or 
work in the country where they lived or worked at the end of the 
transition.258 This includes UK state pensioners who have retired to the 
EU27, as well as people who have started a course of pre-planned 
health treatment abroad. 
The Government will continue to seek agreement with the EU that 
protects the reciprocal healthcare entitlements of state pensioners, 
including those not covered by the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement, 
and seek to fully protect rights under the EHIC S1 and S2 schemes, 
including: 
• the rights of UK state pensioners who retire to the EU 
(and vice versa) after the end of the implementation 
period to benefit from a reciprocal healthcare scheme;  
• the rights of UK residents to continue to receive needs-
arising treatment in the EU under the EHIC scheme (and 
vice versa); and  
• the rights of UK residents to be able to receive planned 
treatment in an EU Member State when this is pre-
authorised by the UK (and vice versa).259 
Possible impact of no deal 
In the event of a no-deal Brexit, the existing reciprocal healthcare 
arrangements for UK citizens in the EU and EU citizens in the UK would 
probably end. The Government has said it is developing contingency 
plans for this eventuality: 
We are confident of securing a comprehensive deal but, to fully 
prepare for the unlikely event the UK and the EU do not agree the 
Withdrawal Agreement and implementation period, or secure a 
deal on future reciprocal healthcare rights, we are further 
developing contingency plans to minimise disruption for patients 
after the UK exits the EU. This includes building our understanding 
of the systems, processes and infrastructure needed in Member 
States to prioritise the safety of both UK and EU patients in all 
scenarios.260 
But the Department added that it was not at this stage “in a position to 
reveal further details of our contingency planning” as it was focussing 
on “securing a reciprocal deal with the EU”.261 
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The British Medical Association (BMA) provided the following summary 
of what a no deal could mean:  
Should there be a failure to agree a withdrawal agreement by 
March 2019, access to reciprocal healthcare arrangements for UK 
citizens and residents within the EU, and EU citizens and residents 
within the UK, would end. This would lead to significant 
disruption to those individuals’ healthcare arrangements, an 
increase in costs of insurance, and uncertainty regarding accessing 
healthcare abroad. Moreover, the NHS would face a drastic 
increase in demand for services, which could dramatically increase 
its costs and place greater pressure on doctors and clinical staff. 
[…] 
The impact of the loss of reciprocal care on patients would be 
significant, especially given the number of beneficiaries that are 
pensioners living abroad. Evidence given to the House of 
Commons Health Select Committee has suggested that many of 
them will be unable to fund private healthcare and so will be 
forced to return to the UK.12 UK citizens travelling within the 
EEA, and EEA citizens visiting the UK, will also need to purchase 
their own travel or health insurance should access to reciprocal 
arrangements be lost. This is a particular concern for those with 
disabilities or long-term conditions, as the cost of health and 
travel insurance for those with pre-existing conditions could be 
prohibitively high.262 
The UK currently has bilateral reciprocal healthcare arrangements with 
16 non-EEA countries.263 In the event of no deal, the UK could 
negotiate similar arrangements with the EU as a whole or with 
individual EEA Member States. However, bilateral agreements cannot be 
negotiated while the UK remains in the EU,264 which means that in the 
event of no deal, and before bilateral agreements have been agreed, 
there could be a sustained period where UK citizens do not have any 
access to reciprocal healthcare arrangements.  
The UK has some reciprocal healthcare arrangements which pre-date EU 
membership (see below), but the status of these agreements if no deal 
is agreed remains unclear. Evidence given to the Health Select 
Committee noted that such agreements would not be comprehensive if 
relied upon as a contingency: 
Of course, we have a number of agreements that predate the 
European Union that we could fall back on, but each of those has 
different terms and conditions, different eligibilities, different 
limits and different numbers of people who can be covered.265 
Access to the NHS of EU nationals resident in UK 
While visitors from the EU to the UK have access to the NHS governed 
by reciprocal healthcare arrangements, EU nationals who are ‘ordinarily 
                                                                                               
262  BMA, Brexit briefing: Reciprocal healthcare between the UK and EU, September 
2017, page 2-7 
263  NHS Choices, Non-European Economic Area (EEA) countries that have reciprocal 
healthcare agreements with the UK 
264  Health Committee, Brexit and health and social care—people & process, 25 April 
2016, HC 640 2016-17, para 108 
265  Ibid, para 111 
 
105 Commons Library Briefing, 10 September 2018 
resident’266 in the UK access free NHS treatment through a different 
legal mechanism.  
Under the National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) 
Regulations 2015, SI 2015/238, providers of NHS healthcare in England 
are required to charge overseas visitors (people not classed as ‘ordinarily 
resident’ in the UK) for use of the NHS, unless they have one of the 
exemptions set out in the regulations.  
As set out in the Government’s Guidance on implementing the overseas 
visitor charging regulations, there is a three-fold test of ordinary 
residence for EEA nationals: 
• Is the individual lawfully in the UK? 
• Is the individual here voluntarily? 
• Is the individual properly settled here for the time being? 
 
There are similar ordinary residence requirements in the Scottish, Welsh 
and Northern Irish equivalent regulations. 
As set out above, in the event of a no-deal Brexit, the Government has 
stated its intention for EU nationals living in the UK to be able to apply 
for settled status, giving them the same access to the NHS as they have 
currently: 
Wera Hobhouse (Bath) (LD) 
…I have a very simple question. Do settled status and pre-settled 
status give EU citizens the same right to use the national health 
service as UK nationals? 
The Minister for Immigration (Caroline Nokes) 
Yes.267 
Medicines supply and availability 
Concerns about the potential impacts of a no-deal Brexit on medicines 
supply in the UK relate to how medicines (and medical devices) will be 
regulated and monitored for safety in future, and the impacts on 
medicines supply and future pharmaceutical trade.  
UK imports of medicine and pharmaceutical products were worth £24.8 
billion in 2016, and mostly came from the EU.  UK exports of these 
products were worth £24.9 billion – around half of these went to EU 
countries. The Association for the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) 
has said that this reflects: 
45 million packs of medicines that leave the UK every month and 
go to Europe, and 37 million packs of medicines that leave the 
continent and come to the UK.268 
Currently, the European Medicines Agency (EMA) provides and 
coordinates licensing, expertise and support for medicines and medical 
devices throughout the EU.  Marketing authorisations (medicines 
                                                                                               
266  Access to the NHS is based on the concept of ‘ordinary residence’, rather than 
nationality or citizenship. 
267  HC Deb 21 June 2018, c519 
268  BEIS Committee, The impact of Brexit on the pharmaceutical sector, 9th Report of 
Session 2017–19, May 2018 p8 
106 What if there's no Brexit deal? 
licences) may be granted centrally or through a mutual recognition 
process and apply across the EU or may be granted by the Member 
State regulator to apply in one country.  The Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) is the UK medicines regulator.  It 
currently works with the EMA as part of a regulatory network and 
contributes to its work. 
The Government has said that it wants to seek an ‘associate’ 
membership of the EMA.  The Secretary of State for Health and Social 
Care has said this means “as close as possible participation with the 
European Medicines Agency with observer rights”.  However, in the 
event of a no-deal Brexit, and without other arrangements in place, the 
UK could not continue to participate in the shared regulatory 
framework with the EMA.  The Government has confirmed that the 
MHRA would take on responsibility for functions currently undertaken 
by the EMA and that this would require changes to the Human 
Medicines Regulations 2012.269   
Delays in licence applications 
However, concerns have been expressed that a separate regulatory 
system could mean delays in applications for licences because the UK 
would represent a much smaller market than the EEA, and this could 
impact on how quickly medicines would be available.270,271   
For those medicines that are to be licensed and supplied in the EU, the 
EMA has set out that, in the event of a no-deal Brexit, there will be 
requirements for marketing authorisation holders and batch testing of 
medicines to be based in the EU from 30 March 2018.272  
Medicines supply 
Beyond the regulation of medicines, there are concerns about potential 
trade barriers and resulting delays in medicines supply that may occur in 
the event of no deal.  Pharmaceutical companies in the UK and EU say 
they are stockpiling medicines in preparation for this scenario. 273, 
In the absence of a trade agreement with the EU, under the WTO 
Pharmaceutical Tariff Elimination Agreement, tariffs on medicines are 
unlikely to increase significantly, compared with other products.274  
However, not all medical products are included in this Agreement; 
pharmaceutical companies have reported that relying on WTO rules 
could disrupt supply chains and lead to higher costs of medicines.275  
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There are also concerns about an increase in non-tariff barriers in the 
event of no deal, and the potential delays this could mean for medicines 
supply, especially for those medicines with a short shelf life, such as 
medical radioisotopes.276 
Box 3: Medical radioisotopes: Radioisotopes are used in the diagnosis and treatment of a range 
of conditions277 and are imported to the UK from (mainly EU) research reactors.278 Although 
radioisotopes can be sourced from beyond the EU, the materials often have short half-lives, meaning 
they can decay rapidly and cannot be stored for very long. In the UK around 700,000 nuclear medicine 
procedures using radioisotopes are carried out each year.279  
Concerns have been raised that Brexit could affect the supply of radioisotopes280 by causing import 
delays281 and causing the UK to leave the Euratom Observatory which manages supply chains in times 
of shortages.282 A no-deal Brexit could mean that any potential customs agreement and cooperation 
with the Observatory which might be sought as part of a deal would not be realised.  
The Government has said that the availability of radioisotopes should not be impacted by Brexit.283 
For further information on the supply of nuclear material, see section 12.2. 
 
Government preparedness 
In July 2018 Secretary of State for Health and Social care Matt Hancock 
said the Department was preparing for range of outcomes, including a 
no deal scenario.284 Furthermore, he said that: 
We are focusing on the importance of a continuous supply of 
medicines that have a short shelf life; some of the medicines that 
would be most difficult to provide in a no-deal scenario where 
there was difficult access through ports would need to be flown 
in, for instance. I hope that, even under a no-deal scenario, there 
will still be smooth movement in through ports, because it is not 
our intention to provide barriers to that, and the work will take 
that into account. But you can imagine that it is incredibly 
important for me, as Secretary of State, to ensure that people will 
have access to the medicines they need.285 
He said the Department was working with industry on the stockpiling of 
medicines and that he was “confident that with the right amount of 
work we can mitigate the worst of the circumstances”.   
On 23 August the Government published ‘technical notices’ relating to 
medicines regulation in the event of no deal: 
• How medicines, medical devices and clinical trials would be 
regulated if there’s no Brexit deal 
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• Batch testing medicines if there's no Brexit deal 
• Submitting regulatory information on medical products if there’s 
no Brexit deal 
The technical notices state that in the event of no deal: 
• existing EU law on medicines would be converted into UK law 
under the EUW Act; 
• the UK will recognise medical devices that are CE marked and 
approved for the EU market and will comply with new EU medical 
devices regulations due to come into force in 2020 and 2022; 
• current marketing authorisations granted through the centrally 
authorised product route will be converted to UK marketing 
authorisations, but after 29 March 2019, all new applications for 
a marketing authorisation in the UK would have to be made to 
the MHRA; 
• batch testing of imported medicines from the EEA and named 
third countries will continue to be recognised in the UK;  
• marketing authorisation holders and those responsible for 
pharmacovigilance (Qualified Persons) should be established in the 
UK by the end of 2020; and 
• new systems for the submission and processing of regulatory 
information are being developed for March 2019. 
The Government said that the MHRA would: 
…take a streamlined approach to approving UKMA applications 
that places no greater burden on industry and ensures that 
patients can access new and innovative medicines at the same 
time as EU patients.286 
On 23 August 2018, alongside the publication of the technical notices, 
Mr Hancock wrote to hospitals, GPs, pharmacies and pharmaceutical 
companies, setting out what action would need to be taken to ensure 
medicines supply to patients continues in the event of a no-deal Brexit.  
The letter requested that pharmaceutical companies ensure that by 29 
March 2019 they have an additional six weeks’ supply of medicines on 
top of the normal buffer stock held and that for products with short 
shelf lives, suppliers should make plans to air freight these to avoid 
border delays.287 
The letter informs pharmacists and hospitals that they should not 
stockpile medicines and asks clinicians to advise patients about 
Government plans to maintain medicines supply - and that they too 
should not stockpile medicines.288 
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The Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) has launched the 
Medicines Supply Contingency Planning Programme through which it 
will require pharmaceutical companies to provide information about its 
contingency planning for medicines supply in the event of no deal.  
More information on the scheme is provided on the DHSC website. 
The Government guidance on preparing for no deal has been welcomed 
by healthcare organisations289 and the pharmaceutical industry,290 but 
there have been calls for more detailed information to be made 
available.  The Brexit Health Alliance (formed of NHS providers, medical 
royal colleges and other health organisations) has said the Government 
guidance is a first step and the NHS will want to see more detailed 
operational advice.  It said its members would work with the 
Government to ensure “these issues are addressed in future guidance 
and that patients will continue to receive the treatment they need 
whatever the outcome of the negotiations”. 291 
9.4 Social security 
In the event of ‘no deal’, the provisions in EU law on the co-ordination 
of social security schemes for people between Member States292 – in 
Regulation 883/2004 and associated regulations – would cease to apply. 
The co-ordination rules do not harmonise social security systems across 
the EU, but instead support freedom of movement by, for example, 
providing for equal treatment in access to benefits with nationals of the 
host state, clarifying which state is responsible for paying benefits, 
allowing aggregation of insurance periods across countries, and 
enabling certain benefits to be ‘exported.’  A well-established system of 
administrative co-operation between Member States ensures the 
effective operation of the co-ordination rules, dispute resolution and 
secure data sharing.293   
For some of the states covered by the co-ordination rules, the UK has 
bilateral, reciprocal social security agreements pre-dating the UK’s EEC 
entry.294 These agreements were superseded by the EU co-ordination 
rules, but remain in force for limited purposes. Should the co-ordination 
rules cease to apply it is possible that these bilateral agreements would 
become applicable again, although this is by no means certain.295  These 
bilateral agreements are, however, far more limited in scope than the 
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EU co-ordination rules; they vary widely in terms of the persons and 
benefits covered and they may refer to benefits which no longer exist.  
Administrative mechanisms would also need to be established in 
tandem with each of the other countries for any reciprocal 
arrangements to work. 
The implications of having no comprehensive post-Brexit agreement to 
co-ordinate social security for people moving, or who have moved, 
between the UK and the EU27 have not as yet received much attention.  
Situations that could occur include, for example: 
• individuals being unable to aggregate contributions paid or 
periods of residence in the UK and the EU27 States to satisfy the 
conditions for benefits;  
• no clear rules about which country, if any, is responsible for 
paying a person’s benefits where they have lived in more than one 
country, and no mechanism for resolving disputes; and 
• posted workers – i.e. employees working in another country 
temporarily – finding themselves liable to pay social security 
contributions in both countries, instead of remaining insured only 
under the scheme of their home country. 
In a recent report the House of Lords European Union Committee noted 
concerns voiced by, among others, the Association of British Orchestras, 
that requiring its members to pay social security contributions when 
working in EU27 counties could make touring too expensive.  This 
potential problem would affect all posted workers, not just those 
working in the cultural sector.  The Committee warns: “Failure to secure 
a reciprocal commitment on social security would undermine any 
broader agreement on migration between the UK and EU”.296 
EU nationals in the UK 
As noted in section 9.1 above on primary free movement of people 
rights, the Government has signalled that it intends to implement the 
proposed ‘settled status’ regime for EU nationals in the UK, regardless 
of whether a deal is successfully concluded with the EU. Those with 
settled status should have full access to UK social security benefits. The 
position of those who, on 29 March 2019, have not been resident in 
the UK for five years – those with ‘pre-settled status’ – is less clear.   
The expectation is that by exit day the UK will have incorporated into 
domestic legislation existing EU laws, including those relating to the co-
ordination of social security. However, for social security co-ordination 
to operate in any meaningful sense post-exit, the EU27 would have to 
reciprocate by continuing to apply the EU rules and allowing the UK full 
access to existing administrative mechanisms.297   
In the absence of any agreement with the EU27 on social security co-
ordination, the pre-existing (and limited) bilateral social security 
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agreements the UK has with some states – if they remain viable and 
operable – would be the only fall-back. 
The position on access to benefits for EU nationals coming to the UK 
after exit day will depend on the yet-to-be-specified future immigration 
regime. The Government’s future relations White Paper said the UK 
would “seek reciprocal arrangements on the future rules around some 
defined elements of social security coordination”.298  Should this not be 
achieved, the existing bilateral agreements – if they still apply – would 
provide the only continuing framework.  The UK could attempt to 
negotiate new reciprocal social security agreements with individual 
states, but such negotiations could prove difficult and protracted.  Until 
any new arrangements were in place, there would remain significant 
gaps in social security coverage for people moving between the EU and 
the UK.   
UK nationals in the EU 
The position on access to benefits for UK nationals in the EU27 in the 
event of ‘no deal’ is even less clear. EU States would not be obliged to 
enact measures to protect citizens’ rights – including to social security – 
for UK nationals in their jurisdictions.  The EU could, as Professor Steve 
Peers has suggested, enact a unilateral EU-wide regulation to ‘ring-
fence’ citizens’ rights, mirroring the UK’s ‘settled status’ legislation.299 
Failing that, individual EU27 States could amend their domestic laws to 
provide guarantees for UK nationals, or agree bilateral social security 
agreements with the UK (although it seems highly unlikely that separate 
agreements could be negotiated and put in place before exit day). 
If no such alternative arrangements are in place, by default UK nationals 
in EU27 countries would become third-country nationals for the 
purposes of the EU social security co-ordination rules.  Existing bilateral 
social security agreements might provide some measure of protection 
for UK nationals in some Member States, but for those in others the loss 
of social security rights would be sudden and could have serious 
consequences. 
For UK nationals moving to EU27 States after exit day, in the absence of 
an EU-wide agreement the position on access to benefits would depend 
on the host country’s immigration policy and the terms of any bilateral 
social security agreement it has with the UK (if these still apply). 
Migrants in the UK 
The NRPF Network – a “network of local authorities and partner 
organisations focusing on the statutory response to migrants with care 
needs who have no recourse to public funds (NRPF)” – notes on its 
webpage about EEA Nationals that at present “EEA nationals and family 
members of EEA nationals, who are not eligible for welfare benefits 
social housing, may be able to receive housing and financial assistance 
from social services” only “if this is necessary to prevent a breach of 
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their human rights or their European Treaty rights” and that any such 
assistance is limited to: 
• Families where there is a child in need (if the family are 
destitute then the child will be in need) [for a definition of 
“children in need”, see the Library briefing paper on this 
issue] 
• A young person who was formerly looked after by a local 
authority 
• An adult requiring care and support due to a disability, 
illness or mental health condition 
In a no-deal scenario, the NPRF Network states that “the Government 
and EU have yet to reach a final agreement on the full terms that will 
apply to the UK when it leaves, and it is unclear how a 'no deal' 
situation will impact on these proposals. Arrangements have not yet 
been confirmed for non-EU EEA (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) or 
Swiss nationals, but the Government has indicated it intends for them 
to be subject to the same process”, adding that: 
The Government is currently proposing that after the UK has left 
the EU on 29 March 2019, there will be a transition period that 
ends on 31 December 2020. EU nationals and their family 
members living in the UK by the end of the transition period will 
need to take action before 30 June 2021 and apply for either 
settled or pre-settled (temporary) status under the EU Settlement 
Scheme if they wish to stay here. EU nationals and family 
members who arrive after 29 March 2019 and people who have 
already obtained a permanent residence document will also need 
to apply. The Government has indicated that a person who fails to 
apply by the end of June 2021 may have no lawful basis to remain 
in the UK, but it is unclear what the consequences of this will be. 
The EU Settlement Scheme is being piloted at the end of August 
and is due to be implemented by the end of the year. . 
9.5 Pensions 
State Pensions 
The social security co-ordination rules allow periods of insurance for 
State Pensions purposes to be aggregated, so an individual who has 
worked in more than one Member States can on reaching pension age 
make one application to the relevant agency in the country of residence 
– in the UK, the International Pension Centre. This agency then notifies 
details of the claim to all countries in which the person has been 
insured. Each Member State in which the person was insured then 
calculates its pro-rata contribution and puts that amount into payment. 
There is information about these rules on the Europa.EU website – see 
State Pensions abroad.  
Future arrangements will depend on the Brexit negotiations.300 In phase 
1, subject to the caveat that nothing is agreed until everything is 
agreed, both sides to the negotiations committed to: 
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• lifetime export of uprated pension;  
• recognising contributions both before and after exit in the EU27 
and the UK, for those covered by the Withdrawal Agreement; and 
• equal treatment under the conditions set out in EU law.301 
If there is no deal, these social security co-ordination provisions would 
cease to apply. In their absence, individuals in a cross-border situation 
could potentially be covered by: 
• any bilateral social security treaties already in place between the 
UK and the relevant Member State (if these became operable 
again and depending on the extent of their scope and current 
relevance (as discussed in section X above);  
• the legislation of the relevant Member State; 
• EU directives on the status of third-country nationals finding 
themselves in a cross-border situation, to which EU Member 
States would be bound.302 
DExEU Permanent Secretary Philip Rycroft told the Exiting the EU 
Committee on 4 September that Ministers would decide when and 
what to advise UK citizens living in an EU27 State about the pensions 
situation. 
Pension uprating 
For people in receipt of the UK State Pension overseas, a major concern 
is whether it will be uprated annually.   
The UK State Pension is payable overseas. However, the policy adopted 
by successive governments is that it is only uprated in EEA countries or 
where there is a reciprocal agreement requiring this.303 
In the event of ‘no deal’, residents of some EU Member States may be 
covered by more limited existing reciprocal agreements, as discussed 
above. Beyond this, a decision whether to uprate the UK State Pension 
overseas is a matter for the UK Government. It could, presumably, seek 
to negotiate new bilateral agreements with individual Member States. 
For more detail, see Library Briefing Paper SN-01457 Frozen Overseas 
Pensions (August 2018). 
Aggregation  
The UK is expected to incorporate into domestic legislation existing EU 
laws, including those relating to the co-ordination of social security.  As 
noted above, however, for social security co-ordination to operate fully, 
the EU27 would have to reciprocate.304 It is possible that any existing 
reciprocal agreements would become applicable again on account of 
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bilateral agreements. Beyond that, it will presumably depend on the 
legislation of the country in question.  
The same might be relevant to a further aspect of the current 
arrangements – whereby years of insurance or residence in another 
Member State or EEA country can count towards satisfying conditions 
of entitlement (for example, the minimum qualifying period for the new 
State Pension).305 While the UK could unilaterally offer to treat those 
years of ‘residence’ as contributing to entitlement conditions, it is not 
clear that it would do so unless UK nationals in the EU27 are likely to 
benefit from similar provisions. 
Private pensions 
UK workplace pensions operate on a national basis subject to UK 
legislation.306 However, they invest internationally and a solution to the 
financial services passporting and derivatives issues discussed in section 
6.2 is therefore important.  
Another issue that will need to be addressed is ensuring that the small 
number of schemes operating across borders (in particular, between the 
UK and Ireland) are able to continue to do so.  
These issues are discussed in more detail in Library Briefing Paper CBP-
07629 Brexit – implications for private pensions (August 2018). 
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10. Food and Farming 
The National Farming Union (NFU) has said that a no-deal outcome is 
the worst possible one for the farming industry.307 The Food and Drink 
Federation has called ‘no-deal’ a ‘grisly prospect’.308 
In a ‘no deal’ scenario for agriculture, trading arrangements - i.e. tariffs 
and standards - are the main issue. Without an alternative arrangement, 
the EU will treat the UK as a third country and a range of tariffs, checks, 
registrations, certifications etc will start to apply for the first time for a 
range of commodities, food and feed, and plant and animal-based 
products.  Agriculture is also impacted by the ‘no deal’ effects of other 
policies such as immigration (for seasonal, agri-food workers and vets).  
The UK will leave the farm support and rural development funding 
systems of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in any Brexit 
scenario, so preparations for alternative domestic arrangements are 
already underway. This is because the CAP is enshrined in EU Treaty 
arrangements for Member States.  Consultations on new domestic 
agriculture policy are either in train or complete across the UK 
legislatures and the UK Government has guaranteed current funding 
levels until 2022. 
The UK Government issued the following no-deal technical notices on 
23 August 2018: 
• Farm payments if there’s no Brexit deal  
• Receiving rural development funding if there’s no Brexit deal  
• Producing and processing organic food if there's no Brexit deal 
• Developing Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) if there’s no 
Brexit deal 
In view of the current regulatory regimes, which are largely EU based, it 
is likely that future technical notices will also need to cover areas such as 
food safety and food labelling, imports of food and feed, plants and 
seeds, veterinary medicines, fertilisers and pesticides. 
For example, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) has highlighted that 
Brexit will create gaps in the food safety regime for the UK. Some of the 
institutions which currently carry out regulatory activities Europe-wide 
will no longer carry out those activities on behalf of the UK and some 
systems used for administering the regulatory regime will not be 
available.309 
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10.1 Tariffs and standards 
‘No deal’ could mean applying WTO tariffs where there currently are 
none for EU trade, as well as WTO rules for plant and animal health 
checks (in trade terms these are known as sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures).310 This could have a significant impact on the farming 
industry and consumers in terms of changing the balance of import and 
export markets and consumer choice, the speed of supply chains and 
prices.  
Tariffs are usually higher for agricultural products than for other goods 
and services. Perishable goods such as milk are also more sensitive to 
delays at borders, as are live animals. With no withdrawal agreement in 
place, there could be different regulatory regimes for the UK as a third 
country relating to pesticide regulation, GM food and plant controls 
(such as seed certification requirements). 311  
However, the UK Government has said it will be establishing its own 
Geographical Indication (GI) scheme to protect regionally protected 
goods such as Scotch Whisky, Welsh Lamb etc. This will be consistent 
with the WTO Agreement of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property (TRIPs). 312 
This new UK framework will go beyond the requirements of 
TRIPS, and will provide a clear and simple set of rules on GIs, and 
continuous protection for UK GIs in the UK. The scheme will be 
open to new applications, from both UK and non-UK applicants, 
from the day it enters into force.  
10.2 Food supply 
Introducing the technical notices, Dominic Raab said that for food, the 
Government had set out “practical measures to mitigate any risks of 
disruption to supply”. He said this would be achieved through “the 
recognition of EU food standards, our pursuit of equivalency 
arrangements on food regulation with the EU and indeed with non-EU 
countries, and through our support for UK farmers in terms of financial 
funding schemes”.313 
He emphasised that the UK’s food and drink supply is diverse, with the 
UK supplying half of the food that we consume, with 30% imported 
from the EU and 20% from the rest of the world. He confirmed 
(contrary to media reports) that there were no plans to deploy the army 
to maintain food supplies and played down the likelihood of the EU not 
offering some kind of mutual recognition in this area in a no-deal 
scenario: “Who is credibly suggesting, in a no deal scenario, that the EU 
would not want to continue to sell food to UK consumers?” 
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Potential short-term disruption to food supplies immediately after a no-
deal Brexit has been given regular media coverage and Dominic Raab 
was asked by the Exiting the EU Committee (July 2018) whether the 
Government was considering stockpiling food in preparation for this. He 
responded:  
Again, we will set this out in the technical notices, but it would be 
wrong to describe it as the Government doing the stockpiling. Of 
course, the idea that we only get food imports into this country 
from one continent is not appropriate, but we will look at this 
issue in the round and make sure that there is adequate food 
supply as well as all these other things.314   
The retail sector has expressed concerns about the practicalities of 
stockpiling food. The British Retail Consortium said:  
Stockpiling of food is not a practical response to a no-deal on 
Brexit and industry has not been approached by Government to 
begin planning for this. Retailers do not have the facilities to 
house stockpiled goods and in the case of fresh produce, it is 
simply not possible to do so. Our food supply chains are extremely 
fragile and this is yet further demonstration of the need for an 
agreement on the backstop to ensure frictionless trade is 
maintained after the 29 March 2019.315 
The Food and Drink Federation (FDF) has said that the technical notices 
published so far confirming anticipated burdens on importers and 
exporters would “frighten many SME food businesses”. The FDF also 
pointed out that there was “no substantive information” on mitigating 
the effect of no-deal on the island of Ireland, where the effects would 
be most significant.316 
10.3 Organic Food 
The technical notice on organic food maintains that UK businesses could 
experience delays of up to nine months after a no-deal Brexit because 
UK organic control bodies offering the necessary certification would 
need to be approved for operation in the UK by the EU. The UK is 
hoping to find ways to speed up this process.317 
The NFU claims this would in effect be a trade embargo on UK organic 
products and could have wider, disruptive implications for the future 
trade of all agri-food products if all of them were subjected to the same 
problems with approvals and certification. The FDF has pointed out that 
similar issues would apply for other food currently displaying EU marks 
or logos.318 
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Farmers Weekly reports that although no official data is available, it is 
estimated that about 10% of the UK’s organic output (worth some 
2.2bn in 2017) is exported, predominantly to EU countries.319 
The Government has said it anticipates “continuing to accept EU 
organic products in a ‘no deal’ scenario, but this will be at the UK’s 
discretion” and it expects to negotiate an equivalence arrangement 
because the UK will be retaining existing EU requirements for organic 
food.  
The technical notice also states that the UK will continue to require 
certification and traceability of organic food and feed products, but a 
new UK-owned imports traceability system would replace the current 
EU Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES) system to ensure the 
traceability of organic food and feed. TRACES tracks the entire trade 
and certification process for animals, food, feed and plants. The FDF 
doubts the UK Government can replace it with a new, comprehensive, 
functional UK alternative IT system in time for exit day.320  
10.4 Genetically Modified Organisms 
Applications for new Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) are 
managed at EU level and include an assessment of the application by 
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) as well as by the national 
authorities in the EU Member States. The Commission can propose a 
GMO be authorised only when there is a favourable risk assessment 
by EFSA. Member States vote in a regulatory committee on the 
authorisation decision proposed by the Commission. 
The Government’s technical notice for ‘no deal’ on GMOs states that 
there will be “no significant implications for UK stakeholders”.  
Regulatory decisions on proposed GM trials would continue as usual 
on a devolved basis and the UK would apply the same risk 
assessment process for regulatory decisions on marketing GMOs as 
currently takes place at EU level (although it has not yet been 
decided whether this would be on a joint-UK basis or separately 
across the devolved legislatures). 
As the UK would be treated as a third country, UK businesses would 
only be able to export GMO products to the EU if the GMO had EU 
marketing approval. This would be the same for the EU with UK 
marketing approval. 
10.5 Farm support 
CAP support is made up of direct payments under the Basic Payment 
Scheme (Pillar I) and payments for agri-environment measures, and 
grants for rural development projects which contribute to wider rural 
development objectives (Pillar II) under the Rural Development 
Programmes for each part of the UK.  
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Currently CAP support makes up around 50-60% of farm incomes in 
England. In other parts of the UK it is a larger proportion, mainly 
because there is more land which has more difficult farming conditions, 
e.g. hill farming. 321 
In terms of overall agricultural policy and future farm support, the UK is 
already preparing farm support payment systems outside the CAP, 
whatever the Brexit scenario. This is because only EU Member States can 
participate in the CAP and its payment schemes. 
The technical notices on farm payments and rural development funding 
confirm previous statements. 
Defra’s Agriculture Command Paper, Health and Harmony (the pre-
cursor to an Agriculture Bill), sets out proposals for managing a 
transition period from 2019 to 2022 and a new scheme of farm support 
beyond.  The devolved legislatures have also set out their proposals. 
The UK Government has pledged to maintain the same cash funds as 
currently for farm support under the CAP until the end of the 
Parliament (assumed to be 2022).322 This is for all of the UK and across 
all aspects of current CAP funding, i.e. Pillars I and II. Further details 
about current CAP funding are provided in Commons Library briefing 
Brexit: Future Agriculture Policy (January 2018), which is being updated. 
Farmers that graze livestock are known to be the most dependent on 
farm subsidies and vulnerable to changes in the farm support system – 
in particular those grazing sheep in remote parts of the UK. The UK pig 
and poultry sectors have the least support but have some of the highest 
farm incomes.323 
10.6 Pesticides 
The UK currently works within an EU regulatory system of pesticide 
approval. Active ingredients are authorised at EU level for use across the 
EU but Member States authorise the specific products that make use of 
these ingredients and set conditions for their use. The competent 
authority for doing this in the UK is the Chemicals Regulation 
Directorate (CRD) in the Health and Safety Executive.  
The Government is already planning for the regulatory capacity needed 
to implement the regulation of plant protection products in the UK 
“building on the existing capacity in the Health and Safety Executive”.324 
The Government has also said it is “considering future arrangements for 
the regulation of pesticides” as part of the preparation for EU exit and 
“remains of the view that decision on the use of pesticides should be 
based on careful scientific assessment of the risks”.325 
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10.7 Potential sector impacts of no-deal 
A 2016 analysis commissioned by the NFU looking at a range of 
potential Brexit trade scenarios (including trading on WTO rules) and 
farm support levels found that for most sectors the biggest driver of UK 
farm income changes was the level of public support payments 
available. The loss of these support payments offset positive price 
impacts in all of the potential Brexit trading scenarios examined. Various 
more recent sector reports are available at https://ahdb.org.uk/brexit/.   
Food and drink 
The potential impacts of a no-deal scenario vary widely by commodity 
and sector of the food chain. The Federation of Wholesale Distributors 
has cautioned that without a trade agreement, the food and drink 
wholesale distribution sector will face upward pressure on their 
suppliers’ prices.326 
Dairy 
Dairy UK has said the worst Brexit outcome would be for trade with the 
EU to be based on WTO rules alone; this is because the tariffs for dairy 
products in the EU’s WTO MFN tariff schedule are “prohibitively high”, 
in order to prevent the import of dairy products into the EU. Working to 
the WTO schedule in the absence of an agreement would make EU 
dairy imports into the UK much more expensive, which would impact on 
UK wholesale prices.327 
Lamb and beef 
Scenario modelling by the Agriculture and Horticulture Development 
Board (AHDB),328 and the NFU,329 have shown the lamb and beef sectors 
to be potentially two of the most vulnerable UK sectors post-Brexit 
overall. In particular, the sectors’ prospects suffer if there is no 
comprehensive trade deal with the EU that maintains similar tariffs to 
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11. Fisheries 
After Brexit the UK will no longer be part of the EU Common Fisheries 
Policy (CFP). It will become an independent coastal state and be fully 
responsible for managing fisheries in the UK’s Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) of 200 miles. This will include setting total allowable catches 
(TACs), distributing quotas and determining who has access to 
fisheries.330 Access for EU vessels to UK waters and vice versa is likely to 
be part of any agreement reached with the EU, as part of a future 
relationship.  
The UK will continue to be bound by the requirements of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and how they relate to the 
management of fisheries in any Brexit outcome. UNCLOS requires 
coastal States to give other States access to the surplus of the allowable 
catch in its EEZ and emphasises the need to minimise economic 
dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone. 
It also provides an obligation to co-operate with other coastal states on 
the management of shared stocks or stocks of associated species.331  
The Government’s Fisheries White Paper Sustainable fisheries for future 
generations, published in July 2018, set out the Government’s intention 
to continue to co-operate closely with the EU and other coastal states 
on the sustainable management of fish stocks that cross borders, and 
states that “any decisions about giving access to our waters for vessels 
from the EU, or any other coastal states including Norway, will then be 
a matter for negotiation”.332  
Setting the system for quota distribution to individual fishing vessels is 
already the responsibility of Member States and therefore largely 
unaffected by any Brexit agreement. However, the White Paper makes 
clear that the Government is considering some changes to how fishing 
effort is set post-Brexit, particularly for smaller and inshore fishing 
vessels.333  
For further information of the UK’s current approach to fisheries 
management within the context of the Common Fisheries Policy please 
see the POST note on UK Fisheries Management.  
11.1 Priorities for fisheries 
The fisheries sector is very diverse in the UK, with both a significant 
inshore and offshore fleet. There are also differences in the size and 
type fishing vessels across the devolved administrations.334 Both EU 
quota species and non-quota species are important for different parts of 
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the sector.335 Non-quota species do not fall under the CFP and include 
most shellfish, which is often high value and exported from the UK. The 
UK also has significant processing and aquaculture industries. This 
results in a diversity of views on priorities for the sector, as was noted in 
the White Paper: 
A full range of views have been expressed across a very wide 
range of issues and there is no consensus. Different sectors within 
the fishing industry (catching, processing, and trading) have 
different priorities. Within each of those sectors, there is a range 
of views.336 
The House of Lords Committee on the European Union 2016 report, 
Brexit: Fisheries, set out some of the potential concerns and priorities for 
fisheries going into the Brexit negotiation The report recognised that 
whilst the fishing industry represents “a very small part of the UK’s 
GDP” it is of great importance to many coastal communities and that 
opportunities exist for the UK in leaving the CFP.  It also noted that the 
majority of fish caught in the UK are exported to the EU and that the 
UK currently imports most of the fish it consumes. 
The report highlighted concerns about the potential impact on the 
fisheries industry of a lack of agreement during the Brexit negotiations 
on access, quotas and trade. The conclusions on access and quota 
included the following: 
20. Unilateral restriction on access to fishing in the UK EEZ would 
almost certainly lead to reciprocal restrictions being placed on UK 
vessels fishing in the EU EEZ. This would also have a profound 
effect both on the fishing industry in the EU and on the UK fleet 
that relies on fishing outside the UK EEZ. Some form of mutual 
access arrangements must therefore be negotiated. 
21. The historic reluctance of Member States to renegotiate the 
relative stability key suggests that negotiating new quota 
allocations after Brexit will be difficult. Such difficulty will be 
accentuated if these negotiations overlap with the wider 
negotiations on EU withdrawal. The Government could use access 
to fishing within the UK EEZ as a lever for achieving a better 
allocation of quotas but must also bear in mind that co-operation 
will be crucial for the long-term sustainability of stocks.  
22. As an independent coastal state the UK will in principle be 
able to ‘walk away’ from negotiations with other coastal states if 
the compromises reached on TACs or quota shares are not 
aligned to UK interests. Walking away would, by leading to 
unilateral management of shared stocks, risk undermining the 
sustainability of fish stocks. It would also invite retaliation in other 
areas, including trade. Consequently, walking away should be a 
last resort.337 
And on fisheries and trade: 
23. Trade in fish and seafood is essential to the wider seafood 
industry, which relies heavily on importing raw goods at reduced 
or zero tariffs for domestic consumption, and on exporting 
domestic catches and production. Any disruptions to the current 
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trading patterns could have profound effects on both the catching 
and processing sectors.  
24. Trade with the EU in fish products will be a key factor to the 
future success of the UK fishing industry and fish processors. We 
therefore urge that the fish sector should be included in the 
Government’s consideration of priorities for a future trading 
relationship with the EU.338 
Fisheries Minister George Eustice emphasised to the Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs (EFRA) Committee on 5 September that the 
Government’s position on fisheries and trade should be dealt with as 
separate issues with annual quota negotiations:  
Our [position] is crystal clear […]. There is a negotiation to be had 
on fisheries but it is entirely separate to the negotiations on trade. 
Fisheries is a dynamic environment. You need to have annual 
discussions and negotiations on the state of stocks, state of 
science and where those stocks are so it will always be a separate 
negotiation in our view.339 
11.2 ‘No deal’ scenarios 
A no-deal Brexit, in which there was no transitional agreement on 
fisheries up to the end of 2020, would mean that the UK would 
become an independent coastal state from 30 March 2019, taking over 
responsibility for its EEZ. The UK would no longer be bound by the 
Common Fisheries Policy and could deny access to EU Member States’ 
vessels. Likewise, UK vessels which currently fish in other Member 
States’ waters could be denied access by the EU, although under 
international legislation (UNCLOS) there is an emphasis on the need for 
States to minimise economic dislocation to other States whose nationals 
have habitually fished in a zone. 
In the event of no deal, the Government would have to legislate to 
replace a number of EU regulations on fisheries under the  EU 
Withdrawal Act 2018 by March 2019. In addition, the Government is 
also planning to introduce a wider Fisheries Bill, by the end of 2018, 
which will provide powers to amend any regulations.340 
Quotas and access to fishing grounds 
In the event of a no deal, should the Government decide to introduce 
any immediate changes to access to fisheries, the impacts for the 
different parts of the fishing industry would depend what changes are 
made. As yet, there has been no indication from the Government if any 
changes would be made immediately, or rather whether the current 
quota allocations and access arrangements would be maintained in the 
first instance. The position may be clarified when the Government 
publishes the technical notice on fisheries. However, UK in a Changing 
Europe noted in its briefing Cost of a No Deal Revisited that, unlike in 
other areas, maintaining the current approach could be difficult for the 
Government: 
                                                                                               
338  Lords EU Committee, Brexit: Fisheries, December 2016 
339  Oral evidence at  https://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/6aa99bfb-d1aa-4dd3-808d-
317c863683b9  
340  EFRA Select Committee Evidence Session, 17 July 2018, Fisheries, Q385 
124 What if there's no Brexit deal? 
The government’s mitigation strategy in key policy areas has been 
to manage disruption through unilaterally retaining the status 
quo. However, this approach seems unsustainable in the case of 
fish. Maintaining current levels of EU access to UK waters would 
be politically problematic in the event of no deal; the pressure on 
the government to reclaim control of UK waters would be 
substantial.341 
After Brexit the UK Government will have to reach agreement on a 
common framework for fisheries with the devolved administrations. In 
the case of a no deal scenario UK in Changing Europe notes that this 
will have to be “resolved as a matter of urgency”.342 In the longer term, 
as set out in the White Paper, the Government plans to maintain the 
system for the existing quota while exploring new ways to allocate any 
additional fishing opportunities that arise as a result of leaving the CFP. 
TACs are agreed on a yearly basis at the EU Agriculture and Fisheries 
Council meeting every December for the following calendar year, 
starting in January. The implications of the UK leaving the CFP part way 
through the year on the 2019 TACs agreements are unclear, as is how 
agreements with non-EU countries on shared stocks would be managed 
by all parties for the remainder of 2019.   
In 2017, UK exports in fish and related products to the EU were worth 
£1.3 billion and comprised 70% of all UK fish exports from the UK by 
value. Fish imports from the EU were worth £1.1 billion (34% of all fish 
imports to the UK by value).343 
The impact of a no deal Brexit on the fisheries industry’s ability to export 
and trade are likely to be felt across the sector. With no agreement, as 
in other areas, trade in fisheries products would default to WTO tariffs. 
Generally, tariffs are higher on the most processed fish products. Defra 
set out, in evidence to the House of Lords EU Select Committee in 2016, 
examples of the level of tariffs that the EU currently applies to Most 
Favoured Nations under WTO rules: 
The EU’s MFN tariffs on fisheries products range from 0% (e.g. on 
imports of fresh eels) to up to 25% (e.g. on fillets on processed 
mackerel). Generally, tariffs are higher on highly processed 
products compared to lightly or unprocessed products – for 
example, the EU’s MFN tariff on unprocessed salmon is 2%, while 
the tariff on  prepared salmon is 5.5%. The EU’s MFN tariff for 
the UK’s five products lines with the largest exports to the EU are 
shown below, with their HS product code: 
• Fresh, whole Atlantic Salmon, exports to the EU worth 
£168m in 2014 (HS 03021400): 2% 
• Live, fresh or chilled scallops, exports worth £62m in 2014 
(HS 03072100): 8% 
• Frozen unsmoked Norway Lobsters (Nephrops), exports 
worth £56m in 2014 (HS 03061590): 12% 
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• Not frozen and unsmoked Norway Lobsters (Nephrops), 
exports worth £45m in 2014 (HS 03061590): 12% 
• Frozen whole mackerel, exports worth £44m worth £44m 
in 2014 (HS 03035410): 20%.344 
In its evidence, Defra also highlighted the EU would also face tariffs on 
fish exports to the UK and that “such an arrangement is unlikely to be 
attractive to the EU”.345   
In addition to tariffs, fisheries products, as all perishable products, could 
be impacted by any increased delays at borders resulting from greater 
custom controls. Box 1 below sets out concerns expressed by the UK 
shellfish sector on the impacts of a no deal scenario. 
 
EU Regulations 
The EU Commission published a preparedness notice to stakeholders on 
Fisheries and Aquaculture in April 2018, setting out how UK withdrawal 
would impact both the UK and EU sectors in the absence of any kind of 
withdrawal agreement.  It sets out that under Regulation (EU) 
2017/2403 on the sustainable management of external fishing fleets, 
EU flagged vessels would need to obtain authorisation from both the 
UK and EU to fish in UK waters, and that UK vessels would have to 
obtain EU authorisation to fish in EU waters.   
With regards to landings, as the third country the UK would only be 
able to land or transfer fish at designated EU ports as set out in 
Regulation 1005/2008. The Regulation also requires third country 
vessels arriving at EU ports are inspected to ensure they comply with 
requirements on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU).  In 
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Box 4: Shellfish Sector 
The shellfish sector does not fall under the CFP quota system, other than for Norway lobster and 
northern prawn in certain areas, and therefore fishing opportunities would be unlikely to change 
significantly as a result of the UK being outside the CFP. 
However, a report commissioned by Shellfish Association, NFFO and SFF, published in July 2018 and 
reported by Fishing News, highlighted the impact of a no-deal on an industry that relies on “smooth 
unimpeded trade”: 
Businesses throughout the shellfish supply chain in the UK and in the EU are reliant on 
smooth, unimpeded trade. We are dependent on the European market, but likewise there is 
heavy dependence on our products on the continent. We have undertaken this study to 
identify the issues to ensure that, as far as possible, no part of our industry will be 
disadvantaged. The study makes clear that both in terms of the tariff regime but also non-
tariff barriers, there is a great deal at stake.346 
The article goes on to highlight the conclusion that “the possibility of replacing EU markets with 
alternative high-value markets is challenged not only by the difficulty of reproducing such traditions 
through marketing, but also by the global production and trade of most shellfish types” The article 
refers to an estimated cost of EU tariffs to the sector of £41m per year, in the event of no deal. 
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addition, under the Regulations the UK would be required to send a flag 
notification to the EU to be able to export fish products to the EU: 
In order to export fishery products caught by third country flagged 
fishing vessels to the EU, the Commission has to have received a 
notification from the flag State. As of the withdrawal date, this 
applies to the United Kingdom.347 
UK exports to the EU, together with EU exports to the UK, would also 
require to be accompanied by a catch certification under the regulations 
from the relevant competent authority: 
The catch certificate to be validated by the United Kingdom must 
certify that the catches concerned have been made in accordance 
with applicable laws, regulations and international conservation 
and management measures. The catch certificate must have been 
validated by the United Kingdom competent authority.348 
Certification of organic aquaculture products 
As set out in the Commission’s notice, EU regulations require organic 
aquaculture products sold in its markets to be certified as such and that 
“a no-deal scenario would make UK issued certificates invalid”.  
As set out by the Government in its preparedness note Producing and 
processing organic food if there's no Brexit deal, businesses could 
experience delays of up to 9 months after a no deal Brexit because UK 
organic control bodies offering the necessary certification for export to 
the EU would need to seek approval by the EU. The Government has 
stated it is hoping to find ways to speed this process up.349 
Funding for fishing communities  
The EU provides funding for fishing communities through the European 
Marine and Fisheries Fund, which is part of the CFP, and runs to 2020. 
The UK has an allocation of €243m for the period 2014-2020. The 
EMFF falls under the 2014-20 Multiannual Financial Framework 
allocation for structural and investment funds and as the Government 
made clear in the notice on The government’s guarantee for EU-funded 
programmes if there’s no Brexit deal, it has guaranteed its funding until 
2020. 
Longer term impacts 
The New Economics Foundation published a report on the impact of 
various Brexit scenarios on fisheries, Not in the same Boat in November 
2017. In a modelled no deal scenario, where there was agreement with 
the EU on shared fish stocks which increased UK share of stock, WTO 
tariffs were applied on trade and EU vessels were excluded from UK 
waters, there was an overall increase in catch and profitability for the 
sector. However, this was not evenly distributed, with the benefit mainly 
accruing to UK flagged vessels, fishing offshore, that fish quota species 
that currently fall under the CFP:  
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This divide in quota ownership is one of the contributing factors 
to a sharp divide in current economic performance, with the 
large-scale fleet recording profit margins of 19% and the small-
scale fleet operating at a profit margin of 0%. As the gains from 
quota increases accrue to those who hold the quota rights, these 
gains further entrench the ‘haves and have nots’ of UK fisheries. 
Small-scale vessels also see little benefit from exclusive access out 
to 200 nautical miles, as they fish exclusively in inshore waters.350 
It should be noted that the study did not include in its no deal model 
any new obstacles to trade with the EU, although it did highlight the 
potential negative of impact of these for fisheries trade: 
New obstacles to selling to the EU market – such as product 
standards and port inspections – are also a significant concern for 
the future economic performance of the UK fishing fleet. 
Fortunately, the UK is starting from a good position: current 
product standards are harmonised. However, to avoid border 
delays and inspections, there will need to be a continued close 
relationship between the EU and the UK on fisheries and the 
avoidance of an adversarial relationship that could ultimately force 
the EU to retaliate with a strong and obstructive hand.351 
A study, Impact of hard Brexit on European fisheries, published by the 
Wageningen University and Research in April 2018,  modelled the 
impact for the EU as a whole of loss of a mutual access to waters, 
together with the application of non-tariff measures (NTM) and the cost 
of measures required to facilitate trade. The study covered fisheries, 
aquaculture and fish processing. The authors concluded that a hard 
Brexit would lead to reduced fish prices in the UK and noted that the 
fish processing and aquaculture sectors could decline due to the impact 
of trade measures: 
If the United Kingdom (UK) would completely close its marine 
areas, the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium would be 
affected the most. For the UK aquaculture and       fish processing 
production will decline due to trade measures. For the other three 
countries production of all fish producing sectors will decline. 
Also, because of a higher production volume of wild fisheries in 
the UK, the price of fish in this country will go down, resulting in 
lower production value and thus income of the sector. In the 
whole of Europe fish prices will rise. Especially Irish consumers will 
have to dig deep into their pockets: fish prices can increase up to 
8%.352 
Fishing for Leave criticised the study, particularly the conclusion that a 
no deal would lead to an increased UK fish production of only 15%.353 
It responded by highlighting the large potential increase in available 
catches to UK flagged vessels that could follow if other vessels were 
excluded from UK waters: 
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Currently the EU catches 675,000 tons in UK waters – 60% of the 
fish caught in the UK sector – whilst the UK only catches 88,000 
tons or 16% of the fish taken in EU waters.354 
The Wageningen report does refer to an increase in fisheries access 
having the potential to increasing fisheries landings in the UK by up to 
60%.355 However, it concluded that for this to be realised would require 
no trade measures being put in place by the EU, and that this would be 
unlikely: 
Gains of $400m could be expected if UK gains back its fishing 
territories and there are no trade protectionism measures. 
However, under NTMs and MFN [most favoured nation] tariffs, 
which is the more likely scenario, most of these gains are faded 
away and there is a zero sum.356  
George Eustice told the EFRA Committee on 5 September that UK 
fishermen would benefit from Brexit even if there is no deal: “Fisheries 
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12. Energy, the environment and 
transport 
Although Member States remain ultimately responsible for the energy 
supply to their citizens and for deciding on the most appropriate energy 
mix, the UK and EU energy sectors are integrated through trade, EU 
legislation, the interconnection of energy supply and nuclear 
cooperation under the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom). Since the mid- 1990s, the EU has been 
implementing an internal energy market (IEM) to build a more efficient 
energy market.357  
Given the existing energy integration between the UK and the EU - 
notably through Euratom and the IEM - the UK energy sector would 
probably be affected by Brexit. However, the UK Government is 
committed to leaving Euratom and is open to leaving the IEM, and has 
begun preparations for leaving. As such, although the Brexit White 
Paper contains preferences on energy integration in future, the impact 
of a sudden no-deal Brexit on energy could be much the same as a 
Brexit deal.  
Potential impacts of ‘no deal’ could be a less integrated relationship 
than the UK’s position in the White Paper, and that UK preparations to 
leave are not ready in time for a no-deal Brexit. These are in addition to 
the potential impacts of Brexit in any scenario.  
12.1 Internal Energy Market 
In 2017 the UK imported 4.2% of its electricity demand through 
interconnectors to Europe and the island of Ireland, and 36.8% of its 
gas.358 The UK also imports Liquified Natural Gas, though not through 
interconnectors and predominantly not from EU countries.  
The IEM facilitates harmonised, tariff-free trade across these 
interconnectors. The Government’s Brexit White Paper said the UK 
wanted to “explore” options for the UK’s future relationship with the 
IEM and contains options to either leave or remain in the market.359 
Therefore, it is possible that ‘no deal’ could be much the same as a deal, 
as the UK could stay in or leave the IEM in the event of a deal or leave in 
the event of no deal. 
Leaving the IEM (as a result or a negotiated deal or a no-deal scenario) 
could have an impact on the trade of energy through interconnectors. 
However, it is also important to note that several countries outside the 
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EU currently trade energy through interconnectors with the EU, and the 
EU does not generally apply tariffs to these imports.360 
National Grid told the BEIS Committee that ‘no deal’ posed no 
immediate risk to the UK’s security of electricity supply, which could be 
supported through greater domestic generation.361  
There may be other, longer term costs of leaving the IEM (with or 
without a deal) without any other sort of agreement to cooperate on 
energy matters, such as less efficient trading, which could increase the 
cost of energy,362 exclusion from EU solidarity principles for gas supply 
crises,363 more difficultly securing future interconnector projects364 
which can help increase flexibility and resilience of grids, especially with 
increasing intermittent renewables, and less influence on future IEM 
rules.365 These costs would impact EU Member States that export or 
import energy to and from the UK, as well as the UK itself. 
Ireland 
Ireland’s Single Electricity Market (SEM) allows free trade of power 
across the island, with all generators and suppliers trading through a 
central mandatory wholesale market.366 The SEM is undergoing 
significant change; the Integrated Single Electricity Market (I-SEM) is 
designed closely around the rules of the IEM.367 Although in the short 
term, a no-deal Brexit is unlikely to affect the transport of electricity, in 
the longer term regulatory divergence could be problematic for the 
continued functioning of this Irish market (including in relation to the 
EU ETS - see below for details). There could also be potential impacts on 
Ireland’s gas supply as a result of Brexit, as Ireland imports much of its 
gas from the UK (see above for ‘no deal’ issues).368  
12.2 Euratom 
The European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) provides the basis 
for regulation of civil nuclear activity in its Member States. The Euratom 
Treaty shares the EU’s institutional framework but is a distinct legal 
entity from the EU.369 The Government announced in the March 2017 
Article 50 letter that the UK would leave Euratom as well as the EU.370  
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The legal basis for leaving Euratom as part of the UK’s exit from the EU 
has been a subject of ongoing debate.371  
The UK began preparations for leaving Euratom by passing the Nuclear 
Safeguards Act 2018 and negotiating replacement Nuclear Cooperation 
Agreements for trade. But if there is no deal and no transition period 
there is a risk that these alterative domestic arrangements are not 
completed in time.  
For other aspects of Euratom such as nuclear research, a no-deal Brexit 
could have a clearer impact, with funding arrangements affecting the 
continuation of existing projects (radioisotopes are discussed in section 
9.3).   
As to its future relationship with Euratom, the UK Government’s White 
Paper says (para 144): 
The UK will seek a close association with Euratom: a new 
relationship that is more comprehensive and broad than any 
existing agreement between Euratom and a third country.  
A no-deal Brexit could mean this relationship with Euratom is not 
realised. It is also possible that even without a deal, the UK could still 
secure a separate deal with Euratom. For more general information, see 
the Library’s briefing paper on Euratom.  
• Nuclear Safeguards: these are measures to verify that countries 
comply with international obligations not to use civil nuclear 
materials for weapons.372 The Nuclear Safeguards Act 2018 makes 
provision for a new domestic safeguard regime after the UK 
leaves Euratom. In May 2018 concern was raised in the press that 
the new regime would not be ready by exit day.373 However, in an 
appearance before the House of Lords Energy and Environment 
Sub-Committee in July 2018, the Office for Nuclear Regulation 
(who are responsible for implementing the new regime) said they 
were “confident” that timeframes would be met.374 ‘No deal’ 
should therefore have little impact on Nuclear Safeguards, if 
domestic provisions are in place in time. The Library Briefing on 
the Nuclear Safeguard’s Bill has further detail.  
• Nuclear Cooperation Agreements: the UK Government is in 
the process of negotiating new Nuclear Cooperation Agreements 
(NCAs) with relevant nuclear states to replace existing Euratom 
agreements. These agreements facilitate trade such as in nuclear 
materials including fuel. An NCA is not a legal requirement for 
trade in many countries (where export licences can be used), but 
is a requirement in Australia, Canada, Japan and the US. The UK 
agreed an NCA with the USA in May 2018, which will need to be 
approved by both countries’ parliaments.375 The Nuclear 
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Safeguards Act 2018 included an amendment to provide that if 
the NCAs are not ready in time, the UK must make a request to 
the EU that existing Euratom NCAs be extended. In the event of a 
no-deal Brexit, if replacement NCAs have not been agreed and 
approved in time and existing arrangements with Euratom are not 
extended, it is possible that trade will cease with the countries 
concerned, and the UK may have to transfer its trading needs to a 
country where an NCA is not required.  
• Research: the UK collaborates with the EU on a number of 
nuclear research projects, including Joint European Torus (JET), a 
fusion power project at Culham. The Brexit White Paper stated 
that the Government wanted a deal to “provide for UK 
association with the Euratom Research and Training 
Programme“.376  Euratom provides 87.5% of the funding for the 
Culham JET project and the UK Government provides the rest.377 
The funding is secure until the end of 2018 and the Government 
has committed to paying its “fair share” of the funding until 
2020.378 However, it is possible that Euratom will not renew its 
funding as a result of Brexit, either later this year or in the event 
of no deal. It is also possible that in the event of ‘no deal’ for 
Euratom cooperation in general, the UK and Euratom do agree to 
collaborate specifically on Culham, or on research more generally. 
Further information on research collaboration and no deal Brexit is 
provided in section 13) 
12.3 Chemicals 
What is REACH? 
The main EU legislation for the regulation of chemicals in the EU is the 
Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals 
Regulation (No 1907/2006), known as REACH.379 REACH requires all 
substances that are manufactured or imported into the EU (in quantities 
of more than 1 tonne) to be registered with the European Chemicals 
Agency (ECHA), along with safety information about the chemical and 
its uses.380 REACH also provides a framework for controlling the 
manufacture, sale and/or use of hazardous substances in the EU.381  
The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) is the competent authority for 
REACH in the UK and plays a role in enforcement and in assessing 
substances before ECHA registration.382 Defra is the lead Government 
department with overall policy responsibility across the UK. 
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The chemicals industry is the second largest exporter to the EU from the 
UK after the automotive industry and the second biggest manufacturing 
industry in the UK overall.383 Substances registered under REACH are 
used in many industries and in the manufacture of many products, 
including household and consumer goods and pharmaceuticals. 
The Government’s preferred approach is to seek an agreement on a 
form of “associate membership” of the ECHA such that substance 
registrations remain valid in both the EU and UK markets.384 The 
European Chemical Industry Council reported in June 2018 that 
members of the European Commission’s Brexit taskforce had said that 
the ECHA was “part and parcel of the Single Market” and advised 
industry to prepare for “all eventualities”, including ‘no deal’.385  
Many of the concerns surrounding a no-deal situation for REACH relate 
to the status of REACH registrations and how the UK would replicate a 
system such as that carried out by the ECHA.386 REACH registrations are 
complex, expensive and can take months to produce; they often involve 
several companies contributing information.387  
No deal  
If there is no EU agreement on some form of associate membership of 
the ECHA, the UK will become a third party to REACH on exit day. In 
this case, the ECHA has stated that UK registrations will become 
immediately invalid.388 The Government appears to have accepted this 
position.389  
Two broad issues arise for a no-deal scenario:  
• how UK companies will be able to export chemicals to the EU if 
registrations are invalid in the EU market; 
 
• how chemicals will be regulated in the UK without REACH in 
place.  
Exporting to the EU market 
Regarding the EU market, in the absence of a deal the ECHA has said 
the UK will be treated like other third-party countries.390 This means UK 
companies exporting to the EU, like companies in non-EEA Member 
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States, will have to nominate an ‘only representative’ agent registered in 
an EU Member State to take over the responsibility of complying with 
REACH on their behalf.391 This is not straightforward while the UK is a 
Member State, because currently REACH only allows companies in third-
party countries to appoint ‘only representatives’.392  
Alternatively, the obligation for compliance with REACH will fall to the 
importer of the substance. 
Industry representatives from both chemical industries and industries 
that use chemicals have raised concerns about the potential impact on 
trade if UK REACH registrations become invalid in a no-deal scenario, 
pointing to the complex supply chains that exist in the chemicals sector, 
and manufacturing sectors in general.393 394 The impact of ‘no deal’ on 
trade is complex; it is not simply that all exports to the EU would 
automatically cease. Each substance and/or company would need to be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis depending on its registration status.395  
UK preparations for no deal: a ‘UK REACH’ 
The Government has indicated that if there is no agreement on 
associate membership of the ECHA, the UK will set up its own system 
for regulating chemicals in the UK – a ‘UK REACH’. 
The EUW Act 2018 provides a framework for converting EU law to the 
UK’s post-exit statute book. However, for REACH this is not 
straightforward because the system relies heavily on EU institutions and 
Member State cooperation.396 Defra’s Deputy Director for chemicals, 
pesticides and hazardous waste, Gabrielle Edwards, told the Lords EU 
Energy and Environment Sub-Committee in July 2018 that the 
Government was working on a “large and detailed” statutory 
instrument to deal with the “complex inoperabilities” that arise when 
transposing REACH into UK law. The SI is intended to address a no-deal 
situation and create a framework for a ‘UK REACH’.397 The legislation is 
expected to be finalised in autumn 2018 and laid in Parliament “later 
this year”.398  
Any such UK-wide framework would require the consent of the 
devolved Administrations, which has not yet been formally agreed.399 In 
June 2018 the Scottish Government stated that “regulation of 
                                                                                               
391  European Chemicals Agency, Only Representative, [accessed 7 November 2017].  
392  See European Chemicals Agency, Advice to companies / Q&As, [accessed 22 August 
2018]. 
393  Chemical Business Association (CBA), Growing Concerns On EU Market Access Post-
Brexit, 27 April 2018; Chemical Industries Association (CIA), European Chemical 
Industries Association (Cefic), European Chemical Industry Joint Statement on Brexit 
and the Future, November 2017.  
394  Lords EU Committee, Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, Oral evidence: The 
future of REACH regulations post-Brexit, 27 June 2018 Q9. 
395  Ibid, Q9 [Silvia Segna] 
396  For background, see: Environmental Audit Committee, Future of Chemicals 
Regulation after the EU Referendum, HC 912, 2016-17, para 4, 29 April 2017. 
397  Lords EU Committee, Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, Oral evidence: The 
future of REACH regulations post-Brexit, 18 July 2018, Q14 [Gabrielle Edwards] 
398  Ibid. 
399  Ibid, Q24 [Dr Thérèse Coffey MP] 
 
135 Commons Library Briefing, 10 September 2018 
chemicals is an area where the adoption of a UK-wide approach, within 
devolved responsibilities would be desirable”.400 
Two of the main challenges to setting up a UK REACH include: 
• establishing a regulatory authority in the UK to perform the 
functions currently carried out by the ECHA; and 
• setting up a UK database of registered substances, in effect 
replicating the ECHA system.  
A UK regulatory authority: in July 2018 Defra Parliamentary Under-
Secretary Dr Thérèse Coffey told the Lords EU Energy and Environment 
Sub-Committee that the Government had not decided which body 
would act as the authority for a UK REACH. Defra official Gabrielle 
Edwards referred to “extending the role” of the HSE and the 
Environment Agency.401 
A UK database of registered substances: Dr Thérèse Coffey, told the 
Lords EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee in July 2018 that the 
Department was working on building an IT system to support a 
database.402 However, it remains unclear how the UK will populate the 
database with information or what the process for registering in the UK 
would be. Dr Thérèse Coffey told the Lords Sub-Committee that the 
Government had not yet made a policy decision about whether to 
accept existing ECHA registrations as valid without the accompanying 
data.403 Defra’s Gabrielle Edwards went on to explain to the Committee 
that in a no-deal scenario, the Government expects that it would have 
to ask companies to resubmit registration information to a UK authority. 
However, as pointed out in the session, some companies may not have 
access to all the information they would need to do this: 
If we are in a no-deal scenario, our expectation is that we would 
need to ask companies to resubmit data to the UK authority. 
Some of them will have ready access to that, because they own 
the data; for some of them, as the Minister mentioned, the data 
will have been put together or will be owned by another 
registrant, so that will be a more complex and potentially costly 
operation for the businesses.404 
Chemical industry groups have raised concerns about the uncertainty of 
the approach to registrations in the absence of a deal.405 Lord Teverson, 
Chair of the Lords EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, 
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expressed concern about the level of the Government’s preparedness 
for a no-deal scenario,406 stating in July 2018: 
…the UK is entirely unprepared to regulate chemicals 
independently post-Brexit. [The Minister] is expecting industry to 
prepare for a potential departure from REACH, but hasn't started 
equipping a UK body to do the same. Given the potential cliff 
edge facing the industry, this simply isn't good enough.”407 
Thérèse Coffey told the Lords Sub-Committee that the Government 
intends to have a framework that is “pretty much aligned to REACH” 
when the UK leaves the EU.408 Nonetheless, environmental groups 
argue that if the UK system is slower than the EU in making regulatory 
decisions, or is not as legally robust, there could be loopholes or legal 
challenges, with the result that chemicals that are restricted in the EU 
are not restricted in the UK.409 
12.4 The environment 
Government funding and preparations 
The Liaison Committee questioned the Prime Minister about ‘no deal’ 
on 18 July 2018. She confirmed that of the £3 billion that the Treasury 
has set aside over two years for no deal preparations, Defra was 
allocated £310 million for 2018-19.410 The Prime Minister assured the 
Committee that the UK would not reduce its environmental standards in 
the event of ‘no deal’.411  
Defra Secretary of State Michael Gove confirmed to the Commons 
European Scrutiny Committee in July 2018 that “although no one 
wants it”, Defra was stepping up its preparation for the possibility that 
the UK would have to trade on WTO terms from March 2019.412 
‘No deal’ scenarios 
A March 2018 risk analysis report commissioned by Friends of the Earth, 
UK environmental policy post-Brexit by the Tyndall Centre, University of 
East Anglia413 examined a number of scenarios, including a “chaotic” no 
deal (‘cliff-edge’ Brexit) and a “planned” no deal (the WTO option) and 
the impact each could have on specific environmental policy areas. 
Waste, chemicals, habitats and birds and climate change were all 
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identified as policy areas at moderate to very high risk under a no-deal 
scenario. Waste is discussed further below.  
Greener UK (a coalition of environmental bodies) published a report 
What would a no deal Brexit mean for the environment? (July 2018) 
highlighting a number of ‘no deal’ concerns, including losing 
mechanisms for co-operating with the EU on transboundary 
environmental issues (of particular importance for Ireland), and a 
potential gap in governance between exit day and the date that any 
new UK environmental watchdog is established.414 During a Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee evidence session, similar ‘no deal’ 
concerns were raised by MPs, including Green Party MP Caroline Lucas 
who stated: 
It is massively urgent. An air gap sounds like quite a benign thing, 
but if we fall off a cliff after March 2019 and we do not have all 
of the infrastructure of environment protection and the 
enforcement mechanisms and all of that, that can have serious 
implications in terms of the state of our environment in this 
country.415 
The Secretary of State confirmed in reply that the Government was 
“stepping up preparations in the event of there not being that 
[withdrawal] agreement”. He confirmed: 
[…] work that is going on at the moment with my team looking 
at all of the statutory, legislative and other underpinnings that 
require to be put in place.416 
Further discussion of environmental issues in the context of Brexit is 
provided in the Library Briefing Paper on Brexit and the environment, 8 
August 2018.  
Waste 
There is concern about the implications for the movement of waste in 
both deal and no-deal Brexit scenarios. The UK is both an exporter of 
waste to EU and non-EU countries and an importer of waste from other 
EU countries. In particular, it is estimated that Ireland ships 40% of its 
hazardous waste to the UK for treatment.417  
Movement of waste 
Articles 34 and 3(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 on shipments of 
waste prohibit the export of waste for disposal and mixed municipal 
waste for recovery operations from the EU to a third country, unless it is 
a member of EFTA and a party to the Basel Convention. As a 
Commission notice to stakeholders sets out, once the UK become a 
third country, it will no longer be possible for EU Member States to 
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export hazardous waste to the UK.418 The House of Lords EU Committee 
Energy and Environment Sub-Committee asked Defra Ministers to clarify 
the impact of this on UK businesses if they were no longer able to 
receive imports of hazardous waste from the EU.419 Dr Thérèse Coffey 
replied that “we have estimated the impact to be very small”. 
On the export of waste shipment from the UK to other countries, the 
Commission notice states that “[i]mports of waste into the EU-27 will 
be governed, as of the withdrawal date, by Title V of Regulation (EC) No 
1013/2006, whereby imports of waste from a third country party to the 
Basel Convention remains allowed, subject to the requirements set out 
in that Regulation”.420 
Trade and tariffs 
Further concerns are about whether it will take a long time to export 
waste out of the country and whether there will be “frictionless” trade 
with EU after Brexit.421 Dr Coffey was asked about this by the Lords 
Energy and Environment Sub-Committee: 
Lord Krebs: (…) the Environmental Services Association told us 
that a hard Brexit, if that were the outcome, could disrupt some 
of the trade in waste and drive up costs of waste management. 
Do you think that it is unnecessarily worried? 
Dr Thérèse Coffey MP: I think it is. It might come back to the 
concept of frictionless trade and its checks and mechanics, rather 
than to the regulations. I see no reason why it is in the interests of 
different countries to make those changes. We are not 
anticipating particular problems, even if it did happen.422  
Dr Coffey also replied to questions about the possibility of tariffs 
being imposed on the export of UK waste in the situation where 
there was a reversion to WTO trading rules. She expressed 
confidence that because the EU was an importer of waste, “the 
tariff would end up on them for importing our waste, which 
would not be in their interest” and that “If tariffs ended up being 
the outcome, it would increase the costs of materials for EU 
companies. I expect that we will want to work together to make 
sure that that is not the outcome.”423 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme  
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is a mandatory cap-and-trade 
scheme for greenhouse gases.424 It operates in 31 countries (the 28 EU 
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countries, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and covers the 45% of 
the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions that come from energy intensive 
sectors.425 The EU ETS is currently in its third trading phase (2013-2020). 
If there is no deal the UK would drop out of the EU ETS before the end 
of Phase 3 and all relevant EU legislation would cease to apply on exit 
day.426 This scenario - leaving part way through a trading phase - would 
have practical consequences for the overall EU ETS market and both EU 
and UK participants. Some of these are discussed further below.  
More generally, a no-deal scenario would not impact the UK’s domestic 
targets to reduce emissions under the Climate Change Act 2008 (which 
are more ambitious than EU targets) and the Government has 
committed to continuing to meet its international climate change 
commitments.427  
While both the UK Government and the European Commission have 
proposed that the UK continues to participate in the EU ETS until the 
end of any transition/implementation period, and thus the end of Phase 
3 of the scheme (2020),428 neither party has formally indicated their 
preference on the UK’s post-Brexit participation in the scheme.429  So 
the UK could also stop participating in the EU ETS under the terms of a 
negotiated withdrawal agreement, albeit under different terms and a 
longer timeframe. The Government has confirmed it is committed to 
carbon pricing but is concerned that the EU ETS has not set a sufficiently 
strong carbon price signal. The Minister of State for Energy and Clean 
Growth, Claire Perry, has said: 
We are committed to carbon pricing as a tool and want the best 
possible way to deliver that carbon pricing. If there is a long-term 
opportunity to improve the carbon pricing signal in the economy 
by amending or changing our relationship with the ETS, we would 
be short-sighted not to take that.430 
If the UK leaves the EU ETS on exit day, a key risk identified in 2017 was 
that UK participants could flood the market with a mass sell-off of EU 
ETS allowances, which would result in a crash in the price of carbon. In 
October 2017 the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) was 
reported to have said: 
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A hard Brexit scenario poses a risk of approximately 220 million 
allowances issued by the United Kingdom to be offloaded onto 
the market between 1 January 2018 and 29 March 2019.431 
To safeguard against this, both the EU and the UK have amended 
legislation432 with the aim of avoiding a mismatch between the 
functioning of the EU ETS and the timing of Brexit for the 2018 
compliance year. The purpose of the amendments was to ensure that 
2018 UK allowances retain their value while also ensuring that they do 
not flood the market on the UK’s exit.  Further explanation of these 
safeguarding measures is set out in the European Commission press 
release: Update on safeguard measures for EU ETS (13 February 2018).  
In evidence on the EU ETS to the Lords Energy and Environment Sub-
Committee, the Managing Director of Sandbag (a climate change think 
tank), Debbie Stockwell, explained some practical implications and the 
default position if there is no agreement and no UK participation in the 
EU ETS: 
The default position, if a deal is not reached about UK 
involvement in the ETS, is that the UK would leave the Scheme at 
the point of leaving the EU. That said, transitional arrangements 
could be put in place to enable the UK to remain in the Scheme 
until the end of Phase 3. In our view, it would be much simpler for 
the UK to remain in the Scheme until that time. In practical terms, 
the UK would cease to be subject to the ETS Directive on 
departure from the EU and relevant UK legislation would need to 
be repealed. The EU would need to adjust the terms of the 
Emissions Trading Directive: for example, the cap and how it 
applies to the remaining 27 Member States.433 
Energy and climate lawyer Silke Goldberg, Partner at Herbert Smith 
Freehills LLP, picked up on other possible practical and legal implications 
of ‘no deal’, including for the Single Irish Electricity Market, the 
uncertainty for scheme participant companies that would need to make 
very short-term and quick adjustments, and the impact on existing 
contracts: 
There are a number of practical implications. You have already 
mentioned Ireland, so let us start there. The practical implication 
for the Single Irish Electricity Market would be distortion of the 
electricity price on the island of Ireland. At the moment, SEM 
works on a pool basis. From May onwards, it will move to 
bilateral. That effectively means that SEM, the single Irish 
electricity market, would need to cope with some of its participant 
electricity generators and market participants being subject to the 
EU ETS, and others not. That might have an impact on the pricing 
on the island of Ireland, and a distortive effect on electricity 
pricing and the functioning of the Single Irish Electricity Market.  
The Commission, in its Regulation of 12 February 2018, has 
already issued arrangements to mark UK allowances for the 
possibility of there being a no deal and related surrender 
                                                                                               
431  Reuters, EU measures to safeguard carbon market from Brexit, Julia Fioretti, 18 
October 2017 [accessed 9 August 2018] 
432  The EU amended the EU ETS Registry Regulation; the UK amended the Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions Trading Scheme Regulations 2012 by passing the Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Trading Scheme (Amendment) Regulations 2017  
433  Lords EU Committee, Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, Oral evidence: EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme, 14 March 2018, Q1 
141 Commons Library Briefing, 10 September 2018 
arrangements. There is also the practical implication that that, in 
itself, could distort pricing for companies that rely on UK-issued 
EU ETS allowances.  
Typically, companies do not enter EU ETS trading arrangements 
for compliance on an extremely short-term basis. Companies 
know that over the next however many years, for Phase 3 of the 
EU ETS, which we are currently in, they have a particular carbon 
strategy. That strategy may be curtailed, and companies may need 
to make very short-term and quick adjustments. That will have 
practical consequences. Perhaps Lawrence can add to that in 
further detail.  
From a legal perspective, that may have an impact on the existing 
contracts. It may be quite disruptive, and it will require an awful 
lot of organisation, in a scenario with quite a lot of price 
distortion. At the moment, the EU ETS is at a seven-year high. It 
trades at around €11. Brexit, in a no-deal scenario, will almost 
certainly have a negative impact on it.434 
Other potential no-deal impacts identified are the loss of income from 
auction revenues to the Treasury (£530 million last year435) and the 
possibility of legal action by adversely affected companies.436 The 
Government has confirmed it is preparing for a range of scenarios for 
the EU ETS, including ‘no deal’, 437 but has not commented in detail on 
the practical/ legal implications of a sudden exit. 
12.5 Transport 
As with many other areas, it is difficult to say with certainty what ‘no 
deal’ would mean for transportation between the UK and the EU27. In 
a report published on 19 July the National Audit Office acknowledged 
that the Department for Transport had “made a determined effort to 
address the significant and complex challenge of delivering the wide-
ranging set of actions required of it to support the UK’s exit from the 
EU”, but concluded: 
Despite these efforts, the Department still faces a considerable 
challenge. For example, it still has much to do on the contingency 
arrangements required by DExEU in case no deal is reached, with 
an increasing risk of not being able to deliver them all within the 
time available.438 
Aviation 
In its December 2017 report on a ‘no deal’ Brexit, the Lords EU 
Committee stated that “[t]he consequences of failure to reach a deal 
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[on aviation] would be grave”.439 It had previously reported in March 
2017 that:  
There is no adequate ‘fall-back’ position for aviation services in 
the event that no agreement is reached with the EU. Air services 
are excluded from the WTO, and the pre-existing bilateral air 
services agreements between the UK and individual EU Member 
States may not be valid, given the EU’s extended competence in 
this area. It follows that, in order to avoid significant damage to 
the UK aviation sector, either a UK-EU bilateral air services 
agreement must be agreed before the UK leaves the EU in 2019, 
or a transitional arrangement must be adopted, to allow 
continuing UK participation in the Single Market for aviation 
pending conclusion of a comprehensive agreement.440 
‘The UK in a Changing Europe’ looked at aviation in a July 2017 paper: 
So would planes actually stop flying between the UK and the 
EU27? In principle, absent measures to mitigate the impact of no 
deal, that is possible – if only because their lawyers would not let 
them. But, even assuming that some stop-gap arrangement were 
to be put in place, it seems likely that there would be very serious 
impacts, with many airlines reducing their schedules to the UK, 
both immediately and in the medium term.441 
Timing is very important. The International Air Transport Association 
(IATA) has urged “an early resolution for aviation in the Brexit 
discussion”: 
Time is precious. The Brexit clock is ticking towards a deadline of 
March 2019. But the aviation deadline is earlier. Normally 
passengers can book travel about a year in advance. At a 
minimum, the flight schedules and seat and cargo inventories 
must be available at least six months in advance. So that puts the 
airlines’ deadline at October 2018…442 
There were reports towards the end of 2017 that some airlines were 
tightening their terms and conditions for flights booked in advance for 
travel after Brexit, warning customers that they may not take off and 
that airlines will not pay compensation if planes are grounded.443 
The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has said it is preparing to assume 
new functions and capabilities that the European Aviation Safety 
Agency currently deals with, in case of a no-deal Brexit, “identifying 
how many new staff would be needed and preparing safety systems to 
take on work now carried out by European authorities”.444 The CAA has 
updated its website to give information on what it will have to do in the 
event of ‘no deal’.  
The Government indicated earlier that if there is no deal, a ‘bare bones’ 
aviation agreement could nonetheless be concluded before the UK 
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leaves the EU. The European Commission has not commented on this 
possibility and it is doubtful that an agreement on a complex regulatory 
area such as aviation could be drafted at the last minute. 
Road transport 
In the event of a no deal scenario, UK hauliers (both companies and 
individual drivers) would lose their current rights of access to the EU 
road transport market, which are set out in EU Regulation 
1072/2009445. The House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee446 
explained what this would entail, noting that the EU road transport 
market eliminates quota restrictions on international traffic between 
Member States, including cross-trade (international road transport 
between two Member States performed by a road motor vehicle 
registered in a third Member State), transit traffic to and from non-
Member States, and even permits a certain amount of ‘cabotage’ 
(journeys entirely within the territory of another EU Member State).447 
 
In the event of no deal, a small proportion of UK hauliers would retain 
limited access to the EU market through the European Conference of 
Ministers of Transport (ECMT) multilateral permit scheme, which 
provides permit-based access across 43 European states for 
some operators with vehicles compliant with Euro 4, 5 and 6 standards. 
However, the ECMT scheme is only designed to provide for a small 
proportion of the total international access that is needed 
(approximately 5–10% of international road haulage in Europe), 
with the principal objectives being to incentivise improvements in road 
safety and environmental standards, and as such could provide only a 
very small proportion of the freight transport that would be necessary. 
 
For the majority of operators, a no deal scenario would therefore entail 
a shift from intra-EU market rights to a bilateral permit system, for 
which the Government has made some preparations. The UK’s decision 
finally to ratify the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic means that 
there will be a framework for international driving permits post-Brexit, 
and the Haulage Permits and Trailer Registration Act would allow the 
Secretary of State to create an international road haulage permit 
scheme.448  
As such an arrangement would have to be negotiated, potentially with 
individual EU Member States, it is unclear whether a functional 
arrangement could be operational on day one of an abrupt, non-
negotiated exit. 
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Regarding the implications of a shift to a permit scheme, the Road 
Haulage Association (RHA) has estimated449 that “a simple bilateral 
permit system will add approximately £53 per movement in and out of 
the UK for UK operators and about £26 for EU operators”, and that 
such an arrangement would “impact greatly on the costs of services 
provided and also create impediments for the smooth and effective 
movement of goods”.450 The Road Haulage Association concluded that 
this would be the worst possible outcome for the UK, and that there are 
no benefits for either the haulage industry or supply chains arising from 
the introduction of a system of bilateral permits. However, the European 
Scrutiny Committee noted that permit schemes are not a fixed quantity, 
and “can vary both in terms of cost and level of market access”. 
 
A no deal scenario would potentially have particularly disruptive effects 
for hauliers operating between the UK (particularly Northern Ireland) 
and Ireland, as integrated cross-border supply chains mean that there is 
a high occurrence of cabotage activity on the island of Ireland. The 
Government said in the July 2018 White Paper that “the UK will ensure 
that there is no requirement in any scenario for new [haulage] permits 
for transport services between Northern Ireland and Ireland” [para 134].  
 
If there is no transitional arrangement, UK-issued certificates of 
professional competence for road transport operators and certificates of 
professional competence for drivers will automatically become invalid in 
the EU27. Coach and truck drivers with a UK-issued certificate would 
therefore have to obtain a new certificate of professional competence in 
an EU Member State before they could work in the EU. 
 
Rail 
On rail the White Paper states that the EU and UK have agreed that 
“the UK will pursue bilateral agreements with France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands to ensure the continued smooth functioning and operation 
of services through the Channel Tunnel, and with Ireland to do the 
same for the Belfast-Dublin Enterprise line” [para 136]. Thus, for 
international rail, ‘no deal’ might look much the same as ‘a deal’.  
 
Maritime/shipping 
In maritime/shipping the Government is generally confident that the 
global nature of shipping means Brexit of whatever sort will have little 
effect on how companies currently operate (see e.g. para 135 of the 
July White Paper). This does not of course account for the possible 
impact of customs and immigration issues, discussed in sections 7 and 
9).  
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But a no-deal Brexit would affect the ability of seafarers with UK-issued 
certificates of competency and proficiency to work onboard ships 
flagged in EU Member States. The current EU-level system provides for 
the mutual recognition of seafarers’ certificates between Member 
States. This means that pending endorsement - a form of authorisation - 
seafarers holding certificates issued in one Member State can serve 
onboard ships flagged in any other Member State. In the event of ‘no 
deal’ and the UK becoming a third country for the purposes of the 
current system, a separate procedure would apply to the recognition of 
UK-issued certificates. Seafarers with UK-issued certificates would only 
be able to serve onboard vessels flagged by Member States that have 
unilaterally recognised UK qualifications.  
 
In a Brexit preparedness notice to stakeholders (19 January 2018) the 
European Commission warned that in the event of an agreement not 
being reached, endorsements issued to UK-certified seafarers would 
only be valid until their date of expiration and that seafarers would not 
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13. Higher education, science and 
research 
Access to research funding and Erasmus+ 
Research funding 
The UK currently does disproportionately well in securing EU research 
funding and UK Universities are the top performers in receiving EU 
funds based on scientific excellence.451 Recent figures show that UK 
Universities receive over £836 million in research grants and contracts 
from EU sources, representing more than 14.2% of all income from 
research grants and contracts.452 Million+, The Russell Group and the 
British Heart Foundation said in their evidence to the House of Lords EU 
Committee inquiry on a no-deal Brexit that ‘no deal’ could stop the UK’s 
access to EU research funds and prevent UK collaboration in EU 
projects:453 
MillionPlus argued that no deal would be “extremely damaging 
for UK universities and should be avoided if at all possible”. They 
cited in particular the reputational damage, deterrent effect and 
confusion that could arise from the designation of EU students as 
international students. No deal could also place existing EU-
funded research projects in jeopardy.       
The Russell Group concluded that no deal would affect 
universities’ ability to deliver world-leading research and 
education. No deal on the rights of EU citizens to live, study and 
work in the UK could lead to a loss of talented researchers and 
technicians with specialist skills who could not be replaced easily 
by UK nationals. If the UK and EU did not secure an agreement on 
science and research collaboration, UK institutions would cease to 
be eligible for Horizon 2020 funding on the day of exit. This 
would mean funding for existing projects would be withdrawn 
and researchers would immediately lose the ability to bid for this 
funding, with a detrimental impact on international 
competitiveness. 
The British Heart Foundation also noted that the EU was a major 
funder of UK research, and helped to promote international 
collaboration. Uncertainty about what could happen to UK access 
to Horizon 2020 funding after March 2019 could discourage EU 
researchers from approaching British counterparts to collaborate 
on projects. They too expressed concern about the reputational 
damage caused by uncertainty over the status of EU researchers 
and healthcare professionals in the UK.  
In October 2017 EU Commissioner Carlos Moedas also said that ‘no 
deal’ could result in the UK losing EU funding from the date of 
withdrawal from the EU: 
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Until the UK leaves, its researchers, universities, organisations, and 
companies are eligible to participate and receive funding in 
Horizon 2020. 
But the eligibility criteria must be complied with for the entire 
duration of the grant. This is why it was important to be 
transparent and inform UK-based applicants now that if the UK 
withdraws from the EU without concluding a withdrawal 
agreement they may be required to leave the project and no 
longer receive funding.454 
The Russell Group have further warned of the dangers of no deal on 
international research competitiveness: 
A sudden cliff-edge in research funding from the EU will have a 
serious impact on our universities’ international competitiveness in 
research. It is already the case that talented researchers at our 
universities are being approached by universities in other 
European countries with offers of academic contracts, so a 
sudden loss of access to EU research programmes in the UK could 
motivate many to relocate.455  
The Government guidance published on 23 August provides further 
information in “Horizon 2020 funding if there’s a Brexit no deal”.  
Erasmus+  
On the 30 May 2018 the EU Commission announced that for the 
funding cycle starting in 2021 any country in the world would be able 
to participate in the Erasmus+ programme if they met set requirements. 
It is possible, therefore, that in the event of ‘no deal' the UK might still 
be able to access the Erasmus+ programme, provided the UK meets 
criteria for admission to the scheme.456  
The Government guidance published on 23 August 2018 includes a 
paper, “Erasmus+ in the UK if there's no Brexit deal”, which gives some 
information on no deal implications for studying in the EU or the UK.  
EU students 
‘No deal’ could potentially result in EU students being re-classified as 
international students, being charged higher fees and denied access to 
student support. Million+ have said that a “‘no deal’ which resulted in 
EU students being treated as international students would have a very 
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significant and negative impact on EU student mobility and the EU 
market”.457  
EU staff in UK universities 
EU staff represent 16% of the academic workforce.458 Million+ has said 
that a no-deal could result in EU staff leaving UK universities and that 
this would have a particularly damaging effect on university foreign  
language and Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics 
(STEM) departments:  
The situation would be even starker for EU staff, as their legal 
status would be in question and their rights not guaranteed. It 
would be difficult to make any claim to say they will definitely be 
able to stay in the UK to work, if indeed they then still wanted to. 
Any significant loss in EU staff, through voluntary means or 
otherwise, would disproportionately impact on certain key 
subjects, like foreign languages and STEM courses, as EU staff 
make up significant proportions of staff in those subject areas. It 
would also, as for students, damage the effective running of 
institutions and the image and reputation of the sector. This 
would be particularly concerning at a time when the UK is already 
being seen as less open than its competitor nations, and when it is 
losing international market share to direct competitors like 
Australia and Canada.459 
The Russell Group has also warned about the damaging effect of a loss 
of highly qualified EU staff: 
If EU staff were required to meet current Tier 2-style visa 
conditions in the absence of an agreement which guarantees their 
rights to stay, our analysis shows that nearly a quarter of existing 
EU staff (over 6,000 people) at Russell Group universities would 
not be eligible to work in the UK. This includes a significant 
number of staff with postgraduate, doctoral and other higher 
degrees (over 2,100 individuals). This would be a great loss for the 
UK’s science base and one that could take many years, and 
probably decades, to rebuild. It is certainly not the case that EU 
staff at Russell Group universities could be replaced easily by UK 
nationals (particularly in the short term) as they are unlikely to 
have the specialist skills, expertise and experience to match those 




                                                                                               
457  House of Lords paper 46. Brexit: Deal or no deal, 7 December 2017, Written 
evidence MillionPlus (DND0013) 
458  Universities UK submission to the House of Commons Education Committee inquiry 
on ‘The impact of exiting the European Union on higher education’, November 
2016.  
459  ibid 
460  House of Lords paper 46. Brexit: Deal or no deal, 7 December 2017, Written 
evidence – Russell Group (DND0044) 
149 Commons Library Briefing, 10 September 2018 
14. Internal security 
The UK currently participates in approximately 40 EU measures that aim 
to support and enhance internal security and police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. Measures identified as being of 
particular significance include the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), 
access to databases, including the Second Generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II), European Criminal Records Information 
Exchange System (ECRIS) and Passenger Name Records (PNR), and 
participation in agencies, in particular Europol and mention the Prüm 
Convention461 – the framework for the exchange of DNA profiles, 
fingerprints and vehicle registration data. 
The Government would like future cooperation with the EU on all the 
EU police and criminal justice measures in which the UK currently 
participates, suggesting it anticipates a significant operational impact if 
this cooperation were brought to an abrupt no-deal end.  
14.1 Data protection and exchange 
Under the EU’s data protection framework, personal data can only be 
transferred to third countries when an “adequate” level of protection is 
guaranteed. The EU can make an adequacy decision so that data can 
flow from Member States to third countries, or one or more specific 
sectors in those countries. The European Council’s guidelines for future 
EU-UK relations state that the protection of personal data “should be 
governed by Union rules on adequacy”.  
 
In its December 2017 report on deal or no deal, the Lords EU 
Committee warned that a complete ‘no deal’ would bring UK-EU 
cooperation in a number of areas – including data exchange - to a 
“sudden halt”.462 This would be “deeply damaging for the UK”.463 
However, David Davis told the Committee that in the absence of a full 
deal, a “bare bones” deal could include an agreement on data sharing: 
(…) in the event that we did not get a full deal, the interest of 
both sides on, say, counterterrorism co-operation, justice co-
operation or data exchange co-operation is so great that I find it 
hard to believe that we will not get some fundamental deal 
there…464 
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14.2 Cooperation in law enforcement and 
criminal justice 
Both the UK and the EU have emphasised the importance of 
maintaining cooperation in the field of security, law enforcement and 
criminal justice. The Home Secretary told the House of Commons Home 
Affairs Select Committee (HASC) that security “is something that should 
not be linked to any of the other discussions”, and that the UK’s 
proposals are “completely unconditional”.465  
However, if there is no agreement at the point of exit, the UK will cease 
to have access to the EU measures in this area.  
Possible impact of ‘no deal’ 
Representatives from the worlds of law enforcement, criminal justice, 
and security and intelligence have provided insights into the possible 
consequences of the UK losing access to EU measures in this area. The 
impacts centre around three broad themes: loss of operational capacity, 
loss of strategic influence and an increased demand on resources 
resulting from the need to compensate for these losses. The consensus 
is that a no-deal scenario would have a significant negative impact on 
public safety. 
Concerns have also been raised about the impact of a loss of 
cooperation on the security situation in Northern Ireland and around the 
Irish border (see section 8).  
Sir Rob Wainwright, former Director of Europol, said in evidence to 
HASC: 
Serious crime today and terrorism today is without doubt a 
transnational problem and requires that kind of response, of 
course. That is precisely why the UK, as much as any other 
member state of the European Union, has invested so much effort 
over the last three decades in constructing the closest possible, 
most cohesive and effective cross-border police co-operation 
arrangements in Europe. It is therefore axiomatic to say that in the 
face of these threats that are continuing to grow and evolve in 
that way that any dislocation in that effort, any break-up of that 
would lead of course to a decrease in the overall effectiveness of 
all of us to keep all of our citizens safe here in the UK, but across 
Europe as well. I think therefore that is a well-understood point.466 
Asked whether there was cause for concern given the different 
positions of the UK and the EU in negotiations on future security 
cooperation, he said:  
We should be worried if we reach a point of no deal or effectively 
no deal on security because that will certainly have an adverse 
effect on our collective ability in Europe to fight crime and 
terrorism.467 
Asked specifically about the consequences of ‘no deal’, he said: 
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We would survive as a country, of course. However, without a 
doubt we suddenly lose access to instruments of very direct and 
practical operational value to the UK on an everyday basis. That 
would be quite serious for the ability of our national police 
authorities to keep us safe.468  
Sir Julian King, European Commissioner for the Security Union, 
expressed a similar view to the Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee 
[I]f there is no agreement, we all stand to lose, because we will be 
less well-equipped to cooperate effectively against these shared 
threats [terrorism, cyber, and serious and organised crime].469 
Members of the Association of Policing and Crime Commissioners’ 
Brexit Working Group wrote to the Home Secretary on 2 August 2018, 
expressing concerns that a no-deal scenario would lead to a significant 
loss of operational capacity, which could pose significant risks to 
communities.470 The letter from Matthew Scott (Kent), Lord William 
Bach (Leicestershire) and Martyn Underhill (Dorset) stated that “[t]he UK 
and EU share a common and ever evolving threat picture. We believe 
that a comprehensive partnership in all areas of policing and security 
cooperation is of mutual benefit to all”. They continued: 
Through discussions with the NCA and NPCC, we understand that 
considerable additional resource would be required for policing to 
operate using non-EU tools and that such tools would be sub-
optimal – potentially putting operational efficiency and public 
safety at risk. 
It is also recognised that recruitment, vetting, and training of staff 
to use these tools would take a substantial amount of time.  
Should an implementation period not be agreed, contingency 
plans will need to be implemented by the end of March 2019. 
Given that the implementation period decision is not likely to be 
known until October 2018, the resultant five month window is 
likely to be very challenging.  
We are therefore concerned that a ‘no deal’ scenario could cause 
delays and challenges for UK policing and justice agencies. 
The Police and Crime Commissioners asserted that the “shared tools, 
measures, initiatives and capabilities” developed over the years of the 
UK’s EU membership had “saved many lives”, and that ways had to be 
found “to protect these mutually important capabilities […] to ensure 
the safety and security all our citizens”. The PCCs called on Sajid Javid 
to “[c]onfirm that the Home Office has developed effective contingency 
plans for a ‘no deal’ scenario”.  
The Law Society of England and Wales suggested in written evidence to 
the Lords EU Committee Home Affairs Sub-Committee that leaving the 
EU without a deal on security would lead to legal and organisational 
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chaos, and create a void which could be exploited by terrorists and 
criminals.471 
The Committee’s subsequent report Brexit: the proposed UK-EU Security 
Treaty reiterated its previous conclusion472 that current cooperation 




The House of Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee concluded in their 
report Brexit: future UK-EU security and police cooperation, that access 
to EU law enforcement databases and data-sharing platforms is integral 
to day-to-day policing, and that loss of access could pose a risk to the 
safety of the public.474   
In its report, Brexit: the proposed UK-EU Security Treaty, the Committee 
stated: 
Were the UK to lose access to the EU’s security databases, 
information that today can be retrieved almost instantaneously 
could take days or weeks to access, creating not only a significant 
hurdle to effective policing but a threat to public safety.475    
These conclusions reflect evidence taken from law enforcement bodies, 
former members of the security and intelligence agencies, the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) and the legal profession, among others.   
Richard Martin, Deputy Assistant Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police, told the Committee that under current arrangements police 
officers on the street are able to run checks on a car or person on the 
police national criminal database and on SIS II simultaneously. He 
described this ability as “absolutely essential” in order to keep people 
safe.476 He suggested that without access to these databases, the police 
would not be able to make as many checks, and the system would be 
much slower and less efficient. Delays in access to information on 
suspects could mean that opportunities to prevent crime would be lost. 
He concluded that a loss of access to databases would mean “[W]e will 
get a poorer picture, a lot more slowly than we do now, which will 
affect our operational capability”.477 
Steve Smart, Director of Intelligence at the National Crime Agency, set 
out the operational impact at a tactical and strategic level: 
At a tactical level, the impact of losing access to those datasets is 
that more bad people will get into the UK, and it will be harder 
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for us to find and deal with them. At a more strategic level … As 
an organisation, we are looking to build, on behalf of wider law 
enforcement, a national data exploitation capability over the next 
three years. Not being able to link to the data that our European 
partners hold, the data that sits at Europol and on the Schengen 
information system, would undoubtedly have a negative impact 
on what we can do with the data we already have.478  
Rob Wainwright told HASC that the UK derives specific and important 
operational value from all the main databases, including the Europol 
Information System, SIS II and the Prüm Convention.479 He explained 
that the ability to quickly circulate information about criminal and 
terrorist suspects has a direct operational benefit 
The analogy might be that a serious criminal, maybe a sex 
offender from one member state, would be registered on the 
Schengen Information System in case, unknown to those 
authorities in Germany or France, he were to travel around 
Europe, then were he to arrive at Dover Docks, then the fact that 
he is on the Schengen Information System would allow our border 
officials here to identify him as that suspected offender. If those 
officials do not have access to that common database on which 
the other authorities have placed his name, then it is pretty 
obvious what possible detrimental effect that might have on the 
ability of that border official to make the right decision about 
letting him in the country.480 
These concerns were shared by Lord Evan of Weardale, former Director 
General of MI5. When asked whether the loss of access to databases 
could cause problems for the security service, he agreed that it could: 
[O]ne of the main ways in which we seek to reduce the risk of 
harm is by getting criminals locked up who are involved in 
planning terrorism or whatever. For that, we have to rely on law 
enforcement agencies because the Security Service has no law 
enforcement powers. From that point of view, a very important 
part of the overall counterterrorism efforts in the country is 
dependent on law enforcement, which in turn is reliant upon 
international cooperation.481  
It should be borne in mind that Article 7 of the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement makes clear that the UK will not be able to access “any 
network, any information system and any database established on the 
basis of Union law” at the end of the transition/implementation period, 
unless there is a further agreement authorising it to do so. 
 
European Arrest Warrant and other criminal justice cooperation 
measures 
Writing in The Times on 9 August, Ed Davey, Liberal Democrat 
spokesperson for Home Affairs, asserted that losing access to the 
European Arrest Warrant (EAW) would mean UK criminals could evade 
                                                                                               
478  Ibid, Q63 
479  This Convention is often referred to as ‘Schengen III’. It is a treaty signed on 27 May 
2005 by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Spain. It deals with cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and 
cross-border crime. 
480  Oral evidence: Eu policing and security cooperation, HC 1356, 3 July 2018, Q22 
481  Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 16 May 2018, Q97 
 
154 What if there's no Brexit deal? 
justice in other European countries, and that criminals from elsewhere in 
the EU would be able to evade justice in the UK.482 
In support of this contention, he quoted the then Home Secretary 
Theresa May in 2014, who described the EAW as “a vital tool for 
ensuring that justice is done in this country and for keeping the British 
public safe”, without which the UK risked becoming “a honeypot for all 
of Europe’s criminals on the run from justice”.  Mr Davey cited the 
example of an ongoing case in Ireland, in which an individual is seeking 
to resist extradition to the UK to stand trial for murder, arson and rape, 
on the grounds that he will not be able to rely on EU derived rights after 
Brexit.483 
Debbie Price, Head of International Justice at the CPS, gave evidence to 
the Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee on the impact of losing 
access to criminal justice cooperation measures, including the EAW, on 
prosecuting crime. She highlighted the operational importance of speed 
in being able to obtain people, evidence and the proceeds of crime, 
which the current arrangements facilitate. She also raised the issue of 
legal certainty: 
[A] reversion to a different set of instruments will lead to a period 
of legal uncertainty where things need to be tried and tested in 
the courts, which takes a lot of resources, time and money from 
everyone involved.484 
She explained that alternative extradition arrangements were slower 
and more expensive, and that alternatives to the European Investigation 
Order and Mutual Legal Assistance mechanisms would also be slower. 
This could lead to a capability gap, for example where someone was on 
remand awaiting trial, but it was not possible to obtain crucial evidence 
in time for the trial. 
She also noted potential costs to victims and witnesses of having to 
travel to trials in other countries if extradition was not possible.485 
Richard Martin suggested that criminals may seek to exploit changes to 
extradition arrangements: 
[C]riminal groups are not daft. They may already be thinking that, 
if certain powers do not exist, there are opportunities for them to 
either operate here, knowing it is far harder to be extradited from 
the country, especially if they are a foreign national, or vice 
versa.486 
Jim Brisbane, CPS Brexit lead, gave evidence about contingency 
planning. In the context of the EAW, he explained that there was a 
need to ensure that the correct processes were in place and that the 
CPS had the necessary expertise to deal with extradition in a different 
context. He suggested this would require additional resources because 
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the process would be less streamlined and there would be more legal 
challenges. However, it was not yet possible to estimate the scale of the 
additional demand.487  
Rob Wainwright suggested that the loss of the EAW would have an 
adverse impact on the UK’s overall security arrangements.488  
Richard Martin and Steve Smart discussed the resource implications of 
losing access to existing measures. Richard Martin said their contingency 
planning included looking at the impact of losing access to the EAW: 
If that is the case, it is much slower and there are a lot more 
manual linkages. It means that we have to get a warrant for 
certain things. That means there is an impact on the CPS. 
We are now trying to quantify what that means at ground level 
for local policing and what each organisation will need in order to 
process things in a different way at a slower rate…. Other things 
include … what our overseas liaison network looks like. What 
might our footprint in Europol look like as a third country? How 
many people do we need? Do we need greater influence? Does 
that equal more people or are there key countries that we need to 
be better represented in?489  
Northern Ireland  
The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) provided evidence to the 
Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee on the impact of losing access to 
EU measures in the context of cooperation with the Garda in Ireland in 
relation to the border. PSNI noted the importance of good working 
relationships, but also emphasised the need for a clear legal framework: 
For example, the loss of European Arrest Warrants would impact 
on the PSNI ability to pursue those who use the land Border to 
evade prosecution. This will affect Counter Terrorism, Serious/ 
Organised Crime and Volume Crime. […] 
There is significant interaction and relationships between 
Organised Crime Groups operating on both sides of the Border 
and they often work together across a number of types of 
organised crime. It is likely that organised crime groups will seek 
to exploit any new arrangements for criminal gain. Many of these 
groups have links to terrorist activity and the funding of acts of 
terrorism.490    
Others have also noted that the loss of the EAW would be felt 
particularly acutely in Ireland/ Northern Ireland context. Alternative 
extradition arrangements allow for exceptions for offences that are 
political in nature, and for the extradition of own nationals, both of 
which may lead to a barrier in extraditing those suspected of 
involvement in dissident Irish Republican terrorism.491 Any reversion to a 
system based on requests via diplomatic, rather than judicial, channels 
(as is the case with extradition arrangements outside the EAW) would 
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also pose difficulties in an environment where political relationships may 
be strained.    
Robert Hannigan, former Director of GCHQ, suggested that the 
presence of a physical border on the island of Ireland would be a threat 
to internal security in itself: 
It is hard to see any of the current solutions not resulting in more 
smuggling, and anyone who has worked there knows that 
smuggling and crime on the border are corrosive to the peace 
process because the money tends to go to paramilitary groups, or 
the rump of paramilitary groups. That is a worry. It is the threat 
and the criminality that might be affected rather than the 
cooperation.492 
Strategic influence  
Rob Wainwright told the Lords EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee that a 
change in the UK’s relationship with Europol would be felt mainly in the 
context of strategic influence. He explained that the UK is currently the 
lead Member State in a number of important projects in the areas of 
modern slavery, large-scale fraud and cocaine trafficking, for example. 
The UK is also currently chair of the counter-terrorist programme board 
at Europol and has been one of the primary architects in the 
development of police cooperation systems in the EU.493  
Steve Smart and Richard Martin both emphasised the need for the UK 
to continue to be able to influence the development of law 
enforcement tools in light of the evolving nature of crime.494 Steve 
Smart pointed out that the UK was responsible for instigating many of 
the measures to which law enforcement now hopes to retain access, 
such as the EAW and PNR. He suggested that as the threat changes, 
new tools will be needed and “[w]e have to maintain the ability to drive 
that discussion”.495 If the UK ends up with a radically different 
relationship with Europol to the one it has now, influencing and shaping 
Europol’s agenda would be a lot harder.496 
As an example of UK influence, Richard Martin said the UK had been 
successful in persuading Europol to include firearms on its list of 
priorities: 
… which allows them to collect intelligence against that, allows 
them to develop products, and gets it on to some of the work 
groups that we need to have. It was our influence that got it on. It 
was not originally on. Areas such as that would concern me.497 
Lord Evans and Robert Hannigan also regarded a change in the UK’s 
status as detrimental to its ability to influence. Mr Hannigan suggested 
that although for cultural reasons the UK could still be a bridge between 
the EU and the Five Eyes countries:498  
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[T]here is no question that removing ourselves from one of those 
groups is going to have an impact as we become another member 
of the Five Eyes that is outside the EU.499 
Lord Evans expressed concern that the UK’s absence from the Council 
of the EU and the European Parliament would mean the loss of a well-
informed and influential voice in the formation of policy that impacts on 
national security: 
We will not be there in the same way in future. It was always 
noticeable that when the Club of Berne [a group comprised of 
heads of EU security agencies] would brief the permanent 
representatives in Europe, which we did periodically, at a quasi-
political level, they were always keen to have the British there, 
because we tended to be better connected in some of those areas 
and more familiar with some of the policies than some of the 
smaller countries perhaps were. We were able to be a helpful 
voice, which will be more difficult going forward. That is an area 
of vulnerability.500  
Robert Hannigan agreed, and emphasised the role of the UK in the 
debate about balancing privacy and security in the context of 
investigatory powers: 
That is an important point on data, in particular. After the 
referendum one of the concerns that I picked up from 
counterparts in Europe was that the strongest voice at one end of 
the spectrum on balancing privacy and security and getting a 
sensible UK-style balance would be gone. There is a wide 
spectrum among the member states. Some are at the extreme 
other end. I know that some of our colleagues worry a lot about 
the absence of that voice.501  
Steve Smart suggested that as the Five Eyes partners look to the UK to 
put forward their point of view within Europol, a loss of access to 
Europol would therefore have a negative impact on them as well.502 
Could the UK fall back on other mechanisms for 
international cooperation? 
In some areas there are existing fall-back options, but they have been 
characterised as suboptimal in comparison with EU measures.  
The 1957 Council of Europe Convention on Extradition could be an 
existing fall-back option on extradition. However, it does not impose 
time limits and requests are made through diplomatic rather than 
judicial channels. There are also more grounds on which extradition can 
be refused, so this process would probably be slower,503 more costly 
and lead to fewer extraditions. Furthermore, because there are EU 
measures, some EU Member States have repealed legislation giving 
effect to the Convention. 
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A 1959 Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal 
Matters could provide a fall-back in the context of mutual assistance in 
criminal investigations. But this would also be a slower, more 
bureaucratic process than under existing arrangements, and it has not 
been ratified by all EU Member States.  
In police cooperation, the UK would have to rely on cooperation 
through the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) and 
bilateral agreements. Interpol’s capabilities are less developed than 
those of Europol, and the quantity and quality of data shared via 
Interpol are regarded as inferior.  
Camino Mortera of the Centre for European Reform suggests: 
… the UK could try to negotiate a surrender agreement similar to 
the one Norway and Iceland have with the EU. But this agreement 
took 13 years to negotiate, is still not in force, and will allow 
countries to refuse to extradite their own nationals.504 
Richard Martin explained in evidence to the Lords EU Sub-Committee 
that law enforcement teams working with the Home Office on 
contingency planning were looking at using the Interpol database I-
24/7. However, he suggested that this would have limitations compared 
to existing mechanisms: 
[The fall-back options] all have limitations compared to what we 
currently have, but we are mapping through all those processes. 
What does that look like when it is a bit slower? How does that 
work for officers on the street, and the NCA officers, when they 
are doing their roles? … 
If there was a cliff edge scenario … we would have these fallbacks 
ready to use. They would be clunky and they would be slower, 
but we would still be able to operate in a way around all that.505    
Steve Smart added that in some areas there were no obvious fall-back 
options, and reliance on what was available would make law 
enforcement agencies less dynamic and less effective: 
We will not be able to work at the speed we work now, assuming 
all things remain the same. There will be a resourcing issue, both 
for national policing and for the NCA, if we end up with a treaty 
that does not give us a lot of what we currently have.506 
National security is not part of EU law and remains the responsibility of 
Member States. Some have therefore suggested that the impact of 
Brexit of any sort in this area will be minimal, because intelligence 
cooperation can and will continue at an intergovernmental level. Before 
the EU referendum, Sir Richard Dearlove, former head of the Secret 
Intelligence Service, suggested that the cost of Brexit to the UK in 
national security terms would be low, because the practical business of 
counter-terrorism and counter-espionage is conducted principally 
through bilateral relationships.507  
                                                                                               
504  Financial Times, What Brexit means for extradition, 7 September 2018 
505  Brexit: the proposed UK-EU security treaty, oral evidence, 2 May 2018, Q62 
506  Ibid 
507  Richard Dearlove, “Brexit would not damage UK security”, Prospect Magazine, 23 
March 2016 
159 Commons Library Briefing, 10 September 2018 
Andrew Parker, Director General of MI5, seemed to support this view in 
a speech in Berlin to the German domestic intelligence agency BfV in 
May 2018. He described existing structures for bilateral and multilateral 
intelligence cooperation in Europe, before concluding: 
This highly developed national security collaboration largely takes 
place outside EU structures, and doesn’t depend on membership. 
So, at the primary level, Brexit makes no difference to the strength 
of those partnerships.508  
However, he then went on to explain how EU mechanisms contribute to 
this cooperation: 
But that is not the whole story. National level and multilateral 
security work between European nations draws strength from a 
range of important EU systems and arrangements. 
Exchanging data through EU law enforcement databases, and 
Passenger Name Records on the travel of terrorist subjects across 
Europe provides vital intelligence. Practical cooperation to 
efficiently arrest and surrender terrorists and criminals using the 
European Arrest Warrant enables the swift delivery of justice. And 
our exchanges with EUROPOL and other EU bodies, where the UK 
is a major contributor, make us all safer.509 
A similar point was made by Lord Evans in evidence to the Lords EU 
Home Affairs Sub-Committee. He said that most cooperation took place 
bilaterally or multilaterally outside EU measures, but added: 
It is important, certainly from MI5’s point of view, that you cannot 
understand the counterterrorism work of MI5 in isolation from the 
law enforcement and policing work because we have an 
extremely interrelated model between the intelligence agencies 
and the police. The dependence of the law enforcement 
community on Europol, the European Arrest Warrants, law 
enforcement cooperation and so on was therefore extremely 
important to the overall efforts that we made collectively, 
although MI5 was not itself a member of Europol because we are 
not a law enforcement agency.510  
Robert Hannigan explained that for GCHQ, relationships with European 
counterparts were extremely important, but that cooperation takes 
place largely outside EU structures 
Over the last five years there has been an extraordinary change in 
the quality and quantity of sharing with European counterparts, 
driven partly by terrorism but also by other threats, cyber in 
particular and Russia. In general, the cooperation is better than 
ever. One of the things that all the agency heads did after the 
referendum was to reassure each other that that would continue. 
The legal basis … is bilateral in most cases. It does not touch on 
EU structures. Where it is multilateral in signal intelligence and 
cyber, it is done through a series of bilateral legal frameworks that 
exist between the SIGNIT agencies of the Five Eyes and a number 
of European countries both inside and outside the EU.511   
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Government contingency planning  
HASC reported in March 2018 that the National Crime Agency was 
unwilling to give public evidence on its contingency planning and 
expressed frustration that as a result, the public debate on this aspect of 
Brexit has been lacking in detail and urgency.512 
The Committee recommended that the Government devote a 
substantial proportion of its Brexit planning fund to policing and security 
cooperation, including detailed impact assessments of losing access to 
existing measures and fully costed plans for contingency arrangements 
such as UK-based call centres for bilateral cooperation with EU 
agencies.513  
In a follow-up inquiry, the Home Secretary told HASC that the 
Government was preparing contingencies for security arrangements but 
that they would be “suboptimal” in many areas, providing the example 
of the 1957 European Convention on Extradition.  
HASC concluded that contingency planning in this area had been 
inadequate and that the Home Office’s Brexit planning budget was 
largely devoted to the UK’s future immigration system: 
It is often said that the primary purpose of any Government is to 
protect its citizens from violence and harm – yet crucial questions 
about the UK’s future security relationship with the EU remain 
unanswered, and the issue continues to be side-lined by public 
debate about customs, borders and immigration after Brexit. […] 
Without urgent action to make progress in these negotiations, 
and to put workable contingency plans in place for a ‘no deal’ 
scenario, the safety and security of UK and EU citizens will be put 
at serious and unnecessary risk.514  
Are there any potential advantages to ‘no deal’? 
The Government’s current position, as reflected in the July White Paper, 
accepts the EU’s requirement that future cooperation in this area should 
be underpinned by safeguards, including the UK’s continuing 
membership of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and 
adherence to adequate data protection standards.  
In a no-deal scenario, the UK would no longer need to adhere to these 
requirements and would therefore have greater latitude in its approach 
to balancing security against other factors. Some have advocated 
departure from the ECHR in order to pursue security objectives, 515 but 
the Government has committed to adhering to it.  
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Proponents of Brexit also suggested during the referendum campaign 
that there would be a security dividend in the UK obtaining greater 
control over its borders, and thus being able to apply more stringent 
tests to EU nationals entering the country.516 
Richard Martin made a similar point in evidence to the HL EU Home 
Affairs Sub-Committee, suggesting that post-Brexit there would be an 
opportunity to have stronger borders and to have more intervention at 
borders. However, he noted that this opportunity was dependent on 
having access to information about people attempting to enter the 
country.517 Other representatives of law enforcement, such as Rob 
Wainwright, suggested that a loss of access to databases would have a 
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15. External relations 
15.1 The EU’s international agreements 
The UK is currently party to numerous international agreements with 
third countries as an EU Member State. The EU’s Europa online treaties 
database lists 1,256 international agreements to which the EU is party.  
How many of these are pertinent to the UK is as yet unclear. But as 
most aspects of external relations are Member State or shared 
competences, there are more options available to the UK to establish 
working bilateral mechanisms for cooperation in a no-deal scenario.  
A report in the Financial Times in May 2017 suggested that there were 
759 separate EU international agreements with potential relevance to 
the UK. These included 295 agreements related to trade (discussed in 
section 6), as well as agreements on regulatory co-operation, fisheries, 
agriculture, nuclear co-operation and transport co-operation (including 
aviation agreements enabling air transport). The agreements cover 168 
countries, with multiple accords with certain countries.  
Liam Fox has indicated that such high figures are misleading, and that 
not all of the treaties would require action to maintain continuity 
following Brexit. Some of these treaties have been superseded, are 
redundant or no longer relevant to the UK, and there are also multiple 
agreements that could be understood as one agreement. It is not 
possible to identify which treaties remain in force from the FCO UK 
Treaties Online database. Dr Fox said in December 2017 that work was 
“ongoing” to “identify the full range of agreements that are affected 
by exit and to take action to ensure continuity for businesses and 
individuals on exit”. 
UK relations with most of the states that are party to the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)518 are, at least partially, mediated through 
that relationship. So ‘no deal’ would mean the UK would drop out of 
the Association Agreement with Ukraine, for example, and in addition 
to losing the EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, it 
would not be able to participate any longer in EU-led stabilisation 
initiatives there. 
The impact of ‘no deal’ on trade agreements specifically is discussed in 
section 6.3519 
FCO funding 
According to the NAO report, Implementing the UK’s exit from the 
European Union. The Foreign & Commonwealth Office, April 2018, 
“Under a ‘no deal’ outcome with the EU the FCO will request a further 
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£65 million for 2018-19” and possibly more to support some of the 
Overseas Territories. The report notes: 
Having previously reduced the number of UK diplomats across the 
EU27, the FCO now intends to increase them in order to enhance 
its ability to engage bilaterally with member states. Although the 
FCO does not have reliable data on actual numbers, it is clear that 
the number of UK diplomats reduced substantially in the decade 
up to the EU referendum. To compensate for leaving the EU 
institutions the UK is increasing staffing numbers across the FCO’s 
Europe network in the EU27 member states. In March 2018, the 
FCO announced 250 new posts in its overseas network, including 
the Europe network. 
Overseas aid spending 
The EU has been one of the UK’s largest multilateral aid partners. We 
are still waiting to find out whether any UK aid will be channelled 
through the EU after Brexit. It is reasonable to anticipate that about 
10% of the UK’s 2019/20 aid budget will potentially be available for 
reallocation after Brexit. This looks all but certain in the event of ‘no 
deal’. 
The EU has so far not commented publicly. Current proposals for future 
EU development funding emphasise converting multiple funding 
streams into a single external action instrument, rather than the kind of 
openness and flexibility towards non-member states which the UK has 
advocated. That would make it particularly difficult for the UK to 
continue funding and overseeing the European Development Fund, 
which is formally outside the framework of the EU treaties and 
therefore – in its current form – offered the possibility of continued UK 
involvement on the same basis as EU Member States. 
In recent weeks, there have also been concerns that the European 
Commission may take the view that UK-based NGOs should be 
immediately ineligible to continue to receive EU funding in the event of 
a ‘no-deal’ Brexit.  
The Government spent £884 million in aid through the EU in 2017, 
around 6% of all aid spending.520 If the UK stops contributing to the 
EU’s budget and paying into the European Development Fund, this will 
not result in it spending less money on aid (because it is legally obliged 
to continue to spend 0.7% of gross national income as aid each year); it 
will, however, mean that this aid will have to be spent differently. 
In the White Paper on the future relationship between the UK and the 
EU, the UK government proposed that the two parties make a series of 
cooperative accords, one of which would cover international 
development and international action.521 This would provide a 
framework under which the UK could continue to participate in EU 
programmes, potentially including those which spend aid money. The 
EU does already have agreements with third countries covering specific 
                                                                                               
520  DFID, Statistics on International Development: Provisional UK Aid Spend 2017, 5 
April 2018 
521  DExEU, The future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union, 12 July 2018 
 
164 What if there's no Brexit deal? 
aid programmes, implying that such collaboration is possible at some 
level. 
A more detailed explanation of the UK’s aid spending, and a discussion 
of the possible ways in which it could change after Brexit, are covered in 
a House of Lords Library briefing paper on Brexit: Overseas Development 
Assistance.  
15.2 External security 
Foreign and defence policy 
With no deal the UK would lose access to Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) decision-making mechanisms used to co-ordinate 
joint responses to foreign policy challenges across all EU Member States. 
A recent example is the EU response to the Skripal assassination 
attempt, when the EU recalled its ambassador from Moscow, and EU 
Member States, as well as NATO partners and the US, ordered the 
expulsion of Russian diplomats. There are also questions around 
intelligence sharing, if there is no legal mechanism in place to share 
classified information (as discussed in section 14 above). 
But the implications of ‘no deal’ for UK defence policy and the UK 
armed forces would be arguably relatively limited.  
Successive Governments have stated that NATO is the cornerstone of 
European defence and security, supported by a network of strong 
multilateral and bilateral alliances and partnerships of which the UK is a 
participant, including permanent membership of the UN Security 
Council. From the UK’s perspective the EU has instead been a notable 
‘soft power’ actor, focusing on crisis prevention, crisis management and 
post-conflict stabilisation. In terms of military capabilities the UK could 
also be considered a net contributor to the EU.522  
Were the UK to leave with EU with ‘no deal’, the most immediate 
implication would be that that UK would no longer be able to 
participate in CSDP missions, the EU battlegroups or in organisations 
such as the European Defence Agency (EDA). All military personnel 
deployed on EU-led operations, such as Operation Althea in Bosnia, 
would have to return to the UK, along with all UK military staff 
seconded to the EU.523  Yet, the UK’s ability to project military power 
would arguably remain largely unaffected at this time. ‘Hard’ power 
would continue to be the purview of NATO or ‘coalitions of the willing’; 
                                                                                               
522  The UK is one of the largest and most advanced military powers in the EU in terms 
of manpower, assets, capabilities and defence spending. It currently provides 20% 
of the EU’s force catalogue, including strategic enablers such as airlift, refuelling and 
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance.  It is also one of only five EU countries 
capable of deploying an operational HQ and therefore taking command of a 
mission. At present the UK provides the operational HQ of the CSDP mission 
Operation Atalanta. On the other hand, the UK contributes only 3-5% of CSDP 
spending (it varies a little depending on whether military only or civilian and military 
together are taken into account. 
523  It would also no longer be able to provide the operational headquarters of 
Operation Atalanta, although this would also be the case under any withdrawal 
agreement.  
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while any shortfalls in soft power projection could be compensated for 
through other multilateral or bilateral frameworks.  
In terms of capability development, the UK would no longer be able to 
participate in the European Defence Agency, or any projects currently 
underway under the remit of the European Defence Research 
Programme (which is part of the European Defence Fund).524 Even 
during the proposed transitional period, the UK could already be 
excluded from certain EU-funded research & development projects 
related to defence because of their ’sensitive’ nature. 
In the longer term, however, and regardless of a ‘no deal’ scenario, the 
UK could seek to re-negotiate its participation in EU military operations 
via a third party framework agreement, in much the same way that the 
United States, Canada and Norway have.525 The same is true of the 
European Defence Agency,526 and the European Defence Fund, 
although under current assumptions third country access to the 
European Defence Fund will be tightly controlled and therefore the 
impact on the UK will be the same whether it leaves the EU with an 
agreement or not.  
Indeed, in the event of a ‘no deal’, and were the UK to pursue third 
country agreements in the longer term, then the majority of the 
negotiations and debate would centre around exactly the same 
discussions which are happening now with respect to Brexit. Yet, the 
political will of the EU27 to positively engage with the UK in such 
negotiations following a ‘no deal’ scenario is debatable. As a result the 
process could be lengthy, and the terms of engagement could be less 
favourable.  
There is a school of thought which would argue that, in defence terms 
at least, the EU needs the UK. And given recent shifts in the 
international security environment, the increasing belligerence of Russia 
and a US President who appears to have very little time for European 
security or the US’ European allies, engaging the UK as a third country 
participant in CSDP regardless of a no deal scenario may not be so 
unappealing. There is another view that it could be helpful for the UK to 
                                                                                               
524  The UK is currently part of the Pythia project and Ocean 2020 project. The 
‘capability’ strand of the EDF (the European Defence Industrial Development 
Programme) is currently being established, with a view to the first projects being 
financed from 2019. Third party arrangements allowing access to the fund are 
currently being negotiated and would be relevant to Brexit regardless. The UK is also 
not currently part of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Details on all of 
these initiatives is available in Library Briefing Paper CBP 8216, European defence: 
where is it heading? 
525  As a result, Canada and Norway have both contributed forces to Operation Althea in 
Bosnia, Canada has provided personnel for EU police Missions in Bosnia and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, while Norway has contributed assets to Operation 
Atalanta (EUNAVFOR) and has provided forces to the EU Nordic Battlegroup. 
526  In 2006 Norway, for example, signed an administrative agreement with the EDA 
which allows it to participate in the Agency’s research and technology projects. 
Switzerland also has a similar cooperation agreement. Under current Brexit 
discussions the UK will still have to conclude an Administrative Agreement with the 
EDA to continue participating in specific EDA capability projects.   
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be leaving, after years of blocking developments such as an Operational 
Headquarters.527 
But there are also non-EU initiatives afoot, such as French President 
Macron’s European Intervention Force proposal, in which the UK could 
take part whether or not there’s a Withdrawal Agreement, if there is 
sufficient political will.528 
Sanctions 
A no-deal Brexit seems not to have been discussed during debates on 
the Sanctions and Anti-Money laundering Bill.  The UK Government 
currently imposes sanctions and updates the anti-money laundering 
(AML) regime using powers in the European Communities Act 1972. 
Those powers will disappear with the repeal of the 1972 Act on exit day 
and the commencement of provisions under the Sanctions and Anti-
Money Laundering Act , which gives the UK Government new powers 
not dependent on EU membership.  
If the UK agreed to continue implementing EU AML and sanctions law 
during a transitional period after Brexit’s official date, it would delay the 
inception of an independent UK policy in these areas.  
A no-deal Brexit would give the UK Government the immediate 
freedom to implement regulations that differ from the EU’s.  Sanctions 
and AML regimes are usually coordinated internationally (depending on 
the regime), for example at G7 meetings, by UN resolution, or following 
decisions by the international Financial Action Task Force, so the 
freedom to impose unilateral UK rules is unlikely to be exercised.  The 
Government has in any case repeatedly insisted - including during the 
debate following the statement on 5 September on the Salisbury Skripal 
investigation - that it intends to keep aligning its sanctions policy with 









                                                                                               
527  A decision to establish an EU Military Planning and Conduct Capabilities (MPCC) unit 
to run “non-executive” training missions in parts of Africa was adopted in June 
2017, having been blocked by the UK Government, which objected to the use of the 
term ‘operation headquarters’. 
528  See Guardian, Nine EU states sign off on joint military intervention force, 25 June 
2018. 
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Appendix 
No deal contingency planning in the EU27 
Austria 
The Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz would prefer to extend 
negotiations rather than surrender to a hard Brexit if a deal on the Irish 
border is not agreed.529 According to Bloomberg (19 July), Austria does 
not anticipate customs problems “because the current WTO regime 
could handle shipments to and from the U.K”. It is also “confident the 
country’s banking industry is prepared for all scenarios”. 
Belgium 
The Belgian Government is reported to be hiring more agents for the 
port of Antwerp and looking into “the need for scanners, sniffer dogs, 
weapons and drones to beef up post-Brexit customs surveillance” to 
monitor its coastline and the North Sea.530  
 
Bulgaria 
Bloomberg reports that Bulgaria is preparing for the risks of three 
possible Brexit scenarios: a comprehensive agreement, a partial 
agreement, and no deal. In September or October the Government “will 
develop a detailed action plan for the three scenarios”. 
 
Denmark 
The Danish Government says it has been preparing for no deal 
throughout the Brexit process (although it expects a deal to be reached) 
and has instructed all ministries to prepare for no deal.531  
 
Finland 
The Finnish Government has instructed ministries to prepare for any 
outcome in the Brexit negotiations. It is concerned mainly about the 




France is reported to have been preparing for Brexit “for almost two 
years in sectors spanning from fisheries and borders to financial 
services”.533 
                                                                                               
529  See Politico, 6 July 2018 
530  New York Times, 19 July 2018; The Express, Brexit no deal MAPPED: How EU 
countries are secretly preparing for no deal UK exit from EU, 20 July 2018 
531  Ibid 
532  Bloomberg, ibid 
533  The Express, Brexit no deal MAPPED: How EU countries are secretly preparing for no 
deal UK exit from EU, 20 July 2018 
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Prime Minister Édouard Philippe said 27 August that France would be 
ready in the event of a ‘cliff edge’ exit. He has “tasked ministers to 
prepare contingency measures that would be necessary... to mitigate 
the difficulties linked with this unprecedented challenge”.534 France is 
preparing measures on the status of UK citizens living in France and 
ensure smooth border controls. “The approximately 150,000 British 
citizens living in France are being actively encouraged by Macron’s 
government to apply for a ‘carte de séjour’ residency permit to avoid 
administrative chaos post-Brexit”.535 Reports maintain that if there is no 
deal, Mr Philippe wants plans in place to “facilitate the residency of 
British nationals already living in France” and to ensure “the greatest 
possible fluidity of border controls”.536 The Government will shortly 
present a bill to the French Parliament. 
According to The Guardian, Xavier Bertrand, a former French minister 
and president of Hauts-de-France, has said that “Calais was prepared to 
solve the problem of space for checks in Dover”. The port had acquired 
17 hectares (42 acres) of land, which could be used for customs 
inspection posts and storage. France is also reported to be planning to 
recruit 700 new customs officials, some of whom will be based in 
Calais. The port also wants to test a new “Fastpass” virtual queuing 
system, whereby preloading passport and cargo information would 
increase the speed of border inspections.537 
Germany 
German companies were reported in 2017 to be preparing for a range 
of outcomes to the Brexit negotiations, including a no deal scenario. 
The Federation of German Industries (BDI) chair, Joachim Lang, said in 
October 2017 that “German companies with a presence in the UK 
should be planning for a ‘very hard Brexit’”.538 
Contingency plans were staved off at the end of 2017 with the Joint 
Report on agreement in phase 1, but there are indications that they are 
once again on the table. The German Government has told drug 
manufacturers to examine their supply chains for any exposure that 
might cause medicines shortages in the event of a no-deal Brexit. The 
Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices (BfArM) asked drug 
manufacturers (such as Bayer, Merck KGaA and Boehringer Ingelheim 
and foreign suppliers such as Teva and Roche) to collect data on the 
impact of a worst-case scenario.  
Greece 
Georgios Katrougalos, Greece’s alternate foreign minister, has said the 
government is studying the “improbable” scenario of no deal and is 
                                                                                               
534  France24, France and Germany are making contingency plans for a no-deal Brexit, 
with Paris looking at residency issues and Berlin examining medical supply chains 
with the UK, 29 August 2018 
535  Ibid 
536  The Local Fr, No-deal Brexit: French government makes contingency plans for Brits 
living in France, 28 August 2018 
537  ‘Dover-Calais 'facing economic catastrophe' due to Brexit’, Guardian, 17 July 2018 
538  BBC News, Plan for a very hard Brexit, German firms told, 5 October 2017 
 
169 Commons Library Briefing, 10 September 2018 




The Irish Government’s 2018 National Risk Assessment – Overview of 
Strategic Risks analysed a range of Brexit-related risks for Ireland and 
concluded: 
While the Irish Government will continue to do all in its power on 
both a domestic and European front to work for a Brexit 
agreement in line with Irish interests, the risks to our interests, our 
trade, our economy at both the macro and micro level8 , and our 
relationship with Northern Ireland, and the UK which could 
emerge from potential Brexits are manifold and significant, and it 
is likely that Brexit will remain one of the most significant risks 
facing this country over the coming years. 
Leo Varadkar, the Irish Taoiseach, has said his Government is making 
contingency plans for a no-deal Brexit, including extra customs officers 
and veterinary inspectors to deal with changes in trade rules.540 
Ireland has also been considering whether to relocate part of the 
emergency oil stocks that it stores at UK refineries back to Ireland or to 
other EU countries.541  
Foreign Affairs Minister Simon Coveney presented Brexit contingency 
plans to the Cabinet on 18 July.542 Speaking after the Cabinet meeting, 
the Taoiseach said: 
The key decisions are particularly focused on areas where the 
Government has direct responsibility and on measures that need 
to be taken on an East-West basis, such as customs and veterinary 
controls at ports and airports. The Government also reiterated its 
position today that it would not countenance a return of a border 
on the island under any circumstances, including in the event of a 
hard Brexit.543 
Simon Coveney said a “huge amount of work has been underway 
across Government and its agencies for many months”, and that the 
Government would also be carrying out preparations “on an EU-wide 
basis, in cooperation with our EU partners”.544 
 
Italy 
                                                                                               
539  Bloomberg, How Europe Is Bracing for Messy Brexit: Dogs, Drones, Do Nothing, 19 
July 2018 
540  See The Telegraph, Brussels warns EU countries: get ready for a no-deal Brexit, 19 
July 2018 
541  Sunday Independent, Ireland set to remove oil reserves from Britain as Brexit 
deadline looms closer, 15 July 2018, and Cabinet to move Irish oil reserve from UK, 
15 July 2018 
542  See RTÉ, 1,000 new customs and veterinary inspectors to be hired, 20 July 2018 
543  Merrion Street, Irish Government News Service, Cabinet Agrees Brexit Preparedness 
Measures, 18 July 2018 
544  Ibid 
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According to reports Italy’s new populist, eurosceptic government does 




The Dutch government is reported to be preparing a ‘playbook’ to be 
ready for a no-deal scenario and is employing extra officials, mostly in 
the port of Rotterdam, “to prepare for the extra bureaucracy required 
for British goods to go through customs before entering the EU after 
Brexit”. 546 According to the New York Times (19 July), “[t]he Dutch 
government is hiring nearly 1,000 customs officials”. The Government is 
also recruiting up to 90 veterinarians for animal and food inspections 
and warehouses for inspection are being considered.547 
Its web-based 'Brexit impact scanner' can be used by SMEs to assess 
their exposure to potential problems related to Brexit, and it offers 
€2,500 ’vouchers’ for small companies to obtain independent advice 
about the Brexit implications for their business. 
The UK being the Netherlands’ third largest trading partner, the Dutch 
customs authorities are expecting an increase of the number of customs 
operations by a third and are expanding the staff capacity by 20%.548 
MLex reported on 4 September on research for the Dutch Government 
by Kantar Public that concluded that around 18% of Dutch companies 
doing business with the UK are “actively preparing for Brexit”, up from 
10% in 2017. The study was carried out in the period 28 June – 3 July 
among 245 companies doing business with the UK. 
 
Poland 
Several ministries are reported to be analysing the potential impact of 
no deal. “The government is determining how many additional customs 




According to the Bloomberg report, Portugal is not expecting major 
changes or increases in staff at the ports of Sines and Lisbon from any 
kind of Brexit. “Almost three-quarters of goods trading at the port of 
Sines -- the nation’s largest -- is with countries outside the EU, so it’s 
already well equipped to deal with shipments to and from non-EU 
nations”. 
 
                                                                                               
545  Bloomberg, ibid; Express, Brexit no deal MAPPED: How EU countries are secretly 
preparing for no deal UK exit from EU, 20 July 2018 
546  Reuters, Dutch cabinet drafting 'playbook' for chaotic Brexit: parliament, 9 July 2018 
547   New York Times, 19 July 2018 
548  ‘Nederlandse Douane nog niet klaar voor Brexit, honderden extra mensen nodig: 
'Het effect is echt groot', (The Netherlands Customs administration not yet ready for 
Brexit, need more people: ‘The effects are major’),  , De Volkskrant, 16 February 
2018 
549  Ibid 
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Spain 
An Elcano policy paper in May 2018 stated that in preparation for a 
possible no deal: 
… it is important for Spanish companies to design contingency 
plans for coping with a reduction in business, whether in terms of 
preparing for changes in the regulatory framework or seeking 
alternative customers and suppliers in other markets, both within 
and beyond the EU.550 
It also noted the possible effects on the Spanish tourism industry 
(“Spain receives millions of British tourists every year, accounting for 
almost a quarter of visitors to the country”): 
it is important that the Spanish tourism industry prepares for a 
possible reduction in British visits and draws up contingency plans 
both with the Spanish authorities and with British tour operators, 
who are equally dependent on tourism to Spain. 
The Spanish Government is looking at different potential outcomes to 
the negotiations, including the cliff-edge scenario. Its analysis includes 
input from companies and business groups, and since last year, Spain 
“has been working on a plan to shield its tourism industry from any 
disruption to air travel”.551 
 
Sweden 
Sweden has established a “preparedness group” to look into the 





                                                                                               
550  Spain and the prospect of Brexit, Salvador Llaudes, Ignacio Molina, Miguel Otero 
Iglesias & Federico Steinberg, May 2018 
551  Bloomberg, 19 July 2018 
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